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BENEFITS FROM PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: FORTY
INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES

Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis

Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement:
Individual Case Studies

Forty

Robert Lande and Joshua Davis1
This Paper presents information about forty of the
largest recent successful private antitrust cases.

To do

this, the paper gathers information about each case,
including, inter alia, (1) the amount of money each action
recovered for the victims of each alleged antitrust violation,
(2) what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign
entities, (3) whether government action preceded the private
litigation, (4) the attorney’s fees awarded to plaintiffs’
counsel, (5) on whose behalf money was recovered (direct
purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and (6) the
kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se,
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the American Antitrust Institute. They are grateful to the
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or a combination of the two). A separate Study, forthcoming in
the U.S.F. Law Review, aggregates and analyzes this
information.

That Study also compares the total monetary

amounts paid in all forty cases, as well as from the subset of
the forty cases that also resulted in criminal penalties, to
the total criminal antitrust fines imposed during the same
period by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and
also to the deterrence effects of the prison sentences that
resulted from DOJ prosecutions during this period.

The

overall goal of the project is to take a first step toward
providing an empirical basis for assessing whether private
enforcement of the antitrust laws serves its intended purposes
and is in the public interest.
The results of the Study show that private antitrust
enforcement helps the economy in many ways.

It very

significantly compensates victims of illegal corporate
behavior, and is almost always the only way they can receive
redress. Private enforcement often prevents foreign
corporations from keeping the many billions of dollars they
illegally obtain from individual and corporate purchasers in
the United States. The Study also shows that almost half of
the underlying violations were first uncovered by private
attorneys, not government enforcers, and that litigation in
many other cases had a mixed public/private origin. The

2

evidence also shows that private litigation probably does more
to deter antitrust violations than all the fines and
incarceration imposed as a result of criminal enforcement by
the U.S. Department of Justice.

This is one of the most

surprising results from our Study.

We do not know of any past

study that has documented that private enforcement has such a
significant deterrence effect as compared to DOJ criminal
enforcement.

3

Cases Studied:
1. In Re Airline Ticket Commission Litigation, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20361; 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P71, 552
2. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327(2d Cir.
2002) and Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 F.3d 384
(2d Cir. 2002).
3. Augmentin. Ryan-House et al v. GlaxoSmithKline plc, C.A.
Doc. No. 2:02cv442 (E.D.Va. 2004); SAJ Distributors, Inc. and
Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp,
Doc. No. 2:04cv23
4. In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation,
177 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2001).
5. In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) MDL Doc. No. 1413, and In re Buspirone Patent
Litigation, 185 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Final
Settlement approval at( 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25638, April 17,
2003). (Buspar)
6. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 2:96CV645B, 72
F.Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999).
7. In re: Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No.
1278; 105 F. Supp 2d 682 (E. Dist. Mich. 2000); 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2003).
8. In re: Citric Acid Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No.
1092; 996 F. Supp. 951 (N. Dist. Cal. 1998).
9. In re Commercial Explosives Litigation, 945 F. Supp. 1489
(D. Utah 1996).
10. Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th
Cir. 2002).
11. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litigation, Master File No. M-02-1486PJH, MDL No. 1486.
12. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV. Sweetie’s,
v. El Paso Corporation, No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct.);
Continental Forge Company v. Southern California Gas Co., No.
BC237336 (L.A. Super. Ct.); Berg v. Southern California Gas
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Co., No. BC241951 (L.A. Super. Ct.); City of Long Beach v.
Southern California Gas Co., No. BC247114 (L.A. Super. Ct.);
City of L.A. v. Southern California Gas Col, No. BC265905
(L.A. Super. Ct.); Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No.
GIC 759425 (San Diego Super. Ct.); and Phillip v. El Paso
Merchant Energy LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego Super. Ct.). (El
Paso)
13. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, MDL 1200, Master
Docket Misc. 97-0550 (W.D. Pa.)
14. In Re: Fructose Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. File 1087,
Master File # 94-1577 (Michael Mihm) (C.D.Ill. 1995)
15. IN RE: Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, 2003 WL
22358491 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
16.

IBM v. Microsoft (complaint apparently not filed)

17. In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464
(N.D. CA 19989); reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991);
affirmed sub nom Hartford Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993).
18. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2000 WL
1475559, at *1–3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.4, 2000) (“Linerboard I” ); In
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 201–04
(E.D.Pa.2001) (“Linerboard II” ); In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 147–49 (3d Cir.2002) (“Linerboard III”);
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F.Supp 2d 619 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
19. In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, MDL No.
1083, 918 F. Supp. 1190.
20. In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No 1402
21. In Re: NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L.
No, 1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
22. Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 902 F.Supp.
1394 (D.Kan. 1995); affirmed, 134 F. 3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998);
reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
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23. Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Per Local Civil
Rule 40.5, Related to Civil Action Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233
(D.D.C. 2002)(a/k/a AOL v. Microsoft).
24. North Shore Hematology & Oncology Associates v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., Civil Action No.:04 cv248(EGS) (2004)
(Platinol)
25. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation (No. II), 186 F.R.D.
403 (S .D. Tex. 1999), 142 Oil & Gas Rep. 532 (1999)
26. Oncology & Radiation Associates v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb
Co., Case No. 1:04CV00248 (D.D.C.) (Taxol).
27. Stop N Shop Supermarket Company, et. al.v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp. Civil Action No. 03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. 2005),
and; Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 00-CV-6222 (E.D.
Pa.2005) (Paxil)
28. In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
29. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No.
JFM-04-968, MDL Docket No. 1332 (D. Md.) (2005 settlement)
30. Red Eagle Resources, et al. v. Baker Hughes Inc., et al.,
No. 4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 1991)(In re Drill
Bits Antitrust Litigation)
31. In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. 0112239-WGY; 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2004); 231 F.R.D. 52
(D. Mass. 2005).
32. In re: Remeron Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis
27013 (D.N.J. 2005).
33. In Re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 350 F.Supp.2d
1366, 2005-1 Trade Cases P 74,804 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. Dec. 21,
2004((No. MDL 1648).
34. In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Not
Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2002 WL 31655191 (N.D. Cal.)
35. Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir.
2003).
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36. In Re: Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation Case
No. 99-MDL-1317-Seitz/Klein, a/k/a Louisiana Wholesale Drug
Co., Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, et al. S.D. Fla Case no. 983125 and Valley Drug Co. v. Abbot Laboratories, et al. S.D.
Fla. Case No. 99-7143.
37. Transamerican Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp., et al., No.
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 1988)(Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust Litigation)(1992 settlement)
38. In re: Urethane Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1616, 232
F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan. 2005).
39. In Re: Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, a/k/a
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. and
MasterCard International Inc., 396 F. 3d 96, 114 (2d Cir.
2005).
40. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation (many related cases)
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1. In Re Airline Ticket Commission Litigation,1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20361; 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P71, 552

This case is notable because: 1: This parties settled
this case for $86.1 million; 2: The Court ordered the
Defendants to pay 75% of the Plaintiffs’ discovery costs,
related to the Defendants’ “passing on” defense;

3:

The

Court awarded plaintiffs’ counsel one-third of the settlement
due to their skill and effort.
The American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) sued seven
major airlines, including TWA, Continental, USAir, American
Airlines, Delta, Northwest, and United Airlines; for
violations of Section I and II of the Sherman Act.2
According ASTA, the anticompetitive conduct occurred when
the airlines imposed an industry-wide cap on the commissions
they paid to travel agents.3

At the time of the suit, the

defendants comprised about 85% of domestic flights in the
United States.4

2

Price Fixing: Cy Pres Distribution Must Be More Closely
Related to Airline Commission Cap Litigation Antitrust Trade &
Regulation Daily (October 22, 2001).
3

The airlines were charged with “conspiring to reduce
commissions on ticket sales by travel agents from 10% to a
maximum of $50 for round-trip domestic flights and $25 for a
one-way ticket”. Preliminary Okay Is Given to $86 Million
Settlement Of Litigation By Travel Agents
BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (September 24, 1996).
4
In Re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litigation, 898
F.Supp. 685, 687 (D.Minn. 1995).
8

Prior to the caps, airlines paid travel agents a
commission based on the ticket price.5
announce a cap on the commissions.6

Delta was first to

Following this

announcement, the other six major airlines implemented caps in
less than a week.7

The plaintiffs argued that it didn’t make

economic sense for the airlines to all impose commission
caps.8

When the parties settled, the airlines agreed to pay

ASTA for the anticompetitive conduct that occurred from
February 1995 to September 1995.9
This case first made news when Judge Rosenbaum ruled on
the defendants’ request to take discovery pertaining to the
“passing on defense” that was denied in Hanover Shoe.10

The

defendants sought discovery regarding damages, or the lack

5

The travel agents claimed that, since 1960, the airlines
paid 10% of the ticket price. In Re Travel Agency Commission
Antitrust Litigation, 898 F.Supp. 685, 687 (D.Minn. 1995).
6

Id. at 687.

7

Id. at 687.

8

“(Plaintiffs) assert that, in an open and competitive
environment, an airline which declined to cut commissions
would benefit because travel agents would favor higher paying
airlines”. Id. at 688.
9

Monetary Settlement Of Airline Ticket Commission Gets Final
Okay, BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (Feb. 10, 1997).
10
Airlines May Engage In Some Discovery To Support
Impermissible Pass-On Defense, BNA Antitrust & Trade
Regulation Daily (April 3, 1996).

9

thereof, suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the caps.11
The defendants reasoned that travel agents were not harmed by
the caps because they could still make money from booking nonflight travel, such as cruises.12

Although Judge Rosenbaum

reluctantly granted the defendants’ request, he noted that the
defendants’ contentions were “unusual” and “most
conjectural”.13

Due to the questionable nature of the

discovery, the defendants were ordered to pay 75% of the
plaintiffs’ costs in producing the discovery.14

Furthermore,

the judge warned the defendants that “if the proffered
discovery is rejected both at trial and appeal, the Court may
also consider assessing defendants with the remaining 25% of
the plaintiffs’ survey cost”.15

11

Id.

12

In Re Airline Commission Antitrust Litigation, 918 F.Supp.
283, 287 (D. Minn. 1996).
13

Airlines May Engage In Some Discovery To Support
Impermissible Pass-On Defense, BNA Antitrust & Trade
Regulation Daily (April 3, 1996).
14

Id.

15

Id.

10

The settlement totaled $86.1 million dollars.16

Only an

approximate 0.5% of the class objected to the settlement.17
The Court awarded plaintiffs’ counsel the full amount they
asked for, one-third of the settlement.18

The Court noted that

plaintiffs’ counsel “reasonably assessed the value of the
case”…in order to reach a settlement that is “cost-effective,
simple, and fundamentally fair” to members of the class.19
Noting the absence of a “smoking gun”, and the existence
of an “oligoplistic market” where “rapid price coalescence is
the norm”, plaintiffs’ counsel “personally financed the case,
incurring expenses exceeding $3 million with no guarantee of
an ultimate recovery”.20
In addition to the resources invested in the case, the
Court also highlighted the fact that plaintiffs’ counsel

16

TWA was the first defendant to settle. Continental settled
for $4.25 million, and USAir paid $9.81 million. The
remaining four airlines settled with the class on the day
trial was to begin, in which American Airlines paid $21.32
million, Delta paid $20.3 million, Northwest paid $10.87
million, and United Airlines paid $19.51 million. Monetary
Settlement of Airline Ticket Commission Litigation Gets Final
Okay, BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (February 10,
1997).
17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

11

“underwent difficult and protracted settlement negotiations
while simultaneously preparing for trial.

This work required

time, expense, and great skill, all to the class’s benefit”.21
After the settlement funds were distributed to travel
agents, about $600,000.00 remained unclaimed.22

The plaintiffs

proposed that the funds should be distributed to travel agents
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, because they were
harmed by the same anticompetitive conduct.23

Instead, the

Court awarded the funds to several law schools and charities
in Minnesota, where the litigation was filed.24

After an

appeal, the Court awarded the funds to the travel agents,
stating that these agents were “clearly the next best
recipients of the funds”.25

21

Id.

22

Cy Pres Award of Settlement Must Be Tailored To Goals Of
Underlying Suit, United States Law Week (October 15, 2002).
http://pub.bna.com/lw/021639.pdf
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.
12

In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327(2d Cir.
2002) and Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 F.3d 384
(2d Cir. 2002).
These cases are outstanding examples of the successful
outcome of a private antitrust class action for many reasons:
1. The aggregate amount of the combined recoveries in the
cases includes $412 million in cash and $100 million in
discount certificates (in the class action involving domestic
auctions), and $40 million in cash (in the class action
involving foreign auctions), for a total recovery of $552
million.

2. The vast majority of the settlement was obtained

by U.S. businesses and consumers from the foreign defendants.
3. The domestic portion of the settlement was found by the
court to represent "perhaps 1.8 times to 4.0 times the
damages" suffered by the domestic class.26 4. Counsel in the
domestic case received legal fees that were approximately 80%

26

The foreign portion of the settlement represented a much
smaller proportion of potential damages, but was substantially
discounted for risks stemming from legal weaknesses in the
claims, including the basic legal weakness subsequently
demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision two years later,
in Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 542 U.S. 155
(2004), under which the foreign class would have had no viable
claims under United States law.
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cash and 20% discount coupons, the same ratio as the overall
cash/coupon ratio in the settlement.

5.

The legal fees

represented only 5.2% of the total settlement. 6.

If the

coupons are not used after 5 years, they can be redeemed for
their face value in cash.

In the late 1990s, the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
initiated an investigation into the possibility that parallel
increases in the amounts of commissions charged by Christie's
and Sotheby's to both buyers and sellers may have been the
result of a conspiracy.

That investigation seemed to stall

until, in late 1999, counsel for Christie's came into the
possession of handwritten notes made by CEO Christopher
Davidge of Christie's, which clearly reflected conspiratorial
communications between the defendants.

In January 2000,

Christie's sought and obtained amnesty from DOJ.

In the

ensuing weeks, many class actions were commenced on behalf of
buyers and sellers at domestic auctions under United States
antitrust law.

Those class actions were consolidated in the

Southern District of New York before Judge Lewis A. Kaplan.
In view of the clear evidence of conspiracy and Christie's
amnesty commitments, Judge Kaplan took the unusual step of
holding an auction for the position of lead counsel. The
winning bid in that auction was submitted by David Boies, who

14

agreed to undertake representation of the class on the unusual
and risky basis that his firm would receive 25 percent of any
recovery in the case in excess of $405 million.

However,

Boies elected not to include claims based on foreign auctions
among the class claims, believing that such claims were not
viable under United States law.

In October 2000, after only

approximately four months of further litigation, a settlement
of the domestic class action for the amount of $412 million in
cash and $100 million in discount certificates was first
documented and proposed to the District Court.
In the interim, the separate Kruman class action had
been commenced by other class counsel on behalf of the
purchasers and sellers at foreign auctions who had been
excluded from the class in the action led by Boies. Initially,
it was proposed to the court in the domestic class action that
to the extent such foreign auction claims were held by persons
who were also domestic class members, they would be released
as part of the domestic settlement.

The effect of such a

release would have been significantly to undercut the separate
class action on behalf of customers at foreign auctions, since
many if not most auction customers buy or sell at auctions
both inside and outside the United States.

However, the

District Court invalidated that aspect of the proposed
releases in a series of rulings in early 2001, finding that in

15

proposing to release the claims based on foreign auctions for
no additional consideration, Boies had had a "structural
conflict of interest."

27

Those rulings by the District Court

invalidating the proposed release of foreign claims were later
affirmed by the Second Circuit in 2002.

However, in response

to the District Court's initial invalidation of the releases,
the parties had modified their settlement to provide that in
the event the Second Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the
releases, the settlement would continue to be final and
effective.

Thus, the invalidation of the initially proposed

releases of claims arising from foreign auctions ultimately
did not derail the domestic settlement.
Thereafter, in 2003, the class of buyers and sellers
at foreign auctions also was able to negotiate its separate
settlement in the amount of an additional $40 million in cash,
in the wake of their success, in Kruman v. Christie's
International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), in
establishing the legal viability of the class claims arising
from foreign auctions.

By the time of that 2003 settlement,

testimony and evidence emerging in the criminal trial of
Alfred Taubman of Sotheby's during 2003 (the government’s
criminal case resulted in a $45 million fine and jail for at
27

Error! Main Document Only.In re Auction House Antitrust
Litigation, 42 Fed. Appx. 511, 516 (2002).

16

least one defendant)28 had cast substantial doubt on the
existence of any conspiracy between the defendants with regard
to buyer's premiums charged by the defendants, as
distinguished from seller's commissions.

In addition, looming

over the case was the strong possibility that the Supreme
Court might take certiorari and reverse the Second Circuit's
decision upholding rights of customers at foreign auctions to
bring claims arising from the foreign auctions under United
States antitrust law.

Those two risks were the primary reason

why less consideration was obtained for the class of foreign
auction customers.

Indeed, after the $40 million foreign

auction settlement had been reached and approved by the court,
the Supreme Court did take certiorari and reverse a D.C.
Circuit ruling that had followed the decision in Kruman, in
Empagran.

Thus, the $40 million foreign auction settlement

may be the only substantial settlement of its kind that ever
will occur, based on United States antitrust law claims
arising entirely from foreign transactions.
The coupons in the domestic case might have been the best
coupons ever issued in an antitrust case.

Valued at $100

million by the Court, they had a face value of $125 million
28

Scott D. Hammond, An Overview of Recent Developments In The
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, Address
Before the American Bar Association (Jan. 10, 2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.pdf, Pg.
11.
17

when issued.29
do trade.

They were and are fully transferable, and they

All unused coupons can be redeemed for face value

after 5 years (in May 2007).

Counsel took approximately 20%

of their fees in these coupons.

29

Id. at 520.
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Augmentin. Ryan-House et al v. GlaxoSmithKline plc, C.A. Doc.
No. 2:02cv442 (E.D.Va. 2004); SAJ Distributors, Inc. and
Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp,
Doc. No. 2:04cv23
This case is notable because (1) it produced substantial
recoveries for both direct and indirect purchasers; of $62.5
million and $29 million respectively, all from a foreign
corporation; (2) this case only involved Section 2 of the
Sherman Act; (3) Class counsel asked for and was awarded 20%
of the recovery in the direct action, and 25% in the indirect
action; (4) there was no prior federal prosecution of the
antitrust violations at issue;30 and (5) there were later state
actions with participation from the US Department of Justice.
GSK allegedly using invalid patents to prevent entry of
generic products.

As stated in GSK’s 2004 Annual Report:31

In 2002, the US District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia found various patents covering
Augmentin invalid. That holding was subsequently
affirmed by the [Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit]. Following the adverse trial court decision,
purported anti-trust class actions were filed on behalf
30

SAJ Distributors, Inc. and Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings,
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, Doc. No. 2:04cv23, Memorandum
in Support of Class Counsel’s Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, page 4 (E.D. Va., 2004),
[hereinafter “Fee Memo”]. (“There was no prior investigation
from the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission
complaint against GSK.”)
31

GSK Form 20-F 03-2004, Annual report pursuant to Section 13
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2004; Commission file number 1-15170,
page 121 [hereinafter “20-F, 2004”].
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of classes of direct and indirect purchasers that were
ultimately consolidated in the US District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. Plaintiffs alleged that
the Group knowingly obtained invalid patents and engaged
in other anticompetitive conduct to prevent entry of
generic products in violation of the monopolization
section of the US anti-trust laws. The court has
approved the Group’s settlement of those class action
claims.
Plaintiffs were a class of “All persons or entities in
the United States that purchased Augmentin directly from GSK
at any time from January 1, 2000 through April 30, 2004
(hereinafter the “Class Period”), except for governmental
entities, GSK, its officers, directors, and subsidiaries,
which are expressly excluded.”32

The Class Counsel for the

Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (“Class Counsel”) alleged a
section 2 monopolization claim33 involving IP and patent law as
well as the Hatch-Waxman Act.34
The Class Counsel were able to negotiate a settlement
with the defendants during the discovery and pre-trial phase
of the case.

Many of the vital facts of this case were the

subject of motions for summary judgment in related cases.35

32

Final Order at 2.

33

Fee Memo at 4.

34

Id. at 22.

35

See Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349
F.3d 1373 (2003); Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 213 F. Supp.2d 597 (2002) Geneva
20

Class counsel retained patent and economic experts to analyze
liability and damages.36

This settlement was obtained despite

the fact that, as the Court described, “GSK had significant
defenses which the Class would need to overcome if the case
went to trial.”37
In September 2004 the Class Counsel filed a Motion for
Award of Attorney Fees which described the risks they
encountered in litigating this case, the difficulty of the
case, and the extraordinary amount they were able to negotiate
for.

Class Counsel explained that this was a section 2

monopolization claim, which is more difficult to litigate than
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.38

Next, Class Counsel

explained that this was not a follow-on case; there was no
prior federal antitrust action, no DOJ investigation, no FTC
complaint.39

There were, however, other similar cases filed

against GSK.40

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 189 F.Supp.2d
377 (2002).
36

Final Order at 4.

37

Id.

38

Fee Memo at 3.

39

Id. at 4.

40

See 20F, 2004.

21

In the preceding cases finding certain Augmentin patents
invalid, there was no court finding of fraud, which would
require that Class Counsel prove fraud themselves as an
element of their case.41

Class Counsel pointed out that

damages would be difficult to prove because there could be
factors other than anticompetitive behavior causing a delay in
generic products reaching the market.42

Another risk was

unfavorable law in the 11th Circuit, where a similar class had
been decertified.43 In light of these factors Class Counsel
asked the Court to award a fee percentage of the settlement
fund, rather than use the “lodestar” method of calculating
fees.
The Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs, SAJ Distributors
and Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, Inc (“Plaintiffs”) as well
as approximately 70 class members44 reached a Settlement
Agreement with foreign company GlaxoSmithKline plc and
SmithKline Beecham Corp (“GSK”) and in July 2004, GSK
deposited $62.5 million into a Direct Purchaser Settlement

41

Fee Memo at 4.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 4-5.

44

Fee Memo at 22.
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Fund Account.45

The Court found this amount “fair and

reasonable and fully justified,”46 saying that class counsel
for the plaintiffs (“Class Counsel”) vigorously and
effectively pursued class members’ claims.47

There was also an

indirect purchaser class action on behalf of insurers and
consumers.48

There, Counsel were awarded 25% of a $29 million

recovery.49

45

SAJ Distributors, Inc. and Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings,
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, Doc. No. 2:04cv23, Final
Settlement Approval Order, page 6, (E.D. Va., 2004),
[hereinafter “Final Order”].
46

Id. at 10.

47

Id. at 9.

48

See In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litigation, Not
Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2230314 (D.N.J.), page 10 (“Mr.
Meltzer was appointed Co-Lead Counsel in Ryan-House v.
GlaxoSmithKline plc, C.A. 2:02cv442 (E.D.Va.), a
pharmaceutical antitrust class action brought on behalf of end
payors of the prescription medication Augmentin which recently
settled for $29 million”);
also see e.g.
http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/Gustafson.pdf however, most citations point to www.augmentinlitigation.com,
and that cite is no longer available.
49

See page 3 (HTML page 5) of AAI, The American, Antitrust
Institute, AAI Working Paper No. 06-05, ABSTRACT: Indirect
Purchaser Class Action Settlements, Author: Patrick E.
Cafferty, Miller Faucher and Cafferty LLP. Though the pdf
file cannot be found at the listed address, (
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/510.pdf), it can be
viewed in its HTML form:
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:h6GrQtZnFRIJ:www.antitrus
tinstitute.org/recent2/510.pdf+indirect+purchaser+augmentin+an
titrust&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us.
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Following the initiation of this private action, States
took action with participation from the U.S. Department of
Justice.

In October of 2004, in West Virigina ex rel. McGraw

v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC et al, Attorney General Darrell McGraw
filed a lawsuit and consent order to settle the lawsuit
against manufacturers GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, and SmithKline
Beechham Corporation.

The State alleged that the defendants

had unlawfully attempted to extend their patent protection for
the Paxil, Augmentin, and Relafen.

After an investigation,

with participation from the US Department of justice,50 and
prior to filing the complaint, the State reached an agreement
with the defendants to settle the manner.

Under the terms of

the settlement, the State received $500,000.00.51
Following that, states initiated the class action, In the
Matter of GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (Augmentin) in 2005 with New
York and Ohio as lead plaintiffs on behalf of states
nationwide.52

An investigation was conducted and in 2006 a

50

http://www.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivil
Litigation.php?trans_id=111
51

http://www.wvs.state.wv.us/wvag/annualreports/2004annual
report.pdf
52

http://www.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation.
php?trans_id=458. Also see Washington Medicaid to Receive
Share of $3.5 Million Settlement with Augmentin Manufacturer,
US State News, Copyright 2006 US Fed News (HT Syndication),
24

$3.5 million multistate settlement was entered into by the
participating states and GlaxoSmithKline.53

April 12, 2006, 2006 WLNR 6392719; Attorney General Petro
Secures Antitrust Settlement Against Drug Maker, US State
News, Copyright 2006 US Fed News (HT Syndication), July 19,
2006, 2006 WLNR 12481907;
53

Id.
25

In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 177
F. Supp. 2d 1378 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2001).

These cases are noteworthy because: 1. they contain
allegations of conspiring to fix, raise, maintain and
stabilize prices, per se rule violations54; 2. class counsel
obtained a cash settlement of $105.75 million55; 3. two of
these defendants were foreign manufacturers56 who paid a total
of $30.75 million to American purchasers;57 4. these cases
followed a government investigation, but that investigation
was closed by the government without any indictments.58 Counsel
requested and was awarded a 32% attorneys’ fee.
In March 2001, the auto body trade publication “Hammer
and Dolly” published an article exposing a Department of
Justice grand jury investigation of a price fixing conspiracy

54

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29161 2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2004).

55

The court granted final approval of a partial settlement
with three defendants - Azko, BASF and DuPont - in September
2003. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29161. at 3. Plaintiffs obtained final
approval of the proposed settlement with PPG and SherwinWilliams, the remaining two defendants, on December 28, 2007.
See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95004 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2007).
56

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 291
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2004).

57

$18.75 million was settled by Azko and $12 million was
settled by BASF. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust
Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29161 3.
58

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29161 at 23, 24.
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among several paint manufacturers.59 This article seems to have
spurred the private suits that followed. By November 2001,
dozens of cases filed in five states by direct purchasers of
Automotive Refinishing Paint were consolidated into one class
action suit.60 Plaintiffs alleged “that defendants combined and
conspired with one another to fix, raise, maintain and
stabilize the prices that they charged their customers for
Automotive Refinishing Paint sold in the United States during
the period from January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2000, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”61 The defendants
consist of three domestic companies: DuPont, PPG and SherwinWilliams; and two foreign based companies: BASF (Germany) and
Akzo Nobel (The Netherlands).62 Automotive Refinishing Paint
refers to paint products which are applied to motor vehicles
directly after the initial manufacturing process; like base
coat paint, clear coat paint, primer etc.63
Apart from the civil lawsuits, the federal grand jury
that was initially investigating the allegations of price
fixing was disbanded in 2003.64 The government’s closing of the
59

Sheila Loftus, Price Fixing in the Refinishing Industry?,
Hammer and Dolly (Mar. 2001).

60

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp.
2d 1378, 1379 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 15, 2001).

61

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18123 1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5 2003).

62

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d
291.
63

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18123 at 29.

64

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29161 at 24.
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investigation came after a first settlement was reached with
one of the two foreign defendants.65 Moreover, the fact that
the government chose not to prosecute the case was one factor
in the court’s approval of the settlement.66 The court felt
that the settlement was reasonable in light of the best
possible recovery and in light of the risks inherent in
litigation since the government had already declined to
prosecute.67
On September 5, 2003, the Court granted final approval to
a partial settlement with the Dutch based company Akzo Nobel.68
They agreed to pay $18.75 million in cash and provided certain
discovery.69 Subsequently, On September 27, 2004, the court
approved a second settlement between plaintiffs and BASF and
DuPont.70 The German based company BASF agreed to pay $12
million in cash and the settlement agreement required DuPont
to pay $36 million in cash.71 In addition, the defendants
provided the plaintiffs with information for the discovery
consisting of: documents, sales transactional data and the

65

Id.

66

Id. at 23, 24.

67

Id.

68

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18123 at 18.

69

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4681 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2003).

70

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29161 at 29.

71

Id. at 3.
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permission to interview (former) employees.72 The settlement
negotiations were tough, but for this settlement “[p]laintiffs
have had the benefits of initial, first wave document
discovery from all defendants – namely, the grand jury
documents defendants produced to the Department of Justice.”73
Moreover, the court granted a fee petition for
plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of over $21.5 million (or 32
percent of the settlements) plus reimbursement of over
$700,000 in expenses.74 The award was made after objections by
three of the plaintiffs who argued that a percentage fee was
inconsistent with other “mega-fund cases.”75 Specifically, they
argued that a lodestar method, by which the number of hours
counsel spent on the case, should be used to calculate the fee
award.76 The court overruled the objections and used several of
the so-called “Gunter” factors including what they deemed as
the high skill and efficiency of plaintiff’s counsel, the
complexity of the litigation, the lengthy time devoted to the
case, and the high risk of non-payment as warranting the
percentage fee.77 The court in its decision spoke highly of the
work done on behalf of the class and even said that

72

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29163 2 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2004).

73

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, at 13.

74

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29162 *40 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13 2004).

75

Id. at 12.

76

Id. at 13.

77

Id. at 11-32.
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“...Plaintiffs' counsel have repeatedly demonstrated their
skill in managing this litigation.”78
On December 28, 2007, the court approved plaintiffs’
final settlement with the remaining two defendants, PPG and
Sherwin-Williams.79

This approval came a full six years after

the first of the private suits were filed in November 2001.
The agreement required PPG to pay $23 million and SherwinWilliams agreed to pay $16 million, bringing the combined
total value of all the settlements to $105.75 million.

The

court awarded class counsel’s requested one-third fee, plus
expenses and incentive awards, for these additional
settlements on January 3, 2008.80

In that order the court

again commended counsel for “the manner in which Petitioners
conducted all aspects of this litigation, including the very
successful settlement negotiations....”81

78

Id. at 20.

79

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95004 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2007).
80

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 569 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008).
81

Id. at *13.
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In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) MDL Doc. No. 1413, and In re Buspirone Patent
Litigation, 185 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Final
Settlement approval at( 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25638, April 17,
2003). (BuSpar)

This case is noteworthy because: 1) Although it was not
the first case to allege that a patent infringement settlement
was actually a horizontal market allocation and therefore a
per se violation of the Sherman Act, the $220 million dollar
settlement in this case was the largest recovery in the first
wave of such cases;82 2) The settlement exceeds the total
amount of overcharges suffered by the Direct Purchaser Class
and is approximately 95% of the total overcharges likely to be
incurred through 2006, as estimated by Plaintiff’s expert;83 3)
Private counsel was first to investigate and secured a
substantial monetary recovery, amounting to more than double
the monetary recovery obtained by the federal government;84 4)

82

See: In re Cardizem CD, 105 F. Supp 2d 682 (E.D. Mich.
2000); 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) Settling for $175 million.
See also: In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F.Supp.2d 1279,
1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005) settling for $75 million.
83

Dr. Jeffrey Leitzinger, Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiff’s
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, pg 3, In re Buspirone
Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1413. (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
84

Attorneys General for Maryland, New York and Texas lead a
class of Plaintiff states, securing a $93 million settlement
to reimburse consumers and state and local agencies for
overcharges resulting from Buspar purchases between January 1,
1998 and December 31, 2002. Alabama, et al, v. Bristol-Myers
31

The outstanding recovery is a result of Class Counsel’s
efforts during the discovery process, which produced evidence
of the Schein Agreement (discussed below), of which Plaintiffs
were not previously aware; 5) Judge John G. Koeltl stated,
“let me say that the lawyers in this case have done a
stupendous job. They really have,”85 when he approved the
settlement and awarded Class Counsel one third of the recovery
in attorney’s fees; 6) This case was the first of several
involving BMS’s strategies for delaying generic competition
with its brand-name drugs (all told, BMS paid out $670 million
dollars in settlements of antitrust suits arising from BuSpar,
Taxol and Platinol);86 and 7) The size of the settlement will

Squibb Co, et al, No. 01-CV. 11401, MDL 1413 (available at
http://www.naag.org). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
cooperated with the state attorneys general to obtain
injunctive relief through a consent order which was finalized
on April 14, 2003 and terminates on April 14, 2013. In the
Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Docket No. C-4076,
Decision and Order (available at Federal Trade Commission,
Bureau of Competition: Case Filings,
http://ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf (last
updated December 14, 2001)). The order prohibits BMS from
engaging in specific anticompetitive tactics including those
used by the company to obstruct the entry of generic versions
of Buspar and Taxol, and requires BMS to abide by certain
reporting procedures for five years.
85

See www.milbergweiss.com/whymilberg? Citing: In re Buspirone
Patent Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1413 at 34:2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 2003) (Final Approval Hearing Transcript).

86

John R Wilke, Bristol-Myers Settles Charges of Patent-Law
Abuse, The Wall Street Journal, Sec. A pg 5, Col. 1, Mar. 10,
2003. “Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. settle FTC complaint that it
32

discourage other brand-name drug manufacturers from using the
same tactics to delay or prevent generic competition, helping
to keep national healthcare costs down by keeping prescription
drugs competitively priced.87
In 1980 Bristol—Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”) obtained a
patent (“the ‘763 Patent”) for treating anxiety with
buspirone, an anti-anxiety drug. The patent was set to expire
on November 21, 2000.

Since 1986, when buspirone was approved

by the FDA, BMS has been selling it under the brand name
Buspar.

Just before this patent was about to expire, BMS

obtained another patent (“the ‘365 Patent”) for one of the
metabolites88 that buspirone naturally produces in the body.
BMS told the FDA that any manufacture of a generic version of
buspirone would violate this second patent.89

illegally sought to extend patent protection on its drugs
BuSpar, Taxol and Platinol; company agreed in January [2003]
to pay $670 million to resolve related lawsuits by states,
generic-drug makers and pharmacies.”
87

See: Elyse Tanouye, Prices of Drugs Increase Faster than
Inflation, The Wall Street Journal, pg B4, Feb. 13, 1997.
88

The metabolite covered by the patent -6-hydroxy-buspironeis a separate chemical compound that the body naturally
produces after taking buspirone. See: Adams, Delayed Reaction;
Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –
That’s One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than
Brands --The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal,
pg A1, Jul. 12, 2001.
89

“On Dec. 4, [2001], an attorney for Bristol-Myers faxed a
letter to the FDA, saying the [‘365] patent did cover
33

In anticipation of the expiration of BMS’s ‘763 Patent,
several generic drug manufacturers90 filed Abbreviated New Drug
Applications91 (“ANDAs”) with the FDA, seeking approval to
begin selling generic versions of buspirone.

“Approximately

eleven hours before the ‘763 Patent expired, Bristol-Myers
hand-delivered copies of the ‘365 Patent to the FDA and
applied to have it listed in the Orange Book as covering
buspirone.”92 Because of this listing in the Orange Book,93
BMS’ subsequent filing of patent infringement suits against
the generic manufacturers triggered an automatic stay of FDA

swallowing BuSpar –even though the company had told the patent
office that it covered only swallowing the metabolite.”
Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction; Drug
Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –That’s
One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than Brands
--The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, pg A1,
Jul. 12, 2001.
90

Specifically, the generic manufacturers were: Danbury
Pharmacal, Inc., Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mylan Laboratories, Inc., and Mylan
Technologies, Inc..
91

For a detailed explanation of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
Orange Book procedures involved this litigation see: In re:
Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345-346
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)
92

In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340,
350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) citing Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139
F. Supp. 2d at 8.
93

The “Orange Book: is an official FDA publication formally
know as “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations.”
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approval of their applications for 30 months or until the
patent infringement actions reached final resolution.94 Mylan
Laboratories, Inc.

95

(“Mylan”) had already loaded trucks with

generic buspirone and was ready to ship the product at 12:00
am on November 22, 2000 when approval of its ANDA was delayed
by the patent infringement suit filed by BMS.96
The second method BMS used to protect sales of its drug
against competitors was to pay Schein Pharmaceutical, Inc.97
(“Schein”) $72.5 million over four years not to enter the
buspirone market (“the Schein Agreement”).

Schein and BMS

94

The generic manufacturers whose ANDA’s were suspended,
immediately filed for injunctive relief in Federal Court. See:
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9 and
Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442 (Dist. MD.
2001) . The patent infringement litigation proceeded and in
February 2002 the generics won a motion for summary judgment
declaring the second patent did not cover buspirone. In re:
Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340. (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
95

Mylan Laboratories is based in West Virginia.

96

Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction; Drug
Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –That’s
One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than Brands
--The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, pg A1,
Jul. 12, 2001. See also: In re: Buspirone Antitrust
Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
97

Schein Pharmaceutical Inc. (“Schein”) is now a subsidiary of
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), which is one of the
generic companies seeking FDA approval for a generic version
of buspirone. Watson settled its antitrust claims with BMS for
$32 million in 2002. See: BMS Settles Antitrust Charges
Involving BuSpar, Generic Line, Vol. 19, No. 7, April 5, 2002.
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characterized the 1994 agreement as a settlement of a patent
infringement suit regarding the original patent. However,
plaintiffs alleged that the settlement “was a sham used to
cover up an unlawful anticompetitive arrangement under which
Schein agreed to stay out of the buspirone market and help
maintain a public perception that the ‘763 Patent was valid …
even though both parties knew that the ‘763 patent was not
valid.”98
Mylan launched its generic busprione product in April,
2001, five months later than scheduled. The delay “yielded
some $200 million in additional exclusive sales of BuSpar.”99
By the end of June 2001, generics had captured two- thirds of
BuSpar’s market share.100
On August 12, 2001 four patent disputes101 and twenty- two
antitrust actions102 were consolidated for pre-trial purposes
in the Southern District of New York.
98

The Direct Purchaser

In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. at 366.

99

Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction; Drug
Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –That’s
One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than Brands
--The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, pg A1,
Jul. 12, 2001.
100

Id.

101

These suits had been consolidated under MDL-1410.

102

These twenty two suits had been consolidated under MDL1413.
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Class103 alleged that the Schein Agreement, the listing of the
‘365 patent in the Orange book and the sham patent
infringement suits filed against competitors were
anticompetitive acts designed to preserve BMS’s monopoly over
the buspirone market.
After two years of intense litigation, the parties agreed
to settle for a cash payment of $220 million. Class Counsel
was in a position to negotiate such a substantial settlement
because in the course of the litigation they discovered the
Schein Agreement and amended their complaint, and because
their motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the
Schein Agreement was per se illegal under the Sherman Act had
been fully briefed but not yet decided.

During the two years

leading up to the settlement, which was preliminarily approved
by the court on January 31, 2003, Class Counsel spent more
103

The Direct Purchaser Class is defined as “All persons who
have directly purchased BuSpar(R) from defendant Bristol-Myers
Squibb Company any time during the period November 9, 1997
through January 28, 2003 ("Direct Purchaser Class" or the
"Class"). Excluded from the Class are the defendants in this
lawsuit, and their officers, directors, management and
employees, subsidiaries and affiliates, and federal government
entities. Also excluded from the Class are the claims brought
by and/or assigned to entities which independently sued BMS in
the actions styled CVS Meridian, Inc. and Rite Aid Corp. v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., et. al., No. 01-CV-10223, and
Walgreen Co., et. al. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., et. al.,
No. 02-CV-2952, as well as claims asserted by certain States
in the action styled State of Alabama et. al. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., et. al., No. 01 CV 11401.” In re: Buspirone
Antitrust Litigation, MDL Doc. No. 1413 at pg 6 (2003 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 26538).
37

than 28,000 hours and conducted exhaustive discovery, prepared
numerous expert witnesses and engaged in extensive motion
practice, including a successful motion for class
certification.

In a decision filed April 17, 2003, the

Honorable John G. Koeltl for the district court awarded Class
Counsel one third of the total recovery from which the
$811,338.41 in expenses were to be deducted.104
As this settlement was in the final stages of
negotiation, on March 7, 2003 the FTC issued its first
complaint against BMS. The complaint accused Bristol-Meyers
Squibb of a decade-long pattern of alleged anticompetitive
acts:

“Bristol avoided competition by abusing federal

regulations in order to block generic entry; deceived the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to obtain unwarranted patent
protection; paid a would-be generic rival over $70 million not
to bring any competing products to market; and filed baseless
patent infringement lawsuits to deter entry by generics.”105

104

In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, Order and Final
Judgment, pg 5, ln 14, MDL Docket No. 1413, April 7, 2003. The
court also awarded named plaintiff Louisiana Wholesale Drug.
Co., Inc $25,000 as an incentive award. Id. at pg 6, ln 16.

105

Press Release: FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with
Pattern of Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug
Competition, March 7, 2003, quoting Joe Simons, Director of
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition (available at www.ftc.gov).

38

The complaint resulted in a consent order106 which will prevent
BMS from using similar tactics in the future.

Attorneys

General for Maryland, New York and Texas, who lead a class of
Plaintiff States, worked with the FTC in securing this
agreement and also settled their claims against BMS for $93
million dollars in 2003.107
The FTC action and the substantial amount that BMS paid
to various plaintiffs in settlement of buspirone claims should
discourage other brand- name drug manufacturers from using
such agreements to delay or prevent generic competition,
helping to keep national healthcare costs down by keeping
prescription drugs competitively priced.108

106

Decision and Order, Docket No. C-4076, April 18, 2003
(available at www.ftc.gov).
107

The Plaintiff states initiated formal action against BMS
in December, 2001. A summary of the efforts of Attorneys
General in this case go to: www.naag.org. According to
Meredyth Smith Andrus, Deputy Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division of the Maryland Attorney General’s Office,
the Attorneys General and the FTC led parallel investigations
of BMS and separately negotiated their settlements. Attorneys
General will often conduct a non-public investigation, long
before a complaint is filed. In this case, the attorneys
general first took formal action in 2001 but they may have
been looking into the agreement long before that so it is
difficult to say with absolute certainty that private counsel
initiated the investigation.
108

See: Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
“Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements,” May 24, 2001, (available
at: www.ftc.gov); and Elyse Tanouye, Prices of Drugs Increase
39

Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 2:96CV645B, 72
F.Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999).

This case is notable because: 1) Although the amount of
the settlement is confidential, the Wall Street Journal
estimated that Microsoft paid approximately $275 million to
settle with Caldera;109 2) This case was filed by a competitor
and was not, in its essence, a follow-up to any case brought
by the U.S. government, a State, or the European Union against
Microsoft; and 3) This case disclosed important information
regarding Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct to consumers.

In July 1996, Caldera filed suit against Microsoft, its
competitor in the computer operating system market, for
illegal tying and monopolization in violation of sections 1
Faster Than Inflation, The Wall Street Journal, pg B4,
13, 1997.
109

Feb.

See Lee Gomes, Microsoft To Settle Suit By Caldera, The Wall Street Journal A3 (Jan. 11,
2000). This estimate was based on Microsoft’s reported charge to
pay the settlement and its tax rate. "Microsoft Corp. agreed
to pay an estimated $275 million to settle an antitrust
lawsuit by Caldera Inc., heading off a trial that was likely
to air nasty allegations from a decade ago. Microsoft and
Caldera, a small Salt Lake City software company that brought
the suit in 1996, didn't disclose terms of the settlement.
Microsoft, though, said it would take a charge of three cents
a share for the agreement in the fiscal third quarter ending
March 31. Since the company has roughly 5.5 billion shares
outstanding, the cost of the deal would appear to be about
$165 million. Michael Kwatinetz, an analyst at Credit Suisse
First Boston, estimated Microsoft paid about $275 million,
based on its tax rate."
40

and 2 of the Sherman Act.

Caldera and Microsoft both produced

versions of the computer operating system, DOS.

Caldera

alleged that its DR-DOS offered more features that consumers
wanted.

110

However, according to Caldera, Microsoft tied its

MS-DOS operating system and its Windows graphical interface,
allowing Microsoft to maintain an illegal monopoly in the
computer operating system market with MS-DOS.
Microsoft had already entered into a Consent Decree with
the United States Department of Justice and a similar
agreement with the European Union regarding certain licensing
violations when Caldera filed suit.111

Caldera alleged that

Microsoft continued to engage in anticompetitive conduct
involving its operating systems, including violations for: (1)
unreasonably long licensing agreements with original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs); (2) pricing schemes that forced OEMs to
only buy MS-DOS; (3) tying MS DOS with Windows; (4) giving
deep discounts to OEMs that were vulnerable to competition;

110

For example, DR-DOS operated at a faster speed and was less
expensive than MS-DOS. See Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
72 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1298.
111

The U.S. and European government cases alleged licensing
violations, including some involving operating systems. The
subsequent Consent Decree barred, among other things,
conditioning licensing agreements of Microsoft operating
system products on the license of another Microsoft product.
See Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 941564 (July 15, 1994).
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(5) false public statements regarding Windows’ compatibility
with DR-DOS; (6) unlawful “beta blacklisting” in order to stop
pre-testing the compatibility of Windows and DR-DOS; (7) false
public statements made about the timing of the release of MSDOS to coincide with the release of new versions of DR-DOS;
(8) intentionally programming code into Windows with the sole
purpose of displaying false error messages when running on DRDOS; and (9) “peer processor royalties,” also referred to as
“the Microsoft tax.”
In early 1998, Caldera filed an amended complaint,
expanding its claims to include allegations that Microsoft
tied MS-DOS to Windows 95 in an attempt to eliminate DOS
competition.112

This claim was especially unique and has since

appeared in the government cases that have followed.113
Microsoft subsequently filed nine separate motions for
summary judgment seeking to dismiss this and many of Caldera’s
other claims.

In response Caldera filed a Statement of Facts,

112

Andrew Schulman, The Caldera v. Microsoft Dossier,
2/7/2000, available at:
www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2000/02/07/schulman.html.

113

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 98-1232,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231, 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14
1998). Microsoft had previously asserted that Windows 95,
unlike previous versions of Windows, was an integrated
operating system rather than an illegal combination of Windows
and MS-DOS. See Consolidated Statement of Facts in Support of
Its Responses to Motions for Summary Judgment by Microsoft
Corporation, generally, Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72
F.Supp.2d 1295.
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making public much of its evidence against Microsoft,
including emails sent by Bill Gates directing his development
staff to identify ways that an application would run only with
MS-DOS and not with DR-DOS.114 Judge Dee Benson denied
Microsoft’s motions for summary judgment, ruling that
Caldera’s evidence was sufficient to support its claims and
present them to a jury.

115

The parties entered into a settlement agreement on
January 9, 2000, less than one month before the case was
scheduled to go to a jury trial.

The timing of the settlement

was also significant given the additional cases brought by the
United States and European Union which had yet to be resolved,
and Microsoft had recently prevailed in a jury trial action
brought by Bristol, another of its competitors.

116

Some

commentators concluded that the settlement represented the
114

See Consolidated Statement of Facts in Support of Its
Responses to Motions for Summary Judgment by Microsoft
Corporation, at paragraph 38, Ex. 16.
115

Memorandum Opinion and Order (June 28, 1999). Judge
Benson’s rulings were upheld on appeal. See Caldera, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1244 (D. Utah 1998) (Plaintiff’s
allegations were sufficient to support its claims of predatory
practices and illegal restraint of trade in violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); and Caldera v. Microsoft
Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999) (Denying Defendant’s
motions for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of
predisclosure, perceived incompatibilities, intentional
incompatibilities, and technological tying).
116

See Bristol Technology Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, Case
No. 398-CV-1567 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 1998).
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first acknowledgment by Microsoft that “Caldera had a solid
case,” and had not been simply playing the “litigation
lottery.”117
Consumers received important information regarding
Microsoft’s conduct as a result of the discovery in this case.
A consulting expert on the case noted, “Confidential
settlements typically allow evidence of corporate wrongdoing
to remain hidden.

However, the settlement of Caldera v.

Microsoft isn’t quite like this.”118

Caldera released a series

of “smoking gun” emails, which included one email from Bill
Gates that threatened “the price of Windows without MS DOS
would be twice as much” to companies that sold personal
computers to consumers.119

117

It had been Microsoft’s contention that in purchasing DRDOS from Novell for $400,000, Caldera bought the lawsuit in
the hopes of winning a big payout from the industry giant. The
Caldera v. Microsoft Dossier.
118

Id.

119

First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, at paragraph 55,
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 1295.
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In re: Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1278;
105 F.Supp 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000); 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.
2003).

This case is noteworthy because: 1) It was the first of
several cases that challenged the validity of settlement
agreements between brand-name pharmaceuticals and their
generic competitors: as the Judge noted, “[t]his case has
helped put prescription drug pricing and marketing tactics at
the forefront of media, Congressional scrutiny, and judicial
scrutiny;”120 2) The initial investigation apparently was led
by private counsel and followed by an FTC investigation;121 3)

120

Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 22. In re Cardizem CD, MDL no.
1278 (E.D. Mich 2004).
121

Private counsel began an investigation in June 1998. In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 508, 511 (E.D.
Mich. 2003). “These cases began after an intensive private
investigation, conducted by Co-Lead Counsel for the State Law
Plaintiffs in June 1998, two months before the first class
action case was filed. Lowey Dannenberg Bemporad & Selinger
("LDBS") was informed of the existence of the September 1997
HMRI/Andrx Agreement by a confidential source in June 1998.
Thereafter, LDBS engaged in an intensive pre-litigation
investigation of factual and legal issues relevant to this
litigation. (Pls.'s Motion, 9/22/03 Lowey Decl. (describing in
detail pre-litigation investigation).) In August 1998, Norman
Morris, a California pharmacist, and Betty Morris, his wife
who was a consumer of Cardizem CD, retained LDBS and Co-Lead
Counsel Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo ("BDPT")
to commence the first lawsuit related to the September 1997
HMRI/Andrx Agreement. LDBS and BDPT filed a comprehensive
California state law complaint on the Morris's behalf In
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California state court on August 20, 1998 as a putative class
action (the "Betnor action"). The following day, The Wall
Street Journal published a story concerning the Betnor
complaint. This publicity led to inquiries to Co-Lead Counsel
from in-house counsel at Aetna and Cobalt (formerly known as
"United Wisconsin Services"), the parent company of Wisconsin
Blue Cross, about the possibility of their serving as class
representative plaintiffs. Within several months, actions
were filed in 11 different states and the District of
Columbia. All were filed in state courts, under state
antitrust and related laws, by consumers and health insurers.
In late 1998 and early 1999, various wholesalers, or retailers
who had obtained assignments of claims from wholesalers, filed
direct purchaser class actions under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, reiterating the allegations of the Betnor complaint, but
asserting federal antitrust claims not available to the State
Law Plaintiffs who were indirect purchasers of Cardizem CD.”
Id. at 511-512 (internal citations omitted).
Although the FTC did not file a complaint until March 16,
2000, it was looking into the agreement as early as March 9,
1999. See: Ralph T. King Jr., “Drugs: FTC widens Prove Into
Generic-Drug Barriers,” The Wall Street Journal. Mar. 9, 1999.
Pg B-1. (The first private complaints in this case were filed
in November 1998 and February 1999.) See also: Jerry Guidera
and Ralph T. King Jr., “Abbot Labs, Novartis Unit Near Pact
With FTC Over Agreement on Hytrin,” The Wall Street Journal.
Mar. 14, 2000, pg B6, writing that the FTC probe “of the drug
industry’s alleged efforts to block generic rivals and thus
protect sales of brand-name medications” was “launched about a
year ago.” Id.
Working with the FTC, class of states led by Attorneys General
for Michigan and New York initiated proceedings against
HMS/Aventis in 2001 which settled for $80 million dollars in
2003. The FTC secured a consent order preventing HMR from
entering into such agreements in the future. See infra, fn 14.
In some cases the Attorneys General, the DOJ, and/or the FTC
will conduct a lengthy non-public investigation before filing a

complaint, making it difficult to determine whether the
government or private counsel began investigating first, or
were conducting separate, parallel investigations. In this
case, the attorneys general first took formal action in 2001
but they may have been looking into the agreement long before
that so it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that
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Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class persuaded the court
that the agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
the first time such an agreement was declared per se illegal;
2) Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class secured a cash
settlement of $110 million,122 which, according to plaintiffs’
expert economist, represents more than 200% of the total
amount the Class was overcharged123 during the period the
illegal agreement was in effect;124 and 3) in her opinion
approving the final settlement, Judge Nancy G. Edmunds for the
Eastern District of Michigan awarded Class Counsel their
requested thirty percent of the total recovery in attorneys’
fees, noting that the award was justified by their “excellent

private counsel initiated the investigation. However, the fact
that private counsel first filed a complaint as early as 1998
supports the inference that this case was initiated by private
counsel.
122

Andrx recorded a $60 million litigation settlements charge
in the second quarter of 2002 for all pending litigation
relating to Cardizem CD. Andrx 2002 Annual Report (available
at http://www.andrx.com). However, although HMR and Andrx
collectively paid into the settlement fund, the proportion
contributed by each is confidential as per the settlement
agreement. Settlement Agreement, In re Cardizem CD, MDL No.
1278 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
123

Memorandum in Support of Sherman Act Class Plaintiff’s
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, filed 11/04/2002, In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1278, at
page 2 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
124

September 24, 1997 through June 9, 1999.
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performance on behalf of the Class in this hotly contested
case.

125

The litigation stems from a 1997 agreement whereby HMR,
manufacturer of the brand-name drug Cardizem CD, agreed to pay
$40 million a year to Andrx, a generic drug manufacturer, in
return for Andrx’s promise not to produce or sell its generic
version of Cardizem CD.

Plaintiffs alleged that this

agreement delayed generic competition and kept prices for
Cardizem CD artificially high in violation of the Sherman Act.
Cardizem CD is the brand-name version of diltiazem
hydrochloride, which is used for the treatment of angina and
hypertension and for the prevention of heart attacks and
strokes.

While Andrx’s generic version was still in

development, the company anticipated the possibility of a
patent infringement suit being filed by HMR and, in the hopes
of avoiding litigation, Andrx provided samples of its version
of the drug to HMR so that HMR scientists could perform their
own tests and be sure that the Andrx version did not infringe
on the HMR patent.

In September 1995, Andrx filed an

125

Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at pg 21. In re Cardizem CD, MDL No.
1278 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
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abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) with the FDA
requesting approval to begin marketing a generic version of
diltiazem hydrochloride.

As required by the Hatch-Waxman

Act,126 Andrx filed a certification that its generic product
did not infringe on any of the patents listed with the FDA.

126

The complicated provisions of the Hatch-Waxman act provide
the backdrop for this and similar litigation. Under its
provisions, the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA is
entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period. Each ANDA must be
accompanied by a certification that the drug for which they
seek approval does not infringe on a legitimate patent right
because the patent is either invalid, expired, or will not be
infringed by the marketing of the generic drug. The patent
holder is entitled to notice of this certification and, can
immediately file a patent infringement suit against the
generic competitor. Filing a patent infringement suit
triggers an automatic stay of FDA approval of the generic
manufacturer’s ANDA for 30 months or until the patent
litigation is resolved. 21 U.S.C. 355. Relevant provisions of
the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in 2003 See: The Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Title XI: Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals, sections a-b,
United States Public Laws, 108th Congress –1st Session, 108
P.L. 173 (2006). The amendments adopt FTC recommendations that
brand-name companies be limited to one 30-month stay of
approval, that a counterclaim for improper Orange Book listing
be authorized for generic companies faced with patent
infringement suits, and that limits be put on the 180 day
exclusivity period. Statement of the Honorable Timothy J.
Muris before the Senate Judiciary committee. Aug. 1, 2003. For
a history of the act and a discussion of the recent amendments
See: Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure and Legacy, 71 Antitrust
L.J. 585 (2003). For a discussion of the 2003 amendments and
the loop holes that still exist see: Brian Porter, Comment:
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s Effort
to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch Waxman Act, 22 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 177 (Fall 2005). For an overview of
the Act and how it has been manipulated by brand-name
pharmaceutical manufacturers as well as differing views as to
how such manipulations should be treated see: Eric L. Cramer
49

In November 1995, HMR obtained patent127 rights for a
new version of diltiazem hydrochloride with a different
dissolution profile. The following January, HMR and Carderm
Capital L.P. (“Carderm”)128 filed a patent infringement suit
against Andrx claiming that the generic drug it intended to
market would violate their

new patent. The filing of this

suit triggered an automatic stay of FDA approval of Andrx’s
ANDA for 30 months or until the patent infringement litigation
reached a final resolution.

Andrx countered with unfair

competition and antitrust claims against HMR and Carderm.
The parties settled the patent infringement suit in
1997: HMR agreed to pay Andrx $40 million a year, as long as
Andrx did not bring its generic drug to the market. By the
time this arrangement was terminated by agreement of both
parties in June 1999, HMR had paid Andrx a total of $89.83
million.

After its subsequent release on June 23, 1999,

and Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of Monopoly
Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving
Delayed Entry of Generic Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L.Rev. 81 (Fall
2004), Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719 (20030),
and Kristopher L. Reed, A Return to Reason: Antitrust
Treatment of Pharmaceutical Settlements Under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 457 (2004/2005).
127

U.S. Patent No. 5,470,584 was issued to Carderm Capital,
L.P. and licensed to HMR.
128

See material two notes earlier.
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Andrx’s generic diltiazem hydrochloride drug, Cartia XT sold
for a much lower price that Cardizem CD and captured a
substantial portion of the market.129
The firm of Lowey Dannenberg Bemporad and Selinger
(“LDBS”) began investigating the HMR/Andrx agreement in June
1998 after receiving an anonymous tip.130

After LBDS conducted

an investigation, complaints were filed on behalf of several
classes of plaintiffs beginning in August 1998. Thanks to the
publicity of an article in the Wall Street Journal131 the issue
received national attention.
In 1999, the FTC launched a “probe of the drug industry’s
alleged efforts to block generic rivals and thus protect sales
of brand-name medications.”132 The FTC filed a complaint
against HMR and Andrx on March 16, 2000133 which was resolved

129

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 903
(6th cir. 2003).

130

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 508, 511
(E.D. Mich. 2003).

131

Ralph T. King, Drugs: Novel Heart-Drug Deal Protects Sales,
Spurs Suit, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 21, 1998, Pg B1.
132

Jerry Guidera and Ralph T. King Jr., Abbot Labs, Novartis
Unit Near Pact With FTC Over Agreement on Hytrin, The Wall
Street Journal. Mar. 14, 2000, pg B6.
133

In the Matter of Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.; Carderm
Capital L.P.; and Andrx Corporation, Complaint, March 16,
2000, Docket No. 9293, available at: www.ftc.gov.
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with a consent order whereby HMR and Andrx agreed not to enter
into similar agreements in the future.134
Class Counsel filed class action suits on behalf of
Direct Purchasers on November 18, 1998 and February 22,
1999.135 The claims were consolidated and Plaintiffs’ motion
for certification of a class of direct purchasers was granted
on March 14, 2001.136

In addition to the substantial $110

million settlement, Class Counsel’s greatest success was
winning a motion for partial summary judgment in which the
court held that the agreement whereby HMR paid Andrx not to
enter the market was a “naked, horizontal restraint of trade

134

See: “Analysis to Aid Public Comment on Both Consent
Orders,” April 2, 2001. Docket No. 9293, available at
www.ftc.gov.

135

The first complaint filed by purchasers arising from these
facts was based on California State Law and was filed on
August 20, 1998. Only the direct purchaser actions are under
Federal Antitrust laws. There were eventually five groups of
plaintiffs: 1) consumers and third party payers, the State Law
Plaintiffs 2) Litigating States represented by their attorney
generals; 3) direct purchasers 4) individual retailers and
chains that opted out of the Direct Purchaser Class and 5)
individual blue cross plaintiffs.
The Litigating States
coordinated their prosecution and settlement with the State
Law Class. Together, they settled for $80 million dollars.
136

The final Direct Purchaser Class consisted of all persons
(or assignees of such persons) who directly purchased Cardizem
CD from HMR (now Aventis) between September, 1998 and June 23,
1999.
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and, as such, per se illegal.”137

Defendants appealed the

class certification and the grant of partial summary judgment
to the Sixth Circuit and lost.138 After nearly four years of
litigation the case finally settled for a cash payment of $110
million.139
Class Counsel expended more than 37,000 hours litigating
this case over the course of four years, preparing successful
motions for class certification and partial summary judgment,
and coordinating an “efficient discovery effort that included
the filing of numerous motions to compel, the review of over a
million pages of documents and conducting over 25 depositions
of witnesses.”140

In approving the final settlement, the court

137

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d at 905.
Citing the district court opinion, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 705-06 (E.D. Mich. 2000).

138

Id.

139

See: Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions
for Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and
Sherman Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for
Named Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 3. In re Cardizem CD, Master
File No. 99-md-1278, MDL no. 1278. (E.D. Mich 2004). The
Litigating States and State Law Class coordinated their
settlement efforts and settled for a combined $80 million
dollars. See: In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 218
F.R.D. 508, MDL No. 1278 (E.D. Mich. 2003).

140

Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named
53

observed that “[t]he complexity of this case cannot be
overstated. Despite its complexity, Class Counsel was able to
efficiently and effectively prosecute and settle this
matter.”141

The court granted Class Counsel’s request for

reimbursement of $1,080,231.74 in expenses and thirty percent
of the total recovery in the case, noting that, “this Court
would be remiss if it failed to acknowledge the experience,
hard work, and skill demonstrated by Class Counsel in this
matter.

Their excellent performance on behalf of the Class in

this hotly contested case justifies the award they seek.”142
Like other antitrust litigation involving brand-name
pharmaceutical companies such as In re: Terazosin
Hydrochloride,143 the success of private counsel in securing a
substantial settlement and persuading the court that such
agreements are a per se violation of the Sherman Act will
discourage other brand-name drug manufacturers from using such
agreements to delay or prevent generic competition, helping to
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 3. In re Cardizem CD, Master File
No. 99-md-1278, MDL no. 1278 (E.D. Mich 2004).
141

Id. at 20-21.

142

Id. at 21.

143

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F.Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D.
Fla 2005). In re Terazosin Hydrochloride involved a similar
agreement between a brand-name manufacturer and its generic
competitor. Plaintiffs in that case won a motion for summary
judgment on the same issue and secured a cash settlement.
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keep national healthcare costs down by keeping prescription
drugs competitively priced.144 The particular importance of
this litigation was recognized by the court.

“This case has

helped put prescription drug pricing and marketing tactics at
the forefront of media, Congressional scrutiny, and judicial
scrutiny.

Encouraging qualified counsel to bring inherently

difficult and risky by beneficial class actions like this case
benefits society.”145

144

See: Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
“Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements,” May 24, 2001, (available
at: www.ftc.gov); and Elyse Tanouye, Prices of Drugs Increase
Faster Than Inflation, The Wall Street Journal, pg B4, Feb.
13, 1997.
145

Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 22. In re: Cardizem CD, MDL no.
1278. (E.D. Mich 2004).
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In re: Citric Acid Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1092;
996 F. Supp. 951 (N. Dist. Cal. 1998).
Summary: The citric acid litigation is noteworthy because: 1)
The FBI uncovered the price-fixing conspiracy while
investigating the price-fixing conspiracy for lysine; 2) The
class-action suit settled for $86.2 million, of which $51.2
million came from two foreign defendants; 3) Four of the
largest purchasers of citric acid opted out and settled for
approximately $89 million from the same defendants, of which
at least $4.3 million came from foreign defendants; 4) The
total amount recovered by private plaintiffs, all of which
were direct purchasers, was approximately $175 million; 5) The
DOJ received $105.4 million in criminal fines, of which $25.4
million came from three foreign defendants; 7) Individuals
involved in the conspiracy were fined nearly $500,000.
In the fall of 1992, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM)
executive and whistleblower Mark Whitacre began working with
the FBI as a cooperating witness, using hidden tape recorders
to reveal price fixing in the lysine market.

While doing so,

Whitacre captured Michael Andreas, vice chairman of ADM, and
Terrance Wilson, head of the corn processing division,
participating in price-fixing meetings concerning citric
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acid.146

On June 27, 1995, the FBI raided ADM’s headquarters

in Decatur, Illinois, and within days the FBI also raided
several other corn-products companies, including Haarmann &
Reimer (Haarmann), Hoffman-La Roche (Roche), and
Jungbunzlauer.

The FBI seized thousands of incriminating

documents implicating all four of these companies in a
conspiracy to fix prices of citric acid.147

Several years

later, in 1998, the U.S. government filed charges against a
fifth company, Cerestar Bioproducts BV (Cerestar).148
Shortly after the criminal proceedings began, civil
antitrust suits against ADM, Haarmann, Roche, and
Jungbunzlauer were filed by hundreds of food, beverage, and
chemical companies, which were consolidated in the summer of
1996 as In re Citric Acid Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1092,
in the Northern District of California.149

These direct

purchasers alleged that the conspiracy occurred from July 1991
146

Citric acid is a flavor additive and preservative produced
from various sugars. It is found in soft drinks, processed
food, detergents, and pharmaceutical and cosmetic products.
147

John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global Price
Conspiracies?, Staff Paper 98-14 (August 1998),
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm.
148

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dutch Company Charged with PriceFixing on Citric Acid, 98-298 (June 23, 1998), http://
149.101.1.32/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1805.pdf.

149

Cargill, Inc. was also named as a defendant, but was
dismissed from the class-action suit in January 1998.
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through December 1995, in which U.S. sales of citric acid
ranged from $1.2 billion to $1.45 billion.150

Plaintiffs

estimated that overcharges during this period could have been
as high as $400 million, and therefore were entitled to treble
damages of nearly $1.2 billion.151

However, in October 1996,

the four defendants offered settlements in proportion to their
market shares of citric acid for $94 million.
Proctor & Gamble, Quaker Oats, Kraft Foods, and
Schreiber Cheese, four of the largest buyers of citric acid,
decided to opt out of the class, and brought their own private
suit against the defendants in June 1997.

One month later, on

July 11, 1997, the class action suit settled for a reduced
amount of $86.2 million: ADM, Haarmann, Roche, and
Jungbunzlauer agreed to pay $35 million, $38 million, $5.7
million, and $7.5 million, respectively.152
In March 1998, the four opt-out firms, who purchased
approximately 19-24% of all U.S. citric acid, reached a
settlement with the defendants for an estimated total of $89

150

John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global
Price Conspiracies?, Staff Paper 98-14 (August 1998),
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm.

151

Id.

152

Id. The settlement was reduced because the four large
buyers that opted out were seeking at least $1 billion in
damages.

58

million.153

This settlement “was from 2 to 3.5 times more

generous than what was received by the members of the federal
class less than a year before.”154
In October 1996, ADM agreed to plead guilty to its
involvement in the price-fixing conspiracy, which ultimately
led to guilty pleas from the other major companies in early
1997.

Overall, the DOJ received $105.4 million in criminal

fines, $25.4 million of which came from foreign companies.155

153

ADM paid $36 million. The other three defendants are not
public companies under U.S. law and therefore are not required
to reveal this information. However, Roche Holding’s CEO,
Franz Humer, stated that Roche paid $10 million to settle the
civil antitrust suit. It paid $5.7 million to members of the
federal class, leaving $4.3 million for the opt-out firms.
Also, it is believed that Unilever settled separately as well
for $25 million, but that has not been verified. John M.
Connor, Archer Daniels Midland: Price Fixer to the World,
Staff Paper 00-11 (Dec. 2000),
http://www.agribusinessaccountability.org/pdfs/
182_ADM%20Price%20Fixer%20to%20the%20World.pdf. It is unknown
how much was awarded in attorneys’ fees for either the class
action or the private suit.
154

“The class settlement of $86.2 million represented an
assumed overcharge of $1.7 to $2.4 million per percentage
point of the market. However, the opt-out firms received $4.7
to $6.0 million per percentage point.” John M. Connor, What
Can We Learn from the ADM Global Price Conspiracies?, Staff
Paper 98-14 (August 1998),
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm.
155

ADM was fined a total of $100 million ($70 million for the
lysine case and $30 million for the citric acid case).
Haarman, a U.S. subsidiary of Bayer AG, a foreign corporation,
paid $50 million in criminal fines, and the two Swiss
companies, Roche and Jungbunzlauer, paid fines of $14 million
and $11 million, respectively. Cerestar, a Dutch company, was
fined $400,000. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dutch Company Charged
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According to the DOJ in 1998, the conspiracy was “one of the
largest, if not the largest, conspiracies ever prosecuted by
the Department of Justice.”156

The companies were also fined

in Canada and Europe for approximately $11.5 million and
$120.5 million, respectively.157
Individuals from each company were also charged for their
participation in the conspiracy.

Although none actually went

to jail, each pled guilty and paid hefty fines totaling
$490,000.158

with Price-Fixing on Citric Acid, 98-298 (June 23, 1998),
http:// 149.101.1.32/atr/public/press_releases/1998/ 1805.pdf.
156

John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global Price
Conspiracies?, Staff Paper 98-14 (August 1998),
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm.
157

Harry Chandler, Cartels and Amnesty: The State of Play in
Canada, Competition Bureau,
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfm?itemID=1
194&lg=e (April 5, 2000). CBG, European Commission Fines Five
Companies in Citric Acid Cartel,
http://www.cbgnetwork.org/408.html (December 5, 2001).
158

ADM’s Michael Andreas and Terrance Wilson were both
imprisoned and fined solely for their involvement in the
lysine conspiracy. Hans Hartmann (Haarman), Udo Haas (Roche),
and Rainer Bichlbauer (Jungbunzlauer) each paid $150,000, and
Silvio Kluzer (Cerestar) paid $40,000 for their roles in the
conspiracy. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dutch Company Charged with
Price-Fixing on Citric Acid, 98-298 (June 23, 1998),
http://149.101.1.32/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1805.pdf.
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In re Commercial Explosives Litigation, 945 F. Supp. 1489 (D.
Utah 1996).

Summary: These related cases concern an agreement between some
of the largest manufacturers of commercial explosives in the
world to fix prices in the sale of certain commercial
explosives. They are noteworthy because: 1) the initial
investigation was apparently initiated by private counsel and
was later followed by a DOJ investigation;

2) There were two

settlements totaling $113 million settlement; 3) of this
amount $97.75 million came from foreign owned corporations,
and; 4) Counsel was awarded a 30% fee in one case; the other
was confidential.159
This litigation and the government investigation that
followed apparently arose out of a 1992 private civil suit
initiated by Thermex Energy Corporation (“Thermex”), a Texas
manufacturer of commercial explosives, against Atlas Powder
Company, owned by Imperial Chemical Industries P.L.C. of
Britain (“ICI”).160 Thermex brought state and federal antitrust
allegations against Atlas Powder and alleged it was forced out
of business for refusing to participate in a conspiracy to

159

Order Awarding Fees and Reimburse. of Expenses for Atty.
Fees, Doc. 874 (Dec. 30, 1998).
160

Thermex Energy Corporation v. Atlas Powder Co. d/b/a ICI
Explosives U.S.A., Inc., et al., No. 92-03-141, District Court
of Wise County Texas (1992).
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monopolize a part of the commercial explosives market.161
In August 1995, a jury awarded $488.5 million to Thermex
and found that ICI had engaged in a conspiracy with Defendant
Dyno Nobel’s predecessor, Ireco Incorporated, “to allocate
territories and fix prices.”162 The case settled for a
confidential amount, later reported to be $36 million.163
In September 1995, the Department of Justice secured
guilty pleas and fines for two of the defendants in the
Commercial Explosives litigation, Dyno Nobel Inc., a unit of
Dyno Industrier A.S. of Norway and ICI, a unit of Imperial
Chemical Industries P.L.C. of Britain.164165 The Defendants were

161

ICI’S Atlas Powder Unit Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, NEW
YORK TIMES (SAT. LATE ED.) Sec. 1; Page 35; Column 1, (Aug.
12, 1995.
162

Consolid. Amend. Complaint ¶ 8 (June 14, 1996). Richard
Forsythe, CEO of Thermex, commented that he’s relieved the 11year order was ending and added that the verdict could trigger
a ripple effect in the construction, mining and the oil and
gas industries worldwide. “This decision should promote
competition and hopefully lower prices for the customer.”
Internet Bankruptcy Library Archives, Dallas, Texas, July 14,
1995. Available at http://bankrupt.com/TCR_Public/950724.MBX
163

Business Wire (August 24, 1995), ICI Explosives USA Inc.
Settles Texas Action. Available at html
164

Dyno is Fined $15 Million in Price Fixing, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (THURS. LATE ED.), Section B, Page 5, Column 1 (Sept. 7,
1995).
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There is corroboration that the DOJ began its
investigation in 1992. See
www.crowell.com/content/Expertise/Antitrust/Publications22/art_rrm_explosi
ve1098.htm
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charged with conspiring to fix the prices of commercial
explosives in Kentucky, Illinois and Indiana and to eliminate
competition in the sale of commercial explosives to three
limestone quarries in central Texas. Dyno Nobel of Sale Lake
City, pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a $15 million fine to
settle antitrust charges. This litigation brought about the
largest ever fine up until that time for a single defendant in
a criminal antitrust case. ICI, which was involved in the same
case agreed to pay a $10 million fine.166 By May 1997, this
investigation had resulted in 14 guilty pleas by 12
corporations and two individuals, and the assessment of $37.5
million in criminal fines.167
In February, 1996 a class action suit was brought by
seventy plaintiffs representing a number of companies that
purchase commercial explosives. In their complaint plaintiffs
allege that the defendants engaged in an over-arching
nationwide conspiracy to fix prices of commercial explosives,
and that they did so by such activity as meeting with
competitors to discuss and agree on prices, imposing
fabricated surcharges, and retaliating against Thermex Energy
166

Id.

167

Press Release U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 30, 1997),
Lacroche Industries Inc. Pleads Guilty to Price Fixing, Pays
$1.5 million. Available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1997/1139.htm
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Corporation, another manufacturers of commercial explosives,
for refusing to cooperate in this conspiracy. The time of the
conspiracy was approximately 1985 until 1993.
Another, similar, class action suit was brought in August
1996 and the two were consolidated.168 The cases then settled
for approximately $77 million by 1998.169

Attorney’s fees of

30% were awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel in addition to
reimbursement of costs.170

168

Defendants E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company and
Austin Powder attempted to have plaintiffs’ Consolidated
Amended Complaint dismissed, but their requests were denied.
169

Out of this settlement, most was paid out by foreign
defendants. Dyno Nobel Inc. (a unit of a Norwegian company)
paid 43,750,000. Settle. Agreement of Defendant Dyno Nobel
Inc. Pg. 3 (Mar. 26, 1998). ICI Explosives USA, Inc. (a unit
of a British company) paid $18 million. Settle. Agreement of
Defendant ICI Explosives U.S.A. Inc., Pg. 2 (Sept. 12, 1996).
DuPont paid $5,750,000. Settle. Agreement of Defendant DuPont,
Pg. 3 (Oct. 13, 1998). Austin Powder Company paid $10 million.
Settle. Agreement of Defendant Austin Powder Co., Pg. 3 (Sept.
23, 1996). Mine Equipment & Mill Supply Co., Inc. paid
$1,150,000. Settle. Agreement of Mine Equip. & Supplies, Pg. 3
(Dec. 31, 1997). The money was distributed to the class and in
2006 the very small amount remaining was subject to a cy pres
distribution, some of which was allocated to the American
Antitrust Institute.
170

Order Awarding Fees and Reimburse. Of Expenses for Atty.
Fees, Doc. 874 (Dec. 30, 1998).
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Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th
Cir. 2002).

This case is noteworthy because: 1) The $1.05 billion
unanimous jury verdict represents the largest antitrust
judgment ever affirmed on appeal; 2) Plaintiff’s counsel
survived motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a
matter of law, and secured injunctive relief to prevent the
defendant from further anti-competitive conduct; 3) Plaintiff
is a competitor; and 4) This case is not a follow-on to any
government action, rather private counsel alone initiated and
obtained substantial monetary and injunctive relief.

In 1998 Conwood (“Conwood”) brought an action against
United States Tobacco Co. (“USTC”), its competitor in the
moist snuff smokeless tobacco industry, for alleged violations
of § 2 of the Sherman Act, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and
various state law violations.
The moist snuff smokeless tobacco industry makes more
than $1 billion in profits each year. USTC controls 75-80% of
that market with its popular Copenhagen and Skoal brands and
“has the highest profit margin of any public company in the
country.”171 Conwood is USTC’s largest competitor with its

171

Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 774
(6th Cir. 2002).
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Kodiak brand, holding approximately 13% of the market. Swisher
International and Swedish Match (“Swedish”) are the only two
other competitors in the industry with about four percent and
six percent of the market share, respectively.
Conwood alleged that beginning in 1990 USTC sought to
exclude competition in the market by pursuing anti-competitive
strategies, issuing from high-level executives, including
unauthorized removal and destruction of Conwood racks, and
deceptive practices in category management and discount
programs.
Moist snuff products are sold from gravity-fed racks,
known as “facings,” which dispense cans of the product and
provide for point of sale advertising (POS). This method of
advertising is particularly important in the moist snuff
industry since the government restricts other forms of tobacco
advertising, and prohibits television and radio advertising
altogether. The racks are often the sole means by which a
manufacturer can reach consumers and are therefore provided to
retail stores by each manufacturer at no cost.
Conwood proved at trial that USTC sales representatives,
at the direction of their supervisors, routinely removed
Conwood and other competitors’ racks, and their accompanying
POS, without obtaining consent or by misrepresenting facts to
retailers who were often unaware that there were multiple
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manufacturers of moist snuff products. Conwood presented
testimony that USTC sales representatives stated that their
bonuses were tied to the destruction of competitors’ racks and
POS. Once competitors’ racks were removed, their products were
either put in USTC racks or bagged up and left under a
counter. According to Conwood’s Chairman, after 1990 the
company “spent $100,000 a month on replacement racks”172 and
its sales representatives spent approximately 50% of their
time repairing or replacing damaged racks.
Conwood asserted that USTC also excluded its competitors
through abuse of its role as category captain, which involves
store-by-store management of an entire class of products and
can control the number of items a store sells. Retailers began
utilizing category management in the 1990s to determine which
products were more profitable and should therefore be
displayed more prominently or given more shelf space. As part
of the process, retailers sometimes rely on manufacturers for
information on “which items to sock, consumer information,
sales, and which stores are stocking what items.”173 In its
role as category captain, USTC supplied false information to
retailers including inflated or “skewed” sales data, in order
to limit the facings and POS of competitors’ products,
172

Id. at 778.

173

Id. at 776.
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particularly the “price value” brands introduced by Conwood
and Swedish in the mid-1990s. According to internal USTC
documents, the company found it “imperative” to continue as
category captain “to eliminate competitive products,” and to
“inhibit competitive growth . . . to the best of [their]
ability.”174
USTC was also successful in excluding competition through
its Consumer Alliance Program, which granted a discount to
retailers who agreed to provide sales data and participate in
promotion programs, and/or give USTC racks the best or
exclusive placement. According to Conwood, this program was
used in an effort to obtain exclusive vending, and according
to a USTC internal document, “the elimination of competition
products.”175 USTC was successful in signing 37,000 retailers,
representing 80% of its entire volume in moist snuff sales, in
the first few months of the program.
Through these and other anticompetitive practices USTC
engaged in a widespread campaign to limit the distribution of
competing brands at retail outlets. These actions harmed
consumers by limiting consumer choice and causing higher
prices. In fact, Conwood’s expert testified that “there was a

174

Id. at 777.

175

Id. at 778.
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direct relationship between the number of facings controlled
by UST[C] and higher prices for consumers.”176
Although Conwood’s market share did increase 2.5% between
1990 and 1998, there was evidence that its share was lower
than its national average in locations where USTC had rack
exclusivity and higher for those locations where USTC had not
obtained such exclusivity, and that its share would have
increased 6.5 to 8.1 percent177 had USTC not engaged in
anticompetitive behavior. According to Conwood’s expert this
disparity was caused by USTC’s exclusionary practices and
resulted in between $313 million and $488 million in
damages.178
USTC did not challenge that it had monopoly power and
asserted that this power was a result of a superior product,
rather than an exercise of monopoly power. The company
defended that Conwood’s evidence of destroyed and discarded
racks supported isolated sporadic torts rather than antitrust
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Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12797, 12 (W.D. Kent. August 10, 2000).
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Conwood’s expert testified that where “Conwood had a market
share in 1990 of 20 percent or more, the market share grew on
average an addition 8.1 percent . . . [and] where Conwood’s
market share in 1990 was at least 15 percent, it grew an
additional 6.5 percent.” Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco
Co., 290 F.3d at 780.
178

Id. at 780.
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violations, and that its actions as category captain were
merely aggressive competition and common practice.179
Before going to trial plaintiff’s counsel successfully
defended motions to exclude Conwood’s expert testimony and
separately, the damages study, and also won on USTC’s motion
for summary judgment. The case then went to trial in February
2000 with both parties agreeing to dismiss their respective
Lanham Act claims and Conwood dismissing its state law claims
before going to the jury. After just four hours of
deliberation the jury returned a $350 million verdict for
Conwood and ruled in favor of Conwood on USTC’s counterclaims
for conversion and Sherman Act violations.
Plaintiff’s counsel also prevailed in its subsequent
motion for injunctive relief to prevent USTC from removing
competitors’ racks and POS without obtaining the retailer’s
prior consent and successfully defended USTC’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law. After trebling, the total amount
of damages awarded was $1.05 billion, the largest antitrust
judgment ever affirmed on appeal. In reviewing the judgment,
district court Judge Thomas B. Russell stated that the award
was “well within the range that Conwood proved at trial.”180
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See Final Brief for Appellants at page 5.
Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at 16.
180
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In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litigation, Master File No. M-02-1486PJH, MDL No. 1486.

This case is noteworthy because: 1) The $325,997,000
settlement represents more than 85% of the alleged pre-trebled
damages;181 2) Of this total, $310,997,000 was recovered from
foreign cartelists; 3) The direct purchaser action182 was filed
shortly after a federal grand jury issued subpoenas to various
DRAM manufacturers;183 4)

Class Counsel cooperated with the

Department of Justice to obtain documents already produced in
the grand jury investigation; and 5) Class Counsel negotiated
a successful settlement despite many of defendants’ key
employees invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination as a result of the Department of Justice
investigation, and were awarded a 25% attorneys fee.

181

This percentage, 85% of the pre-trebled damages, is based
on damages as alleged by Plaintiffs. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses &
Incentive Awards, FN 5, In re Dynamic Random Access Memory
(DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. M-02-1486PJH, MDL
No. 1486.
182

An indirect purchaser action is still pending. See In re
Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44254.

183

“The three largest chip makers said that they had been
subpoenaed or informally contacted in recent days by the
Justice Department” as part of an industry-wide antitrust
investigation. Barnaby J. Feder, Chip Makers Report Inquiry
on Industry, The New York Times C1 (June 20, 2002).
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Dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”) is an electronic
microchip used in everyday electronics, including personal
computers, printers, digital cameras and cell phones, and is
sold in two forms and a variety of densities, speeds, and
frequencies.184

DRAM manufacturers sell to both large and

small-scale customers185 through a variety of channels and
using at least two pricing methods.186

In the year leading up

to the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the $11.2 billion
industry sustained significant losses due to waning sales in
the personal computer market, causing manufacturers to lose
money on “every DRAM they made.”187

However, prices for DRAM

components and modules rose from approximately $1 per in
December 2001 to between $4 and $5 per by the end of May
2002.188

184

In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 at 21.

185

Purchasers include equipment manufacturer customers,
franchise distributors, smaller-volume customers, and those
who purchased through defendant Micron’s online DRAM sales.
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 at 22-23.
186

All defendants use contract and spot pricing, “while
defendant Micron additionally engages in direct sales to
customers through its [online] division.” Id. at 23.
187

Barnaby J. Feder, Chip Makers Report Inquiry on Industry,
The New York Times C1 (June 20, 2002).

188

Id.
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A federal grand jury sitting in the Northern District of
California began investigating several DRAM manufacturers in
June 2002 for antitrust violations.189

Shortly thereafter, on

June 21, 2002, direct purchasers filed suit against the
leading manufacturers190 for violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.

Specifically, the complaint alleged that during

the period April 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002, defendants
engaged in an international conspiracy to fix, raise and
maintain prices for DRAM, causing purchasers to pay
artificially inflated prices.191
The direct purchaser class faced significant hurdles
throughout the course of the litigation.

First, on October

16, 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) moved to stay all
discovery pending its grand jury investigation.

While
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See U.S. v. Censullo, No. CR 03 0368 PJH, paragraph 3 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2003).
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Defendants’ market share was more than 70% during the class
period. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841, 21 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006).
Defendants include Elpida Memory, Inc., Hynix Semiconductor,
Inc., Infineon Technologies AG, Micron Technology Inc., Mosel
Vitelic Corporation, Nanya Technology Corporation, NEC
Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.,
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Winbond Electronics
Corporation, and their U.S. subsidiaries. See Third
Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. M-021486PJH, MDL No. 1486.
191

Third Consolidated Amended Complaint.
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numerous agreements resulted in production of documents by
defendants on a rolling basis, merits discovery did not begin
until July 14, 2005.192

During the course of the litigation

Class Counsel ultimately reviewed and analyzed more than 4.5
million pages of documents, participated in 129 depositions
around the world, and defended against repeated motions to
compel and five separate motions for summary judgment.193
Perhaps Class Counsel’s greatest success was certifying the
class on June 5, 2006, despite defendants’ vigorous argument
that typicality could not be met given the different types of
DRAM, different categories of customers, and different
channels though which plaintiffs purchased DRAM.194

Class

Counsel also had to contend with the ramifications of 16 of
defendants’ key employees invoking their Fifth Amendment

192

See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards. The parties
stipulated to production by Defendants, on a rolling basis, of
all documents produced to the grand jury, and Plaintiffs
agreed to wait to take depositions and make interrogatory
requests. The DOJ renewed its request for a stay of
deposition and interrogatory discovery in July 2004 and again
on January 20, 2005. “On July 14, 2005, Class Counsel worked
with Defendants and the DOJ to come up with an agreement
whereby merits discovery could finally begin.” Id.

193

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards, page 11-12.
194

Order Granting Motion for Class Certification, pages 31-32,
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litigation, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841.
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privilege against self-incrimination due to the continuing DOJ
investigation.195
The parties began settlement discussions in 2004, with
several partial settlements occurring between 2004 and 2007.
Seven of the nine defendants settled prior to February 20,
2007, when the Court ruled on four of defendants’ summary
judgment motions.196

The remaining two defendants settled only

after mediation, and just one month before the case was set to
go to trial in April 2007.197
On August 15, 2007, Judge Phyllis Hamilton granted Class
Counsel’s request for attorneys fees in the amount of 25% of
the settlement, plus expenses and incentive awards for the ten

195

As of March 7, 2007 the DOJ investigation has resulted in
more the $732 million in fines, and criminal charges against
four companies and 18 individuals. See Statement of Thomas O.
Barnett Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division: Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, March
7, 2007, available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/221777.htm.
196

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards, page 11-12. The
Court ruled on four of defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, denying all but one, resulting in the dismissal of
defendant Nanya’s foreign parent corporation and Taiwan
subsidiary, but keeping in Nanya’s American subsidiary.
197

The defendants settled with plaintiffs as follows: Infineon
$20,750,000; Samsung $67,000,000; Hynix $73,000,000; Elpida
$14,750,000; NEC $35,960,000; Micron $90,537,000; Winbond
$2,000,000; Mosel $15,000,000; and Nanya $7,000,000. See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Attorneys’
Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards, page 16.
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Class Representatives in the amount of $10,000 each.198

In

granting the $81 million award, Judge Hamilton praised Class
Counsel for “an exceptional job” coordinating and litigating
the case, and stated, “I have cases a fraction the size of
this one that take up more of my time, just because counsel
are not acting as cooperatively and professionally as you
are.”199

198

Matthew Hirsch, DRAM Case Yields $81 Million Fee Award, The
Recorder (August 16, 2007) available at:
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1187168529608. Judge
Hamilton did take $20,000 off of the $4.2 million in requested
expenses, due to some airfare and meals that “gave her some
concern.”
199

Id.
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Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV. Sweetie’s, v. El
Paso Corporation, No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct.); Continental
Forge Company v. Southern California Gas Co., No. BC237336
(L.A. Super. Ct.); Berg v. Southern California Gas Co., No.
BC241951 (L.A. Super. Ct.); City of Long Beach v. Southern
California Gas Co., No. BC247114 (L.A. Super. Ct.); City of
L.A. v. Southern California Gas Col, No. BC265905 (L.A. Super.
Ct.); Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No. GIC 759425
(San Diego Super. Ct.); and Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy
LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego Super. Ct.). (El Paso)

This settlement positively exemplifies private class
action enforcement of antitrust violations because: (1)
Approximately thirteen million California consumers and three
thousand businesses200 benefited from the settlement;201 (2) The
settlement consideration consisted of more than $1.552
billion,202 including $551 million in upfront cash and stock
valued at market rates, $876 million in semi-annual cash
payments, and $125 million in rate reductions on
electricity,203 a total settlement consideration which at the

200

Ruling Following Oral Argument, 1, (Dec. 5, 2003).

201

The class consisted almost entirely of indirect purchasers.
After disbursement to city and states and compensation for
attorney’s fees, the class will receive more than $1.4
billion. Ruling, 2.
202

203

The upfront payment included cash totaling over $323.8
million and stock worth over $227.5 million at market rates at
the time of the settlement, for a combined value of slightly
over $551 million. The semi-annual payments are to be paid
out over 15 or 20 years, depending on El Paso’s credit rating.
In regard to the $125 million reduction of the price paid for
electricity, El Paso lowered its prices to the California
Department of Water Resources and class members received the
benefit in the form of reduced natural gas bills. Ruling, 2.
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time resulted in the “largest antitrust class action
settlement in California history;”204 (3) The recovery was
significantly larger than the profit earned by the illegal
overcharge and a substantial proportion of the damages
allegedly caused by the conduct at issue;205 (4) Attorneys’
fees composed only 6% of the settlement-date206 total
recovery;207 (5) Because of private counsel’s efforts, the
California Attorney General’s office chose not to pursue the
defendants independently;208 and (6) The defendants’ conduct
increased prices significantly for more than six years.209
Private plaintiffs first filed natural gas antitrust
actions in California Superior Court in September 2000, the
same year that California Attorney General Bill Lockyer began

204

Ruling, 1.

205

“The [$1.5 billion] settlement is also extraordinary in
relationship to the $184 million in profits reportedly earned
by [defendant] El Paso Merchant Energy on the pipeline
capacity it purchased.” Ruling, 4.
206

The Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting
Final Approval to the Class Action Settlement, 6 (Dec. 10,
2003), estimated the present value at approximately $1
billion.
207

$60 million.

208

“Except as a vehicle to implement the structural relief
terms of this settlement.” MPA ISO Motion for an Award of
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs, 11 (Nov. 6, 2003).
209

09/01/1996 – 03/20/2003.
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investigations under his Energy Task Force.210

Defendants,

including El Paso and its subsidiaries (“El Paso”)211 and
Sempra, removed to federal court, though the federal court
later remanded to state court.

The California Judicial

Council next coordinated the cases in the San Diego Superior
Court under Coordination Trial Judge Richard Haden.

In May

2002, Judge Haden ordered that the cases be divided into
Northern and Southern California tracks.
Plaintiffs in Northern and Southern California then filed
two separate complaints against the defendants.

The Northern

California Plaintiffs alleged that El Paso and its
subsidiaries entered into self-dealing in, or manipulation of,
the price of natural gas in California.212

Northern California

210

Brooks, Nancy Rivera, “Lockyer's Goal Is to Make Them Pay;
While U.S. seeks convictions, California has settled with
energy suppliers, winning nearly $450 million,” Los Angeles
Times, Business, Part 3, 6, Home Ed. (Dec. 2, 2002).
211

El Paso consists of El Paso Pipeline and El Paso Merchant.
Both have several subsidiaries. MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 5 (May 8,
2003).
212

El Paso Natural Gas (“Natural Gas”) acquired additional
pipeline capacity—enough to meet one-sixth the daily
requirement for natural gas in California—for gas traveling to
California. The El Paso companies decided to engage in a sham
open bidding process in February 2000, and Natural Gas
announced it would only accept bids over $37.5 million for the
entire capacity. Another El Paso subsidiary, El Paso Merchant
(“Merchant”), was the only bidder for the entire capacity,
offering $38.5 million. Unknown to other bidders, Mojave
Pipeline, another El Paso subsidiary, had agreed to give
79

Plaintiffs, overcoming challenges to their actions, ultimately
proceeded on an intra-corporate conspiracy claim.213

The

Southern California Plaintiffs alleged that El Paso and Sempra
“participated in a conspiracy to eliminate competition,
preserve and maintain their market power, artificially
constrain supplies of natural gas, and exploit the
deregulation of the electricity industry for their illicit
gain.”214

Plaintiffs proceeded with their actions after the

Natural Gas a secret discounted rate for its downstream
transportation costs. Thus, the discounted transportation
rate allowed Natural Gas to bid high for the capacity. Once
Natural Gas won the capacity, El Paso had firm-wide capacity
rights to transport “an enormous amount of the total
capacity,” allowing El Paso to “manipulate the market and
raise prices to class members.” MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 7.
Merchant overbooked delivery of natural gas into California on
the pipeline and allowed its gas to flow, while denying longterm customers delivery. Merchant forced those shorted
customers, still needing to supply their customers, to buy gas
in the spot markets. During this time, El Paso sold in the
spot market at inflated prices, “unlawfully [tying] the
purchase of gas transportation services to the purchase of the
natural gas.” Id. at 8.
213

Declaration of Bill Lockyer, 3 (November 5, 2003).
“Defendants unlawfully tied the purchase of gas transportation
services to the purchase of natural gas.” MPA ISO Plaintiffs’
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, 5,
citing Nor. Cal. Compl. ¶¶195-202.
214

MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement, 5. In the early 1990s, changes in the law
allowed pipelines outside California to deliver gas to
California, eliminating the monopolies of Southern California
Gas Company (“SoCal Gas”) and San Diego Gas & Electric
(“SDG&E”). In 1992, Tenneco finished a pipeline that
partially bypassed SoCal Gas and SDG&E and began planning new
80

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that El
Paso had “violated FERC’s affiliate rules, substantially
injuring California consumers”215 when it falsely reported its
natural gas sales to the trade press to influence published
natural gas prices.216

The claims included allegations of

conduct that would ordinarily be subject to the per se rule
under the Cartwright Act, the California antitrust statute.217
The settlement resolved the claims against El Paso.
After three years of substantial investigation,
discovery218 and litigation, the Court approved the parties’

pipelines that would entirely bypass the SoCal Gas and SDG&E.
In 1996, El Paso acquired Tenneco. The plaintiffs alleged
that in September 1996, El Paso, SoCal Gas and SDG&E secretly
met and agreed not to compete with each other in California
and to increase their stranglehold on the Southern California
market. El Paso agreed to abandon Tenneco’s projects intended
to circumvent SoCal Gas and SDG&E. In exchange, SoCal Gas and
SDG&E agreed to stop competing with El Paso on pipeline
project in Mexico. The agreement left SoCal Gas and SDG&E
without competition.
215

Declaration of Bill Lockyer, 2.

216

FERC confirmed this conduct. See Final Report on Price
Manipulation in Western Markets, Fact-Finding Investigation of
Potential Manipulation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, at
III-12-15 (March 2003), quoted in MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 11.
217
The court did not rule on whether the conduct at issue was
per se illegal, subject to the rule of reason, or some
combination of the two.
218

Plaintiffs’ discovery included reviewing over 1,650,000
pages of documents and 30,000 electronic files. Ruling, 6.
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settlement in December 2003.219

The settlement class220 (the

“Class”) consisted of California purchasers of natural gas for
consumption, but not for resale or generation of electricity
for resale, between September 1, 1996 and March 20, 2003.221
Three subclasses existed within the Class: (1) Core Natural
Gas Subclass; (2) Non-Core Natural Gas Subclass; and (3)
Electricity Subclass.

The Core Natural Gas Subclass consisted

of core subscribers of at least one California natural gas
utility.

The Non-Core Natural Gas Subclass was non-core

subscribers of at least one California natural gas utility.
The Electricity Subclass included purchasers of electricity
from any California public utility.

Government entities,

including federal and state agencies, cities, counties and
other municipalities, were excluded from the class.222

219

Id. Ruling Following Oral Argument, entered Dec. 5, 2003.
Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting Final
Approval to the Class Action Settlement, entered Dec. 10,
2003.

220

See Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting
Final Approval to the Class Action Settlement, 5 (Dec. 10,
2003) (certifying the class and subclasses for the
settlement).
221

Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting Final
Approval to the Class Action Settlement, 2-3. The class
consisted almost entirely of indirect purchasers.
222

Id. at 3.
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The total recovery of $1.55 billion was significantly
larger than the profit earned by El Paso’s illegal overcharge
and a substantial proportion of the alleged damages caused by
the defendants’ conduct.223

After deducting attorneys’ fees,

litigation expenses, and payments to various state and city
governments, the settlement provided a net of $1.4 billion224
to the Class including $481 million in upfront cash and cash
equivalent,225 $799 million in semiannual payments226 and a $125

223

“The [total] settlement is also extraordinary in
relationship to the $184 million in profits reportedly earned
by El Paso Merchant Energy on the pipeline capacity it
purchased.” Ruling, 4. The exact correlation between the
settlement and El Paso’s profit is unclear, as $184 million is
only the profit El Paso Merchant made by purchasing pipeline
capacity and does not include other potential sources of
profit, e.g., how much El Paso might have gained by
eliminating competing pipeline projects into Southern
California. The alleged damages were significantly larger, as
the conduct at issue allegedly cause a general increase of
prices for gas and electricity in California.
224

Amounts received by non-Class plaintiffs, attorneys’ fees
and litigation expenses of the utilities and California
governmental parties account for the deductions from the full
amount. Ruling, 2. The payments to non-Class plaintiffs
provided compensation to the states of Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington, and to the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach.
225

The upfront cash equivalent consisted of the proceeds of
the sale of El Paso common stock. Id. Again, the $481
million is the net amount paid to the class, after deducting
payments for non-Class plaintiffs, attorneys’ fees and the
litigation expenses of the utilities and California
governmental parties. The $481 million is based on the value
of the stock at the time of the settlement, which was slightly
over $227 million.

83

million reduction of the price paid for electricity.227
Regarding the price reductions, to avoid performing “‘any sort
of ’true-up’ of the allocation in place at the time’” of the
overcharge, the California Public Utilities Commission
(“CPUC”) found that the only efficient manner to distribute
the settlement funds was to adjust current gas rates upon
receipt of the funds.228

Class member payout by check was

unsatisfactory because of the substantial administrative cost
to maintain mailing addresses and print checks.229
Counsel received the full fee award they requested—which
amounted to 6% of the settlement-date value of the total
settlement.230

The Court approved a 3.32 multiplier of

Southern California counsel’s $16 million in costs and fees,231
granting $50 million. “Such a fee request,” the Court noted,

226

The $799 million is the amount the class will receive over
a 15 or 20 year period, after deducting amounts paid to nonclass members, including to Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Los
Angeles and Long Beach.
227
Id.
228

Id. at 9.

229

Id.

230

The Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting
Final Approval to the Class Action Settlement estimated the
present value at approximately $1 billion. Id. at 6. This
evaluation was based on the value of the stock at the time of
the settlement, which was slightly over $227 million.
231

Costs of $1,380,752.14 and fees of $15,072,831.
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Id.

“would be one of the lowest fees requested and granted in a
common fund settlement of this magnitude,”232 especially given
that the “risks faced by plaintiffs’ attorneys were
enormous.”233

Northern California counsel requested a 4.58

multiplier for $2 million in costs and fees234 and received $10
million.

In addition, the Court lauded counsel because

“[h]ere an exceptional benefit was achieved, even though
plaintiffs’ counsel had significant contingent risk.”235
The settlement provided consumers with certain and longterm monetary benefits.

For instance, “[the settlement]

contains significant structural benefits that will assure more
plentiful and affordable gas to Californians for decades.”

236

California Public Utilities Commission “not only approved [the
settlement] but. . . guaranteed ratepayers will receive 100
percent of the benefit of the [$125 million electricity] rate

232

Id. at 11. The Court reiterated that Southern California
counsel’s “requested five (5) percent fee is low when
contrasted with customary contingent agreements in class
action cases.” Id. at 12.

233

Id. at 11.

234

Costs of $473,568 and fees of $2,079,474.

235

Id.

236

Id. at 1.
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Id. at 13.

reductions over 15 to 20 years.”237

The reach of the

settlement is also impressive, given that “[e]very California
consumer and business that purchases natural gas and/or
electricity will benefit from this settlement in the form of
rate relief.”238
Consumers also benefited by the settlement’s deterrent
effect.

The settlement imposed a “significant deterrent

benefit and require[d] El Paso to implement an antitrust
compliance program.”239

More broadly, “the settlement amount

serves as a strong deterrent to industries who believe they
can engage in antitrust activities with impunity.”240

“In

sum,” the Court concluded, “the settlement confers a
substantial benefit on the class as a whole [and] is an
outstanding result in a case that may be challenging to prove
at trial...

.”241

These important benefits resulted directly from private
enforcement of El Paso’s alleged antitrust violations.

237

Though

Id. at 2. These rate reductions provide compensation in
addition to the upfront cash and stock proceeds and the semiannual cash payments.

238

Id. at 4.

239

Id. at 1.

240

Id. at 12.

241

Id. at 4.
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the “California Attorney General’s office investigated El Paso
for over two years, they never filed a case...

.”242

California Attorney General Bill Lockyer noted that while FERC
in 2002 found that El Paso had violated FERC’s rules, FERC’s
outcome “did not provide the same opportunities for relief” as
the private actions filed.243

“Class counsel,”244 Lockyer

stated, “were crucial to bringing [the settlement] to
fruition.”245

242

MPA ISO Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and
Reimbursement of Costs, 11 (Nov. 6, 2003). The California
Attorney General’s office became aware of the El Paso
situation during an on-going investigation into higher gas
costs commenced in the summer of 2000. Declaration of Bill
Lockyer, 1.
243

Declaration of Bill Lockyer, 2.

244

Lockyer also noted that “[c]ounsel for both the Southern
California Plaintiffs and the Northern California Plaintiffs
were well-financed and expert litigators, bringing particular
credibility to the [settlement] negotiations.” Id. at 4.
245

Id. at 4.
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In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, MDL 1200, Master Docket
Misc. 97-0550 (W.D. Pa.)
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation is significant for a
number of reasons: (1) the Federal Government had initiated an
investigation into price-fixing in the flat glass industry,
but no indictments were ever issued nor any government civil
proceedings commenced against any company or individual;
(2) one of the defendants had applied for leniency under the
DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Program, but its application was
rejected; (3) plaintiffs successfully appealed to the Third
Circuit from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the sole remaining defendant246; (4) settlements in
the litigation, to direct purchasers, ultimately totaled
$121.7 million, $37.7 million of which came from foreign
corporations or wholly-owned US subsidiaries of foreign
corporations247; (5) plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees averaged 32%
(33 1/3% from settlements with some defendants and 30% from
the settlement with another)".
Beginning in July 1997, numerous lawsuits were filed in
various district courts against six manufacturers of glass
246

See 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004).

247

$17.9 million came from Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, Inc. and
Pilkington, and $19.8 million came from AFG Industries Inc. a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Asahi Glass Co., a Japanese
corporation.
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products sold in the United States: Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, Inc.
(“LOF”) (now know as Pilkington North America); its parent,
Pilkington plc, (“Pilkington”) a United Kingdom corporation;
AFG Industries, Inc. (“AFG”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Asahi Glass Co, a Japanese corporation ; Guardian Industries
Corp. (“Guardian”); Ford Motor Company (“Ford”); and PPG
Industries, Inc. (“PPG”). All of the lawsuits were
subsequently consolidated by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania before then Chief
Judge Donald E. Ziegler.

The cases were filed after two

former senior executives of LOF made disclosures in an
unrelated criminal case against them, that there had been a
marketwide price-fixing conspiracy in the flat glass industry.
It was later revealed that LOF had applied for leniency under
the DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Program, but was turned down.

It

was also later revealed that the DOJ had initiated two grand
jury investigations into anticompetitive conduct in the flat
glass industry, but no person or entity was ever indicted or
charged.
On February 27, 1998, plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint alleging that defendants had engaged in a classic,
per se, horizontal conspiracy to fix, raise and maintain the
price of flat glass products and automobile replacement glass

89

(“ARG”) sold in the United States from August 1991 through
December 1995.

It was also alleged that, as a result of the

defendants’ conspiracy, members of the Class paid higher
prices than they would have paid absent the conspiracy.
By Orders dated November 5, 1999 and February 16, 2000, and in
a

decision reported at In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation,

191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1999), the Court certified the Class.
Following arm’s length settlement negotiations, plaintiffs
reached settlement agreements on behalf of the Class with five
of the six defendants: LOF/Pilkington ($17.9 million), AFG
($19.8 million), Guardian ($16.9 million), and Ford ($8
million), for a total of $61.7 million. Following Court
approval of the settlements, plaintiffs filed an application
for fees and reimbursement of expenses and the court awarded
attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3%.
After the conclusion of merits discovery, PPG, the sole
non-settling defendant, moved for summary judgment. In May
2003, in an unreported decision the District Court granted
summary judgment to PPG248

The Court held that the record,

considered as a whole, “though it undoubtedly evidences that
several of the settling defendants conspired to fix prices [of
flat glass products], does not tend to exclude the possibility
248

. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 97-550,
Opinion (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2003).
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that PPG acted independently and therefore does not support a
reasonable inference that PPG was involved in a price fixing
conspiracy.”249
Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s summary judgment
ruling and on September 29, 2004, the Third Circuit issued its
opinion, In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350 (3d
Cir. 2004). The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment as to the conspiracy to fix prices
of flat glass products.250

Among other things, the Third

Circuit rejected PPG’s contention that the Court should look
at each piece of evidence separately to see if it was as
consistent with the absence of a price fixing conspiracy, and
found that, considered as a whole, there was sufficient
evidence that PPG conspired with the settling defendants to
fix the prices of flat glass products to create a question of
fact for the jury, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.251

249

Thereafter, a trial date was set and the

Id. at 40.

250

The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment
as to the ARG conspiracy. Id. at 369-70.
251

Id. At 368-69. After the Third Circuit’s decision, PPG
filed petitions for rehearing, for a stay of the mandate, and
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. These
petitions were denied. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust
Litigation, 115 Fed. Appx. 570 (3d Cir. 2004); PPG Industries
Inc. v. Nelson, 125 S. Ct. 1699 (2005).
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parties prepared the case for trial. The parties exchanged
lists of proposed trial exhibits and deposition designations,
proposed jury instructions and voir dire questions, and filed
15 in limine motions.

During this period of intense trial

preparation, settlement negotiations between the parties were
undertaken and in October 2005, virtually on the eve of trial,
a settlement agreement was reached with PPG for $60 million,
an amount nearly equal to the total of the settlements with
all of the other defendants combined. After notice and a
hearing, the district court approved this settlement, and
granted plaintiffs’ application for attorneys fees of 30% of
this settlement fund.
Both Chief Judge Ziegler and Chief Judge Ambrose (to whom
the case was reassigned after Judge Ziegler's retirement) made
statements about the quality of plaintiffs’ counsels’ legal
representation at the time of the award of attorneys' fees and
expenses. At a hearing on May 28, 2003 Judge Ziegler, in
awarding fees of 1/3 of the $61.7 million settlements with all
defendants except PPG said: "Next, we have carefully reviewed
the counsel fee request of class counsel and find that the
requested contingent of 33 1/3 percent and the sums to be
distributed to class counsel, including for expenses, are not
only fair, reasonable, and appropriate, but the fees are
modest when the Court considers the stature of class counsel
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and the relief obtained for the class in this case and under
the circumstances."252

Similarly, Chief Judge Ambrose, in

approving the requested fee of 30% of the $60 million
settlement with PPG stated: "Well, I find that the request
from plaintiffs for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses is reasonable, considering the skill
and efficiency of counsel in obtaining this result, the
complexity and duration of the litigation, the risks
undertaken by plaintiffs' counsel and the time and effort
devoted by them."253
Thus, in this case, where there were (a) no governmental
criminal or civil proceedings, (b) a grant of summary judgment
against plaintiffs and reversal on appeal, and (c) nearly
completed trial preparations, total attorneys fees amounted to
slightly less than one-third of the settlements combined.
Moreover, purchasers of flat glass received distributions from
the settlement funds equal to approximately 2.1% of their
total purchases of flat glass during the relevant period,
which was a significant percentage of the alleged overcharge.

252

Transcript of May 28, 2004 at 9.

253

Transcript of Feb. 3, 2006 at10.
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In Re: Fructose Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. File 1087, Master
File # 94-1577 (Michael Mihm) (C.D.Ill. 1995)
The Fructose Antitrust Litigation is an important example
of private antitrust litigation because:

(1) while the

government convened a grand jury to investigate price fixing
among the major manufacturers of fructose, no indictments were
brought, even though indictments were brought against the
major manufacturers of two related products, lysine and citric
acid;

(2) notwithstanding the absence of an indictment, after

10 years of litigation, including three appeals to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and two petitions to the Supreme
Court for writs of certiorari, the case settled for $531
million, one of the largest antitrust class action settlements
ever achieved;

(3) Of this amount, $100 million came from a

foreign corporation, A.E. Staley Manufacturing; (4)

due to

the relatively small number of fructose purchasers, the
payments to individual absent class members were very large in excess of $10 million per class member in some instances;
(5) each of the three appeals to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals254 resulted in a significant ruling relating
to antitrust law in particular, and civil conspiracy in

254

216 F. 3d 621 (7th Cir. 2000); 295 F. 3d 651 (7th Cir.
2002); 361 F. 3d 459 (7th Cir. 2004).

94

general; and (6) the presiding judge repeatedly praised the
skills and conduct of the class counsel.

In 1995, following a well-publicized FBI raid at the
Decatur, Illinois headquarters of Archer Daniels Midland
Company, a number of antitrust class action suits were filed
against manufacturers of 3 products: fructose, lysine, and
citric acid.

The cases were all sent to the Judicial Panel on

Multi-District Litigation, which in turn separated the cases
by product, transferring them to different judicial districts
for consolidated and coordinated pretrial discovery.

The

Fructose cases were transferred to the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.255
Although grand jury investigations were conducted with
respect to the manufacture and sale of fructose, citric acid,
and lysine, indictments were issued only with respect to
citric acid and lysine.

Guilty pleas were entered

by manufacturers and their agents relating to citric acid and

255

The Citric Acid cases were transferred to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, and
the Lysine cases were transferred to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In Re
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, et al., 910 F.Supp.966
(J.P.M.L. 1995)
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lysine.256 Given the fact that a final judgment in a criminal
proceeding to the effect that a defendant has violated the
antitrust laws, is prima facie evidence of violation of the
antitrust laws in a related civil case,257 as could have
been expected, class action settlements were entered into, in
relatively short order, in both the Citric Acid Antitrust
Litigation258 and the Lysine Antitrust Litigation.259
In contrast, no guilty pleas were entered into by any
manufacturer of fructose.260

Indeed, Archer Daniels

Midland Company, while entering a guilty plea with respect to
citric acid and lysine, and agreeing to pay a then-record $100
million fine, did not enter a plea with respect to fructose.

256

In addition, after trial, convictions were obtained against
certain officers of Archer Daniels Midland Company relating to
lysine and citric acid.
257

15 U.S.C. §16

258

1997 WL 446241 (N.D. Cal. 1997); 1997 WL 446240 (N.D. Cal.
1997); 1997 WL 446242 (N.D. Cal. 1997); and 1997 WL 446239
(N.D. Cal. 1997)
259

1996 WL 197671 (N.D. Ill. 1996) and 1996 400017 (N.D. Ill.
1996) In addition, there were numerous purchasers of citric
acid and lysine in each case which elected to be excluded from
the class and commence their own non-class action cases.
These opt-out cases settled as well.
260

The fructose defendants were Error! Main Document
Only.Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Company, Cargill, Inc., and American MaizeProducts Company.
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As a result, the Fructose case became a heavily litigated case
which lasted almost 10 years from inception to conclusion.
During the course of the Fructose Antitrust Litigation,
there were three separate significant appeals to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals:
1.

In 216 F. 3d 621 (7th Cir. 2000), the Court of

Appeals was asked to rule on whether plaintiffs could enforce
a subpoena to obtain copies of both audio and video recordings
which were made by a Vice-President of Archer Daniels Midland
during the course of the criminal price fixing investigation.
These recordings had not been used in the criminal proceedings
but were filed with the Department of Justice.

The district

court held that recordings of face-to-face-conversations
should be produced but that audio recordings did not have to
be produced.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal required

production of all the recordings filed with the Department of
Justice.
2.

In 295 F. 3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002), plaintiffs

appealed the grant of a summary judgment by the district court
against plaintiffs and in favor of all non-settling
defendants.

At the time this ruling was entered, there was

only a single $7 million settlement, so plaintiffs counsel
were at risk for virtually all of their time and expense in
the matter.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.
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After

analyzing the record evidence, the court held that fact
questions precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.

In a subsidiary ruling, the court held that

an adverse inference could be drawn against Archer Daniels
Midland, but no other defendant, as a result of the refusal
of two ADM officers to answer deposition questions on the
grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them.

In

rendering its' ruling, the Court of Appeals made two
significant rulings relating to antitrust enforcement - - it
declined to accept defendants' extreme interpretation of the
application of the Matsushita case to the case on appeal and
rejected defendants argument that if no single item of
evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to
conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary
judgment.
3.

In 361 F. 3d 439 (7th cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit

was presented with the novel question of whether the trial
court had the authority to effect severance of two defendants
for trial by impaneling two separate juries to sit
simultaneously in one trial.

The trial court had ruled that

it had such authority and that, therefore, severance into two
separate trials was not necessary.
Circuit affirmed this ruling.
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On appeal, the Seventh

As a result of their determined efforts, class plaintiffs
and their counsel overcame the absence of a government
indictment, ten years of litigation, and the entry of summary
judgment for the defendants, and achieved a settlement of $531
million, which resulted in payments of more than $10 million
to some absent class members.

Without this private class

action litigation, the purchasers of fructose during the class
period would have received nothing, since there was not a
single fructose purchaser which elected to be excluded from
the class in order to pursue it's own case.
The judge who oversaw the case, the Honorable Michael M
Mihm, repeatedly praised the effort and conduct of class
counsel. “I’ve said many times during this litigation that you
and the attorneys who represented the defendants here are as
good as it gets.

Very professional...You’ve always been

cutting to the chase and not wasting my time or each others’
time or adding to the cost of the litigation.

And this was

very difficult litigation... Skill and efficiency of the
attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and duration of the
litigation. It was very complex.

We made some new law on more

than one occasion....261 He accordingly awarded class counsel
costs plus 25% of the settlement fund.

261

See Trial Transcript of Oct. 4, 2004, at 45-46.
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In Re: Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, 2003 WL
22358491 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
This settlement in the last of three related cases is
noteworthy because (1) the two defendants in this settlement
returned over $47 million to overcharged direct purchasers;
(2) this cash recovery came from foreign firms; (3) legal fees
were at most 15% of the total recovery; (4) the recovery was
estimated at 105% of their actual damages;

(5) The cases were

successful follow-ons to a federal criminal prosecution that
resulted in a criminal fines of more than $300 million against
at total of six defendants.

This case is a “follow on case” to a federal criminal
prosecution of an international price-fixing conspiracy. The
plaintiffs were direct purchasers of the defendants products,
graphite electrodes, in the U.S. market. (The steel industry
uses graphite electrodes to general the intense heat needed to
melt scrap metal and refine steel in electric arc furnaces.)
The Department of Justice obtained over $300 million in

100

criminal fines against the cartel members and many of their
executives.262
The Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation consisted of
three class action lawsuits alleging horizontal price-fixing
in the graphite electrodes industry.263
During the period from December 1998 through November
2002, settlements were approved with all of the defendants

262

Kylie Cooper & Adrienne C. Dedjinou, Twentieth Survey of
White Collar Crime: Article: Antitrust Violations, 42 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 179, 214 (2005). The criminal fines for each
company were: Mitsubishi of Japan, $134 million; “SGL Carbon
AG of Wiesbaden, Germany, $ 135 million; UCAR international of
Danbury, Conn., $ 110 million; Showa Denko of Ridgeville,
S.C., $ 32.5 million; Tokai Carbon Co. of Japan, $ 6 million;
and Nippon Carbon, also of Japan, $ 2.5 million. A seventh
producer, the Carbide Graphite Group of Pittsburgh, cooperated
in the investigation and the company and its executives
received amnesty.” J. Seper, Mitsubishi Fined for Price Fixing
on Key Parts in Steel Industry, Wash. Times, May 12, 2001.

263

(1) Kentucky Electric Steel Inc. v. The Carbide/Graphite
Group, Inc., SGL Carbon AG, and UCAR International Inc., No.
97-CV-4182 (E.D. Pa.), (2) Kentucky Electric Steel Inc. v.
Showa Denko Carbon, Inc., No. 98-CV-1017 (E.D. Pa.), (3)
Kentucky Electric Steel Inc., No. 99-CV-482 (E.D. Pa.). The
defendants were: Tokai Carbon Company, Ltd., Tokai Carbon
U.S.A., Inc. (collectively “Tokai”); SEC Corporation (“SEC”);
Nippon; Mitsubishi; VAW Aluminum AG, VAW Carbon GmBH
(collectively “VAW”); The Carbide/Graphite Group, Inc. (“CG”);
SGL Carbon AG, SGL Carbon Corporation (collectively “SGL”);
UCAR International Inc. (“UCAR”); and Showa Denko Carbon, Inc.
(“SDC”).
One of the defendants, SGL, attempted to evade civil
liability by filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in
1998. The Third Circuit, however, ordered the dismissal of
SGL’s bankruptcy petition on grounds that it had been filed in
bad faith. In re SGL Carbon Corporation, 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
1999).
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except Mitsubishi and Nippon. The certified the class in the
action against these two defendants in February 2003. Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiffs reached a settlement with the
remaining defendants, and the Court approved a notice of the
proposed settlement on May 14, 2003.264
Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Mitsubishi
agreed to pay the Class $45,000,000, and Nippon agreed to pay
$2,875,000. Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that their request for
attorney fees would not exceed fifteen percent of the
settlement funds, plus reimbursement of litigation costs and
expenses. According to the notice of the proposed settlement,
a pro rata distribution of the proceeds would be determined by
using the overcharge percentage found in the report prepared
by the Plaintiffs’ expert on damages.265 The overcharge varied
overtime and was higher for deliveries in the United States
than for deliveries outside the United States. To account for
the variance over time, the proposed settlement divided the
relevant period of time into twelve six month periods and
264

See, Notice of Proposed Settlements with Mitsubishi
Corporation and Mitsubishi International Corporation in the
Amount of $45,000,000, and With Nippon Carbon Company, Ltd. in
the Amount of $2,875,000, Class Action Determination and Other
Matters, IN RE: Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, MDL
No. 1244 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2003).
265

The court does not appear to have made any published
remarks regarding the quality of the work performed by the
plaintiffs’ attorneys.
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called for the assignment of an overcharge percentage for each
period.266 Overall, the plaintiffs’ expert estimated the amount
distributed to the class members at 105% of their actual
damages.267
Ellwood Quality Steel had chosen to opt-out of earlier
settlements and had succeeded in recovering larger amounts
from the other defendants.

As a result, the allocation plan

in the proposed settlement with Mitsubishi and Nippon would
have denied Ellwood any distribution of funds because its
settlements outside the class exceeded the amount it would
have otherwise received in the settlement with Mitsubishi and
Nippon. Nonetheless, Ellwood chose to opt-in to the
Mitsubishi/Nippon settlement, and it objected to the
allocation plan insofar as it took into account Ellwood’s
prior settlements.
Judge Weiner denied Ellwood’s objection. First, the
provision ensured that all of the class members received equal
distributions from the Mitsubishi/Nippon settlement. Second,
there was precedent for offsetting a share of a class
settlement with funds received in private litigation. Finally,
266

Although the class was limited to consumers who purchased
graphite electrodes from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1997,
the proposed settlement provided for damages for purchases
from July 1, 1992, to June 30, 1998. Id. at 3.
267

In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, 2003 WL
22358491, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
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Ellwood had received an opportunity to opt-out of the
Mitsubishi/Nippon settlement and knowingly chose not to do so.
The award of damages had a material effect on the
earnings of at least some consumers. Roanoke Steel Corporation
reported that $1.4 million of its $1.5 million profit for the
first quarter of 2004 was attributable to the settlement.268

268

Roanoke Electric Steel Corporation Reports First Quarter
Results, P.R. Newswire, March 9, 2004.
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IBM v. Microsoft
This case is noteworthy because: 1) It settled for $775
million cash and a $75 million credit toward Microsoft
software; 2) It was a successful follow-on resolving claims
between International Business Machines, Inc. (“IBM”) and
Microsoft arising from the U.S. government’s antitrust case
against Microsoft; 3) IBM’s allegations were broader than
those in the government’s case; 4) The settlement was reached
in the absence of a separate lawsuit; and 5) The federal judge
in the government case found that Microsoft’s anticompetitive
practices harmed both competitors and consumers.
In November 2003, on the heels of a settlement with the
Department of Justice, Microsoft entered into a tolling
agreement with IBM extending the statute of limitations on
antitrust claims to avoid protracted litigation and explore
settlement options.269 The final settlement resolved claims
arising from the government’s case against Microsoft which was
filed in 1998 and alleged violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, including unlawful maintenance of monopoly power
and unreasonable restraint on trade through anticompetitive

269

IBM, Microsoft and IBM Resolve Antitrust Issues,
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/7767.wss (July
1, 2005).
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marketing practices.

270

The U.S. District Court for the

District of Colombia issued findings of fact in the government
case in November 1999 establishing that Microsoft had used its
“prodigious market power and immense profits”

271

to harm

competitors, including IBM.272 Specifically, the judge found
that Microsoft had “punished” IBM for failing to halt the
promotion of its own products that competed with Windows and
Office by withholding technical and marketing assistance,
blocking the issuance of a Windows 95 license, and forcing IBM

270

U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
Although twenty states joined in the government action, nine
ultimately joined in the final judgment while the remainder
went on to pursue a full remedies trial. The final judgment
which was entered on November 12, 2001, prohibited Microsoft
from engaging in a number of anticompetitive practices,
including discriminatory pricing and overcharging, and from
retaliating against its competitors for supporting or
developing certain competing software − the same actions the
court identified as having harmed IBM. Final Judgment (Nov.
12, 2001) (available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.htm).
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U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
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Microsoft defended its actions in the press and complained
that its competitors were using the government action out of
jealousy to attack the company. The Microsoft-funded
Independent Institute ran a full-page ad in both The
Washington Post and The New York Times on June 2, 1999
delivering “An Open Letter to President Clinton from 240
Economists on Antitrust Protectionism.” The letter complained
that not only did consumers not ask for the antitrust actions,
but that consumers benefited from Microsoft’s success. An Open
Letter to President Clinton from 240 Economists on Antitrust
Protectionism (available at
http://www.independent.org/pdf/open_letters/antitrust.pdf).

106

to pay higher prices.273 According to the findings, these
actions also resulted in harm to consumers since, “some
innovations that would truly benefit consumers never occur[ed]
for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft’s
self-interest.”274
Two months before the tolling agreement was set to
expire, Microsoft and IBM entered into settlement discussions
to resolve the claims arising out of the factual findings in
the government case. The parties reached an agreement on July
1, 2005 whereby Microsoft agreed to pay $775 million lump sum
and extend a $75 million credit toward Microsoft software.
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The settlement agreement resolved claims arising out of
the government case, including the discriminatory pricing and
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U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 39.

274

Id. at 112.
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IBM, Microsoft and IBM Resolve Antitrust Issues,
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/7767.wss (July
1, 2005).

Although it is unclear whether IBM has used the $75 million
credit, a principal analyst commented that the company would
“most likely procure Microsoft PC software, such as operating
systems and office productivity applications, with that
credit.” Juan Carlos Perez, Microsoft to Pay IBM $775 Million
in Cash, Plus $75 Million in Credit, InfoWorld (July 1, 2005)
(available at
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A
=/article/05/07/01/HNmsibmsettle_1.html).
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overcharge claims addressed in the findings.276 The parties
also negotiated to resolve claims related to IBM’s OS/2
operating system and SmartSuite products. The OS/2 claims
first arose in the early 1980s when the parties publicly
agreed to develop the OS/2 operating system together as a
replacement for MS-DOS, which was the original IBM operating
system.

277

Microsoft undercut that agreement when it developed

its Windows operating system and also impacted the software
that IBM and others initially developed for the OS/2 system.278
The agreement does not include claims against Microsoft
for harm to IBM’s server hardware and software businesses,
though IBM did agree not to assert claims for money damages
for a period of two years and not to seek recovery for claims
involving events prior to June 30, 2002. This exclusion leaves
IBM the option to pursue further legal actions, particularly
in Europe where antitrust disputes against Microsoft remain
unresolved.279 The parties did not release any further details
of the agreement.280
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IBM, Microsoft and IBM Resolve Antitrust Issues,
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/7767.wss (July
1, 2005).
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Markoff, N.Y. Times.

278

Id.
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In 2004 the European Commission fined Microsoft $662
million upon its determination that “the software maker had
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abused its dominance in desktop operating systems to gain an
unfair advantage in related markets, including servers.”
Perez, InfoWorld. If this ruling is upheld on appeal, it could
pave the way for a similar action by IBM.
280

Microsoft has paid more than $4 billion to settle state and
federal antitrust suits related to the government case,
including those brought by Sun Microsystems, Gateway Computers
and Novell, and 13 class actions. Perez, InfoWorld; see also
Steve Lohr, Preaching from the Ballmer Pulpit, N.Y. Times
(Jan. 28, 2007). Microsoft agreed to pay Gateway $150 million
over four years to settle its claims arising out of the
government case, which were similar to IBM’s discriminatory
pricing and overcharge claims. Robert A. Guth, Microsoft Takes
$714 Million Charge, Wall St. J. A.2 (Apr. 12, 2005). In
addition, “Novell settled antitrust claims related to its
NetWare network operating system in November 2004, with
Microsoft paying the company $536 million.” Perez, InfoWorld.
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In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D.
CA 19989); reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991); affirmed
sub nom Hartford Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
This highly publicized and jurisprudentially important
case is notable because: 1. It resulted in a settlement with
significant prophylactic relief through an injunction that
restructured the industry-wide mechanism for providing support
and advisory services to Commercial General Liability
insurance; 2. It also included a total of $36 million in cash
paid by the defendants; 3. Of the cash payout, 27.2% consisted
of attorneys fees; 4. The cash component of the settlement was
a creative remedy that: (i) funded the development of a Public
Entity that provides risk management education and technical
services to small businesses, public entities, and non
profits; and (ii) funded the States for development of a risk
database for municipalities and local governments. 5. Money
was returned to American businesses from foreign ($6 million)
and domestic ($30 million) reinsurers. 6. The private action
was a follow-up to investigations initiated by State
enforcers.7. The case went to the Supreme Court and
established important legal principles.

In 1989 the plaintiffs - consisting of “nineteen states
and numerous private plaintiffs”

281

- sued “a group of

insurance companies, reinsurance companies, underwriters,
brokers and individuals, and the Insurance Services Office,

281

In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464,
468 (N.D. CA 19989).
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Inc. (“ISO”)”282 for alleged violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and state antitrust laws.
The insurance companies sold Commercial General Liability
Insurance (“CGL”), which protects the insured against the risk
of liability to third parties for bodily injury or property
damages. To share their risks, insurers turn to reinsurers.
“Reinsurance is arranged by specialized brokers and
underwriters. Much … [of which] is done by syndicates doing
business through Lloyd’s of London.”283 The terms and
availability of reinsurance directly affect those of primary
insurance. The insurance association, ISO, had an important
role in the furtherance of the business of insurance by the
states, and consisted of 1400 domestic property and casualty
insurers. ISO’s function at that time was to draft the
standard CGL forms that were submitted to State regulators for
approval, and to provide support services by collecting
statistical data and estimating risks relevant to the forms.
This information was then used by the insurers in underwriting
decision making, including pricing of premiums.
But the defendants’ primary insurers didn’t like the
standard ISO form for CGL insurance, and challenged the
accidental pollution and the “long tail”284 coverage. They
“exerted concerted pressure on ISO to get it to withdraw its

282

Id.

283

In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 923
(9th Cir. 1991).
284

“Long tail” coverage means that a claim can be made after
the policy has expired if the event occurred during the life
of the policy. The defendants preferred a “claims made” form
under which only claims made during the life of the policy
would be covered. See Id. at 923
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form for CGL insurance.”285 They also persuaded key foreign
underwriters and substantial American reinsurers to join their
boycott of the ISO form. “As a result of the reinsurers’
actions, primary insurers were precluded from selling long
tail insurance and also from selling accidental pollution
insurance.”286 Therefore the availability of these varieties of
insurance was substantially diminished. Eventually, ISO gave
into the pressure and eliminated the challenged accidental
pollution coverage, and withdrew its support services for the
challenged long tail insurance.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed this Complaint over an
agreement between the domestic insurers and ISO to limit longtail risks, and the enlistment of the London reinsurance
market to refuse to provide reinsurance for long-tail risks
which competitors of the domestic insurers might wish to
offer.

This allegedly constituted a conspiracy to withhold

the inputs required by competitors in order to be able to
offer long-tail coverage in competition with the domestic
defendants' short-tailed products. Plaintiffs also alleged
that defendants’ boycott removed their conduct from the
insurance exemption to the antitrust laws, pursuant to Section
3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The District Court
dismissed the complaints on defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion. The
court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings.
After the document discovery in the District Court had
started, the case was settled.

285
286

Id.
Id. at 923, 924
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The settlement agreement of March 19, 1995287, consisted
of significant injunctive relief and a cash payment of $36
million. The underwriters from the London Market paid, as
alleged co-conspirators, a part of this. The injunctive relief
disengaged ISO from industry members and instead put them
under control of an independent board of directors.
Furthermore, certain defendants were restricted from
participating in contract development activities for five
years. A total of $9.8 million dollars of the settlement fund
was awarded for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for the
private plaintiffs. The remaining $26.2 million was placed in
an escrow fund, of which $21 million was used to develop the
Public Entity Risk Institute (“PERI”). PERI provides risk
management education and technical services to public
entities, small businesses, and non-profit organizations. PERI
seems to have become an extremely successful self-sustaining
entity which, apparently, public risk managers find quite
useful. Another $5.2 million was distributed to the States for
development of a risk database for municipalities and local
governments.

287

http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/stateantitrust/insurance.pdf
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In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2000 WL
1475559, at *1–3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.4, 2000) (“Linerboard I” ); In
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 201–04
(E.D.Pa.2001) (“Linerboard II” ); In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 147–49 (3d Cir.2002) (“Linerboard III”);
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F.Supp 2d 619 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
Summary: This case is a good example of the significance of
private enforcement because: 1. it was a class action that led
to a cash settlement of $202.5 million; 2. the total
settlement represented 42-55 percent288 of alleged damages; 3.
the awarded attorneys fees were 30% of the total settlement;
4. the court stated repeatedly that “the lawyering in the case
at every stage was superb”;289 5. “there was no prior
government action to establish liability”290 and the plaintiffs
“did not benefit from the fruits of a prior government
investigation or prosecution.”291

In 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a
complaint against Stone Container Corporation (Stone) charging
them “with a unilateral violation of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. According to the FTC, Stone had
attempted to reduce linerboard292 inventories and had
"invite[d]" some of its competitors to join in a "coordinated
288

289

290

291

321 F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D.Pa. 2004), at 623

2004 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004)
Id. at 5.
Id. at 11

292

“Linerboard includes any grade of paperboard suitable for
use in the production of corrugated sheets, which are in turn
used in the manufacture of corrugated boxes (...) corrugated
sheets are also referred to as containerboard.” See 203 FRD
197, at 201
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price increase." The FTC did not allege that any other
manufacturer had accepted Stone's "invitation," nor did it
allege the existence of any conspiracy.”293
Shortly after the complaint of the FTC, several lawsuits
where filed against Stone on behalf of corrugated sheets
purchasers and others on behalf of corrugated box purchasers.
The latter expanded their allegations in comparison to the
complaint of the FTC. They not only charged Stone, but also
several of its competitors (manufacturers of linerboard),
claiming that “the Non-Stone defendants accepted Stone’s
“invitation” to restrict the production of linerboard and
artificially raise prices, resulting in an antitrust
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.”294
In 2001 the corrugated sheets plaintiffs and the
corrugated box plaintiffs joined and requested the court to
certify both classes in re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation.
“This case is grounded on allegations that defendants
conspired to restrict the output of linerboard in order to
support increases in the price of linerboard with the
objective of increasing the price of corrugated sheets and
corrugated boxes. Linerboard is the key component in
production cost of corrugated sheets and corrugated boxes, and
is the primary determinant of the prices of those items.”295
The plaintiffs accused the defendants of a price fixing
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman act, based on an
agreement between Stone and the other defendants. The
defendants agreed to “close their their mills for “market
293

Id., referring to: In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation,
2000 WL 1475559, *1 (E.D.Pa, Oct. 4, 2000)
294

Id. at 202

295

Id. at 203
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downtime,” thereby reducing industry inventory at mills and
box plants. (...) Stone would than purchase inventory from
other manufactures while idling its own mills. (...) A total
of 435,000 tons had been withdrawn from the market. Inventory
reached “a twenty-year low in terms of weeks of supply” (...)
[Defendants] successfully increased their prices for
containerboard and boxes for the first time in more than two
years.”296
The court ruled that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
proven that the prices of corrugated sheets and boxes directly
related to the price of linerboard.297 Therefore the court
acknowledged that both classes of plaintiffs where direct
purchasers of linerboard. On September 4, 2001 the court
certified both classes of the plaintiffs.
Eventually four settlements were reached between the
plaintiffs and the defendant. On April 21, 2004 the Court
approved all of these settlements298, worth a total of
$202,572,489 which covers 55% of the total damages for the
limitations period and approximately 42% of the damages for
the full period.299 The awarded attorneys’ fees amounted
$60,771,747, representing 30% of the settlement, the amount
requested.300
Furthermore the Court awarded $1,391,203 in expenses and
$25,000 in incentive fees to each of the five corporate class
representatives. The Court reasoned that “[a]s well as being
296

305 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2002), at 150

297

203 FRD 197, at 214

298

321 F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D.Pa. 2004)

299

2000 WL 1475559, *4 (E.D.Pa, Oct. 4, 2000)

300

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10533 (E.D. Penn. June 2, 2004).
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novel, this litigation was highly complex and thus required a
great deal of lawyering skill.”301 And “[t]he settlements are
remarkable given the fact that there was no prior government
action to establish liability and the case covered a
relatively short conspiracy period of 26 months. The number of
persons benefited is large, and includes all entities that
purchased corrugated containers and sheets during the class
period. (...) The size of that population is (...)
approximately 80,000 companies.”302 And finally, “[t]hroughout
every phase of the litigation petitioners managed a major
discovery effort”303 and the plaintiffs “did not benefit from
the fruits of a prior government investigation or
prosecution.”304

301

Id. at 14

302

Id. at *5

303

Id. at 10

304

Id. at 11
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In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1083,
918 F. Supp. 1190.
This is a noteworthy price fixing settlement because: 1.
it led to a court approved cash settlement with the three
major defendants of $45 million and a the cash settlement with
the other two defendants amounted almost $5 million; 2. in
addition, an estimated amount of $15 million in cash was
recovered by 33 plaintiffs who opted-out of the class
settlement; 3. in total about 400 direct buyers were recovered
from their damage; 4. approximately $24 million dollar of the
total recovery to U.S. businesses was contributed by foreign
companies; 5. only 7% ($3.5 million) of the total class
settlement was awarded for counsel fees; 6. the main
settlement was reached at a time that the government
investigation of the same businesses appeared to be stalled
and four months before the government obtained the first of
its guilty pleas.

On June 27, 1995, the FBI raided the world headquarters
of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) in Decatur, Illinois;
soon followed by raids on the offices of two Japanese
companies: Ajinomoto and Kyowa Hakko Kogyo, and of two South
Korean companies: Sewon and Cheil Jedang. All of the five
companies manufactured or imported lysine and where suspected
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of price fixing agreements,
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. “In September and
November 1995, while the DOJ’s investigation was continuing
and formal federal charges had not yet been filed, a number of
private civil (treble damages) suits were filed by buyers of
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lysine.”305 The civil suits were brought together in one case,
called Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation.
Lysine is an essential amino acid and a building block of
proteins. It speeds the development of muscle tisssue and it
is therefore an important supplement in animal feeds. Lysine
is mainly produced by biotechnology. Since the late 1980s
there were three major producers of lysine in the world:
Ajinomoto and Kyowa Hakko of Japan, and Sewon of South Korea.
Until 1991, the year in which ADM opened a new and very large
lysine production facility in Decatur. This facility doubled
the world’s production capacity for lysine and brought ADM
among the major producers. Cheaper production costs as well as
the huge increase in supply, caused a steep decline in the
prices of lysine of 45% in the first 18 months of operation.
In 1992, ADM officials (including Mark Whitacre) met with
officials of Ajinomoto and Kyowas Hakko and agreed to the
formation of the International Amino Acids Manufacturers’
Association. The meetings of the association became a forum
for discussions of prices, production levels, and sales share
allocations. Sewon and another South Korean company also
joined the association. This resulted in rising prices of
lysine. By the end of 1992, Mark Whitacre of ADM became an
inside source of information for the FBI and he supplied them
with evidence of the illegal meetings. The lysine cartel came
to an end in June 1995, when the DOJ convened a grand jury in
Chicago to consider the collected evidence of the price fixing
conspiracy and the FBI raided the offices of the
manufacturers. The DOJ investigation resulted in three major
federal antitrust actions and lead to more than 40 civil
305

Lawrence J. White, Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How
Severe?, Review of Industrial Organization, 18(1), Feb 2001,
23-31, at 25
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antitrust suits in federal district courts by direct buyers of
lysine.
The civil suits were brought together in 1996 under the
name of Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, in which about
400 plaintiffs were certified as a single class. This lead to
a settlement offer by the three largest defendants in April
1996, totalling $45 million. ADM offered $25 million to the
plaintiffs; Ajinomoto and Kyowa both offered $10 million to
settle the suit. “This offer came at a time when the DOJ’s
criminal investigation appeared stalled. Indeed, a rather
unusual feature of the civil suit is that the settlement offer
was made four months before the government obtained the first
of its guilty pleas.”306 Therefore the plaintiffs couldn’t
benefit from extensive information gathered from a closed
grand-jury investigation or from facts admitted in guilty
pleas. Subsequently, it was hard to determine the amount of
overcharge, which resulted in a major dispute about the
adequacy of the settlement amount.
“[A] number of plaintiffs objected that the proposed
settlement was too low. A report by Connor (1996) supported
these claims. (...) [H]e concluded that the combined priceovercharge and deadweight loss came to about $165-$180
million.”307 However, “[c]rucial and controversial in Connor’s
analysis were his assumptions with regard to the “but for”
price (...) and the time period during which the conspiracy
had an effect on prices.”308 In 2002 Connor adjusted his

306

John M. Connor (2002), Global Cartels Redux: The Amino Acid
Lysine Antitrust Litigation (1996), at 17.
307

White, at 26.

308

Id. at 27.
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earlier conclusions on the amount of the overcharge. He
concluded that “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight and a great
deal more information, it appears now that the first $150million estimate by the plaintiffs was too high.”309
In July 1996 the court determined “that the proposed
payments in settlement by three of the defendants in this
antitrust action (...) were within the range of fairness,
adequacy and reasonableness.”310 About 33 plaintiffs chose to
opt out of the settlement and according to estimates managed
to settle for $15 million.311 “Most of the opt outs were larger
firms with the legal resources to continue hard negotiations
with the defendants. Although settlement terms are
confidential, reports in the press suggested that the opt-out
firms, with the benefit of criminal guilty pleas by the lysine
cartel members, got at least double the amount per dollar of
purchases than did the smaller buyers in the class.”312
The two other lysine defendants settled with the
plaintiffs for almost $5 million in 1997.313 “The federal
lysine class and the opt-outs from the class eventually
collected approximately $70 million from the cartel members;
indirect purchasers of lysine obtained an estimated $15
million in state courts (...) Thus, U.S. lysine buyers
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Connor (2002), at 28.
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In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, 1996 WL
411665, at 1.
311

Connor, John M. (1997) ‘The Global Lysine Price-Fixing
Conspiracy of 1992–1995’, Review of Agricultural Economics,
19, 158–174, at table 1.
312

Connor (2002), at 28.
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Id. at 2.
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recovered as a group slightly more than single damages; net of
legal fees, buyers recovered less than single damages.”314
About $25 million of the total recovery went from foreign
violators of U.S. antitrust law to U.S. businesses. The court
had awarded the role of lead class counsel on the basis of a
fixed-fee auction. “The fee was capped at $3.5 million for any
settlements above $25 million. The firm hired no economists to
analyse the overcharge issue. The legal fees, at 7% of the
settlement, were very low by historical standards.”315 But it
also lead to discussions whether the counsel represented the
plaintiffs properly, namely “the suggestion, which has
appeared in some of the media coverage, that the class counsel
may have sold out too cheaply because of their unwillingness
to invest all of the time that is required for the full
representation of their clients' interests.”316 But the court
ruled that “it is a total red herring to suggest that either
the bidding process to obtain the best quality representation
at the lowest cost to the plaintiff class members, or the cap
on fees that the Kohn firm chose to include in its ultimately
successful bid, has in any respect disadvantaged the plaintiff
class. Instead precisely the opposite is true.”317
Apart from the treble-damage settlements, the DOJ
obtained convictions for criminal price fixing by the five
corporate lysine sellers. By the end of 1996 all the
defendants had agreed to plea guilty to criminal price fixing
314

Id. at 29.

315

Id. Supra note 22, at 17.

316

In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, 1996 WL
197671, at 1.

317

Id. at 3.
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charges. Ajinomoto and Kyowa paid a fine of $10 million, Sewon
paid a fine of $1.3 million and ADM paid the largest fine of
$70 million. In addition, four of the executives who managed
the conspiracy pleaded guilty and paid substantial fines. Four
other executives were prosecuted by the DOJ. In 1999, three of
them were found guilty and sentenced to long prison terms by a
jury in Chicago. Michael D. Andreas, a top ADM officer, got
sentenced to 36-month of imprisonment which is the maximum
allowed by the Sherman Act.
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In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation, MDL No
1402
These related cases are notable because 1) they produced
recoveries for three classes of direct purchasers of
Microcrystalline Cellulose (“MCC”) against two defendants, the
foreign Asahi Defendants and the domestic Defendant FMC
Corporation; 2) Class Counsel recovered $25,000,000 from each
defendant for a combined total of $50,000,000 plus accrued
interest up to the date of payment; 3) this settlement amount
represented approximately 40% of the damages claimed by the
classes; 4) Plaintiffs’ Counsel was awarded one-third (33
1/3%) of the combined gross settlement funds; 5) though this
was a follow-on to an FTC action for violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, Class Counsel alleged violations of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and did further discovery
to expose the defendants’ involvement.
The background of this case was described by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, where the case was brought:
In the early 1960s, FMC purchased the company that had
developed MCC and obtained a patent for the product.
Shortly thereafter, FMC chose Asahi as the exclusive
distributor of Avicel®, its brand name of MCC, in Asia.
FMC also licensed Asahi to manufacture some of its MCC
products. The two companies continued to cooperate in
marketing Avicel as well as some unbranded MCC products
during the 1970s and 1980s. [This portion under seal].
From 1984 to 1997, the relevant class period, FMC sold
approximately 50 different MCC products and blends for
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use in the pharmaceutical, vitamin, and food industries.
The two major categories of MCC products are colloidal
and non-colloidal. Non-colloidal MCC is used mainly in
drug and vitamin tablets and some food products, while
colloidal MCC is a blended product used in liquid drug
suspensions and emulsions and other food products.
*
*
*
After FMC's patents expired, approximately ten firms
entered the MCC market . . . . At least four of these
competitors had exited the market by the early 1990s.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, FMC had lost some of
its MCC market share to competitors that had expanded
their MCC production, . . . Competition increased in
the mid-1990s as competitors improved the quality of
their MCC products and production neared market
capacity.318
In late December of 2001, the FTC announced it had filed
a complaint319 and simultaneously entered into consent
decrees320 with FMC and Asahi.

The complaint alleged that FMC

and Asahi had allocated geographic markets for MCC.

The FTC

also alleged that FMC solicited other MCC manufacturers to
conspire to allocate markets.321

This complaint was brought

under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.322

318

In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation, 218
F.R.D. 79, 82 (2003) (internal citations omitted);
[hereinafter “MCC litigation”].
319

www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/fmcasahicomplaint.htm;
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/fmc.htm.
320

www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/fmcconsent.htm.
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See 65 FR 83038 Federal Trade Commission Analysis to Aid
Public Comment (Dec. 29, 2000); also see
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/fmc.htm.
322

15 U.S.C. § 45.
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The FTC Consent Order prohibited Asahi and FMC from
conspiring further, and barred FMC for a number of years from
serving as the U.S. distributor for any MCC competitor
including Asahi.323
As a result of these and a public announcement by the
FTC, Class counsel investigated potential claims.

The first

complaint was filed in January 2001 by the Ivax Corporation, a
firm that had purchased MCC products from FMC, against FMC and
Asahi.

The plaintiffs alleged that FMC and Asahi conspired to

allocate the MCC market in violation of Sections One and Two
of the Sherman Act.324
Classes were certified in August, 2003.325

There were

three classes which consisted of approximately 1700 class

323

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/fmcd_o.pdf.

324

MCC litigation at 81, (“See Complaint in Civ. A. No. 01111 . . . . In simple terms, the alleged agreement barred
Asahi from selling any MCC products in North America or Europe
without FMC's consent and barred FMC from selling MCC products
in Asia. Plaintiffs claim that this alleged allocation of the
market was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,
2. The action is brought under Sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, which provide for the private enforcement of the
antitrust laws to recover resulting damages. See 15 U.S.C. §§
15(a), 26.”).

325

MCC litigation.
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members, the Pharmaceutical Class, the Vitamins Class, and the
Food Purchasers Class.326
Though this private action was a follow on to the FTC
action, Class Counsel argued that the FTC’s case was not
sufficiently developed to permit Class Counsel to rely on any
record created by the FTC.

Class Counsel fought discovery

battles to retrieve documents that had not been uncovered by
the FTC.

The FTC did not take discovery of the Japanese Asahi

entity responsible for manufacturing MCC, but only sought
documents from the American affiliate, which related to
jurisdictional issues.

326

Class Counsel asserted that the

MCC litigation at 94:
In August of 2003, the Court determined that this case
could proceed as a class action and certified the
following three classes:
1. The Pharmaceutical Class is defined as: United
States All persons or entities in the United States who
purchased microcrystalline cellulose directly from
defendant FMC Corporation in the United States for use
in connection with the manufacture or preparation of
prescription and/or over-the-counter pharmaceutical
products at any time during the period January 1, 1984
through December 31, 1997. The Class excludes governmental
entities, defendants, defendants’ parents, subsidiaries,
and affiliates.
2. The Vitamins Class is defined as: [all direct U.S.
purchasers of MCC] for use in connection with the
manufacture or preparation of vitamin products [during
the relevant time period].
3. The Food Purchasers Class is defined as: [all direct
U.S. purchasers of MCC] for use as a food additive
[during the relevant time period].
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documents received from Asahi, along with depositions of Asahi
employees, were essential to this case.327
In April 2005 Class Counsel was able to negotiate a
settlement with Asahi.

Asahi agreed to make a $25 million

dollar cash payment, and to cooperate with Plaintiffs
litigation against FMC.328

Class counsel received approval

from the court to use up to $2,500,000 of the proceeds from
that settlement to pay expenses in the FMC litigation.329
Class Counsel submitted merits expert declarations
finding that the relevant antitrust market was the sale of MCC
to pharmaceutical and vitamins manufacturers in the U.S., the
entry of small, lower quality MCC manufacturers into the US
market during the class period was insufficient to prevent FMC
from exercising monopoly power.

FMC Defendant’s merits

declaration of two experts found that Asahi’s decision not to
enter the U.S. market was consistent with independent business
327

In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1402, Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for
Award of Attorney’s Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and
Incentive Payments to Class Representative, pages 9 – 11;
[hereinafter “Memo in Support of Fees”].
328

In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1402, Declaration of H. Laddie Montague, Jr. in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement with Defendant FMC Corporation and for an Award of
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, page 2, ¶ 5;
[hereinafter “Montague Declaration”].
329

Memo in Support of Fees at 11.
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decision making.

The experts based this on findings that

Asahi was not successful in selling MCC outside of Japan,
faced capacity and distributor network restraints, and did not
have a plant in the U.S.330
Class Counsel reached a settlement with FMC while an FMC
summary judgment motion was pending.331

The settlement with

FMC consisted of a cash payment of $25,000,000.

This occurred

after more than five and a half years of litigation, and the
gross settlement fund represented approximately 40% of the
damages claimed by all three classes over the 14 year class
period.332 This settlement was approved by the Court.333
The Pharmaceutical/Vitamin Classes’ Counsel used an
expert, Dr. John C. Beyer, to calculate that the
Pharmaceutical and Vitamin Classes suffered an average
overcharge of 22.1% in purchases of MCC from FMC, which
translates into class-wide single damages of $78.259 million.
The Food Purchasers Class Counsel used an expert, Dr. Douglas
F. Greer, to calculate that the Food Purchaser Class suffered

330

Montague Declaration at 21, 22.

331

Id. at 29.

332

Id. at 30.

333

In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1402, Final Judgment Order (Nov. 20, 2003);
[hereinafter “Final Judgment Order”].
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an average overcharge of 18.5%, which translates into classwide single damages of $50.9 million.334
These percentages served as the basis for a proposal by
the Plaintiffs’ Counsel as to each Class’ allocation. Members
of the Pharmaceutical/Vitamins Classes’ claims were to be
calculated at the rate of 22.1% of their purchases of MCC from
FMC.335

These allocations were approved by the Court.336

334

In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1402, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Plan of Distribution
(attached to Final Judgment Order as Exhibit C) page 2, 3.
335

In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1402, Agreement of Settlement and Plaintiffs’ Proposed
Plan of Distribution (attached to Final Judgment Order as
exhibits B and C respectively).
336

Final Judgment Order at 2.
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In Re: NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No,
1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Summary: The NASDAQ litigation is an outstanding example of
private antitrust litigation because: 1. the case returned a
significant amount of cash to victimized consumers ($1.027
billion plus interest); 2. It involved a large nationwide
class action; 3. It was not a follow-up to a government action
(private attorneys uncovered the wrongdoings, initiated the
litigation, and carried it to conclusion); 4. The awarded
attorneys' fees were quite modest in percentage terms (only
13% of the total recovery); and 5. It achieved important
prophylactic relief.

In 1993 private plaintiffs began their investigation of
possible collusion involving NASDAQ.337 It was triggered by a
Forbes article338 that criticized the influence of large
market-makers trading on NASDAQ, and it was supported by a
later study which concluded: “In effect, spreads on the
affected NASDAQ securities were rounded-up to the nearest
even-eight, and were therefore substantially larger than
spreads on comparable securities traded on the NYSE.”339
The private plaintiffs filed their complaints in May
1994, representing “a class of over 1.0 million individual and

337

See Arthur M. Kaplan, “Antitrust As A Public-Private
Partnership: A Case Study of the NASDAQ Litigation”, 52 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 111, 114 (2001). This summary is based upon
Kaplan’s article.
338

Gretchen Morgenson, “Fun and Games on NASDAQ”, Forbes, Aug.
16, 1993, at 74.
339

Kaplan, supra note 1, at 114. See William Christie & Paul
Schultz, “Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth
Quotes?”, 49 J. Fin. 1813, 1840 (1994).
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institutional investors who purchased or sold shares of class
securities on the [NASDAQ Exchange] during the period of May
1, 1989 to May 24, 1994”340 The defendants consisted of thirtyseven market makers on the NASDAQ Exchange.341
One of plaintiffs’ earliest actions was to obtain a
document preservation order which prevented periodic erasure
and recycling of crucial audiotapes. This happened long before
any government subpoenas. It was not until after the class
actions were filed that the SEC and the DOJ opened formal
investigation in the fall of 1994. “Without the early
preservation orders crucial evidence would have been lost to
private plaintiffs and the government. The preserved audiotape
eventually provided important, direct evidence of
collusion.”342
The Defendants planned to file a motion arguing antitrust
preemption, and contacted the SEC. But after the plaintiffs
met with the SEC, the SEC decided that the complaint was not
preempted. The plaintiffs initiated another meeting with the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ and convinced them, by
presenting factual and economic evidence, to start an
investigation. As Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. (member of the
Legal Advisory Board of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (“NASD”) stated in his affidavit: “[private
plaintiffs] awake the federal government to … price collusion

340

184 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

341

A market maker quotes a buy and sell price, trading for its
own account. Their profit – or for the party at the other
side, the trading costs - derives from the spread between the
bid and the offer. That is the difference between the buying
and selling price of the same stock.
342

Kaplan, supra note 1, at 117.
132

that the government had previously ignored,” and pulled “the
principal laboring oar in advancing this case.”

343

This early cooperation between the plaintiffs and the SEC
resulted in a consent agreement with the NASD on August 8,
1996, reorganizing the NASD and NASDAQ, followed by the
implementation of new trading rules for NASDAQ. “The new rules
(expressly formulated in response to imperfect competition on
Nasdaq) furthered and systematized the narrowing of spreads
that already had occurred on many high profile Nasdaq
securities, under the glare of publicity and private
litigation.”344
The discovery leading to class certification was a
complex process. The plaintiffs also actively helped to keep
the government investigation alive by providing them with
relevant factual and economic information.345 In the end the
plaintiffs “reviewed and analyzed over 3,000,000 pages of
documents, and over 10,000 hours of audiotape, in addition to
the numerous depositions taken by plaintiffs, and more than
200 government transcripts.”346
The plaintiffs achieved the first individual settlement
on April 9, 1997. But it was difficult to reach a collective
settlement with the defendants, who where resisting an all
cash settlement in favor of a coupons settlement. On March 23,
1998 the last settlement was signed. “The settlements in the
aggregate totaled approximately $1.027 billion. [All cash!] An
343

Affidavit of John C. Coffee, Jr. par. 24, In re Nasdaq
Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94
Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
344

See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 120.

345

Id. at 119.

346

Id. at 125.
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affidavit of Professor Michael Barclay showed that this amount
approximated plaintiffs’ individual damages.“347 On top of
this, the private litigation and the new SEC rules greatly
reduced NASDAQ spreads. An subsequent study showed a “large
decline” in NASDAQ spreads, resulting in newly “competitive
pricing.”348
Because the awarded attorneys' fees were quite modest in
percentage terms (only 13% of the total recovery), a total of
$896,233,301 were paid to class members. Approximately
1,249,500 claimants received payment, with a range from $25 to
more than $11 million.349 The cooperation between the private
plaintiffs and the government agencies resulted in the largest
antitrust recovery in history at the time of the final
settlement. And, as strikingly pointed out by Professor
Stephen Calkins: “NASDAQ did not follow a prior governmental
investigation. Indeed, the private action appears to have
triggered the governmental activity.”350

347

Id. at 128.

348

James P. Weston, “Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact
of Recent Market Reforms”, 55 J. Fin. 2565, 2566 (2000).
Kaplan at 128
349

Re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 2000-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) at 86,648 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
350

Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections On
Antitrust Class Actions, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 422 (1997). See
also id. at 443 (“NASDAQ’s genesis was entirely private.”)
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Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 902 F.Supp. 1394
(D.Kan. 1995); affirmed, 134 F. 3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998);
reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991).

This case is an interesting example of recent antitrust
litigation for six reasons: 1. The National Collegiate
Athletic Association holds a unique position in multiple
markets, as both a major producer and consumer, based on the
distinct relationship between higher education and sports
marketing; 2. The trial court: (i) examined the case under a
“quick look” rule of reason analysis, and (ii) made specific
determinations that there was an antitrust violation; 3. The
anticompetitive action significantly depressed wages in the
market for assistant college coaches; 4. The case included a
total of $74.5 million in cash paid by the defendants; 5.

Of

this total, $20 million (26.8%) went for attorneys’ fees and
expenses; 6. The case was exclusively litigated by private
parties, without any Federal or State action taken.

In 1989, the National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. (“NCAA”)
formed the Cost Reduction Committee (“Committee”) in response
to rising costs in athletic programs. “As a result of its
deliberations, the [c]ommittee proposed legislation
(collectively, the “Restricted Earnings Coach Rule”),”351 which
was subsequently adopted in January 1991 by Division I NCAA
members. Essentially the rule limited the number of coaches
allowed on each college team who were allowed to make more
than a baseline level set by the REC rule.
In 1994, several coaches who had been adversely affected
by the REC rule brought separate suits against the NCAA,

351

See Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 902 F.
Supp. 1394, 1400-401 n. 5 (D.Kan. 1995).
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claiming injuries as a result of antitrust violations.
Plaintiff’s jointly brought a motion for summary judgment
asserting that the “NCAA . . . conspired to limit the
compensation they will pay to one category of . . . coaches
[and] that the restriction on its face is an impermissible
restraint of trade.”352
In response, the NCAA offered several arguments designed
to show that the REC rule was justified, including: (1) The
rule was “necessary to maintain competitive equity and to
prevent schools from escalating personnel expenditures,”353
(2)”establish an “unrestricted” head or assistant coach
category that will accommodate any type of volunteer, paid,
full-time or part-time coach, and (3) establish a “restrictedearnings” category that will encourage the development of new
coaches while more effectively limiting compensation to such
coaches.”354
The trial court began its analysis by explaining that
although such an obvious case of horizontal price fixing among
NCAA Division I institutions would normally be subject to a
“per se” analysis, such application would be inappropriate
under the Supreme Courts holding in NCAA v. Board of Regents
of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).355 Based on the
unique situation of college sports, some horizontal collusion
is necessary to preserve the integrity of the NCAA and its

352

Id. at 1398.

353

Id. at 1399.

354

Id. at 1401.

355

Id. (explaining that the NCAA is “an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all”).
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ability to make college sports available to the public. As
such, the court analyzed the NCAA’s actions under a “quick
look” rule of reason standard.356
The trial court determined that the NCAA, through
application of the REC rule, prohibited the operation of the
free market by limiting demand for coaches, some of whom made
“$60,000 to $70,000” before the implementation of the rule.357
The court was not persuaded by any of the NCAA’s
justifications for the REC rule, finding that they offered no
evidence to support the conclusion that they were trying to
promote competition; rather, that the NCAA’s actions were
solely in the interest of it’s member institutions financial
stability. As such, the trial court granted the plaintiff
classes’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability, finding that the NCAA failed to meet the burden of
showing “that the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule actually
promotes a legitimate, pro-competitive objective.”358
Subsequent to the court granting plaintiffs’ motion, the
plaintiff groups filed motions for permanent injunction,359 and
a motion for class certification for proceedings on injunctive
relief and damages.360 Although the court recognized that many
356

“[U]nder the quick look standard[,] because adverse effects
on competition are apparent, the court does not require proof
of market power, and instead moves directly to an analysis of
the defendant's proffered competitive justifications for the
restraint.” Law v. NCAA at 1405.
357

Id.

358

Id. at 1410; affirmed 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).

359

Law v. NCAA, Not Reported in F.Supp., 1996 WL 104328
(D.Kan. 1996)
360

Schreiber v. NCAA, 167 F.R.D. 169 (D.Kan., 1996.)
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of the plaintiffs were no longer employed with NCAA Division I
schools, so as to be immediately in danger of suffering
irreparable harm, plaintiffs who could demonstrate harm would
be entitled to an injunction prohibiting the NCAA from
enacting similar legislation in the future. However, the court
declined to certify the plaintiffs as a class with respect to
damages, because they failed to show a manageable method of
dealing with individual issues of harm.
On plaintiffs’ request for interim attorneys fees
pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, the court
acknowledged that plaintiffs had substantially prevailed in
the litigation, however there were complications as to the
reasonable amount to be awarded each attorney. Although the
court ordered the NCAA to pay out interim fees by April 29,
1996, the NCAA failed to do so and had sanctions imposed by
the court accordingly.361 On appeal, the court upheld the order
imposing the payment of interim fees, but reversed based on
the trial courts failure to adequately notify the NCAA of the
possibility of being held in criminal contempt.
After the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed
the trial court’s order granting plaintiff classes motion for
summary judgment,362 the trial court considered the issue of
damages with regards to individual plaintiffs and the class as
a whole. In three separate class awards, class representatives
Law, Hall and Schreiber were awarded CPI adjusted damages of
$12,053,528.00, $10,194,861.00, and $1,704,059.00 for their
classes, respectively.363 After trebling of damages, the total
361

See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1025, (10th Cir. 1998).

362

Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).

363

Law v. NCAA, 185 F.R.D. 324 (D.Kan. 1999).
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amount of damages awarded to the classes was $71,857,344.00,
although the prior injunction against NCAA was reversed due to
availability of appropriate remedies for future harm.364
What appeared to be an ending to five years of back and
forth rulings and appeals was not quite over.
“Before the Court awarded attorneys' fees, the NCAA
agreed to pay $54,500,000.00 to settle the lawsuits.
On
August
31,
1999,
the
Court
approved
the
settlement but did not rule on the allocation of the
proceeds among class members. On August 31 and
September 3, 1999, the Court awarded attorneys fees
in the amount of $18,209,149.50 and costs in the
amount
of
$1,749,302.80
to
counsel
for
365
plaintiffs.”
In 2000, the court set out the terms of a revised settlement
allocation fund based on the trial testimony of plaintiffs’
expert; which was upheld on appeal as a reasonable method for
fair payment allocation. Finally, all of the excess damages
from the settlement, after paying out the coaches and
attorneys, were donated to various charitable organizations.

364

Id. at 350.

365

Law v. NCAA, 108 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1195 (D.Kan. 2000).
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North Shore Hematology & Oncology Associates v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 1:04cv248(EGS)(2004)(Platinol)

This case is notable because: 1. The plaintiffs obtained
a $50,000,000 verdict in a Section 2 case; 2. This case
settled in less than one year after its inception as a followup to an FTC case.366
Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) developed cisplatin, a drug
used to treat certain types of cancer, under the brand names
“Platinol” and “Platinol AQ” (Hereinafter collectively
referred to as “Platinol”).367

Both drugs contain the same

active ingredient, cisplatin.368

The Plaintiffs, direct

366

This case was filed on May 22, 2004. The Final Order
Approving Settlement was entered on November 30, 2004. Docket
entries available at: https://courtlink.lexisnexis.com/
DocketSearch/Results.aspx. The Federal Trade Commission filed
the government case on April 23, 2003. Complaint, In The
Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, A Corporation,
available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf. The
government case ended in a Consent Order on March 7, 2003.
According to FTC Chairman Timothy Muris, the consent order
“stands for an important proposition: competition must be on
the merits, not through misusing the government to stifle your
competition." FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern
of Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug
Competition, available at: www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm.
However, the government suit did not reimburse direct
purchasers for the overcharges they paid BMS as a result of
the company’s anticompetitive conduct.
367

Notice of Settlement at 1.

368

Id. The only significant difference between the two drugs
is that Platinol AQ is the aqueous form of the drug and
Platinol is a freeze-dried powder form.
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purchasers of Platinol, sued BMS for maintaining an illegal
monopoly in the cisplatin market, by fraudulently obtaining
patents and filing a series of “sham” patent infringement
lawsuits.369
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA grants pharmaceutical
companies a statutory monopoly when the company develops a new
drug.

During this exclusivity period, the drug manufacturer

is free from generic competition.

When the exclusivity period

ends, generic manufacturers may apply to the FDA for approval
to sell generic bioequivalents.370

During the generic approval

process, if a name brand manufacturer files a patent
infringement suit, it triggers an automatic thirty-month stay
against generic entry into the market.
Direct purchasers of Platinol sued BMS on February 13,
2004 under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.371

They argued that

BMS unlawfully maintained its monopoly by filing a series of

369

The market was defined as Platinol which was purchased
from “Bristol Myers Squibb Company or its wholly-owned
subsidiary Oncology Therapeutic Network, Inc., any time from
June 19, 1999 through September 8, 2004” in the United States.
Id.
370

Generic bioequivalents offer consumers the same
therapeutic value and active ingredients as their brand name
counterparts, at a significantly lower cost. Id.
371

They accused BMS and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Oncology
Therapeutic Network, Inc. of maintaining a monopoly from June
28, 1999 to September 8, 2004. Notice of Settlement at 1.
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frivolous patent infringement suits against would-be generic
competitors.

Due to the absence of generic competition, they

claimed that they were forced to purchase Platinol from BMS at
supracompetitive prices.
The putative anticompetitive conduct began in 1995, when
several generic manufacturers applied for FDA approval of
generic cisplatin.372

Less than two months before BMS’ patents

were set to expire, BMS applied for a new patent.373

BMS

stated it had recently discovered Platinol had additional
properties that were not included in the earlier patents.374
Specifically, the prior patents did not contain any “protected
from light” language.375

The plaintiffs argued that it was

common knowledge that Platinol and other Platinum-based
compounds had to be protected from light.376

According to the

372

Complaint at ¶ 111, In Re Bristol Myers Squibb Co., Before
Federal Trade Commission, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyerscmp.pdf
373

Id. at ¶ 115.

374

Id. at ¶ 113.

375

Cisplatin is a platinum-based compound, which is sensitive
from light. More importantly to the plaintiffs, the new
patent would also prolong BMS’ statutory monopoly in the
cisplatin market for another thirty months.
376

According to the plaintiffs, the fact that Platinol had to
be protected from light was common knowledge in the medical
field for some time. In fact, they argued that it was known
as far back as 1967, when this information was published in a
widely-read medical journal. Id. at ¶ 113.
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plaintiffs, BMS filed a series of “sham” infringement suits in
order to prevent generic competition.377
This case settled less than one year after its inception,
for $50 million in cash.378

The Court awarded Plaintiffs’

Counsel 33% of the settlement fund.379

The 33% award in this

case has been cited as precedent in other complex antitrust
cases involving pharmaceutical companies engaged in similar
conduct.380

377

In the first year generic competitors entered the cisplatin
market, Platinol sales decreased by fifty percent. Notice of
Settlement at 4. November 30, 2004.
378

Id.

379

Id.

380

The judge in Remeron cited this case as precedent, noting
that “the requested fee is consistent with awards in other
complex antitrust actions involving the pharmaceutical
industry”.In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013, 27044. Id.
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In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation (No. II), 186 F.R.D. 403
(S .D. Tex. 1999), 142 Oil & Gas Rep. 532 (1999)

This is a noteworthy example of private enforcement
because: 1) it involved a nationwide class action;

2) the

case brought a sizeable amount of cash to the class: $164.2
million under the Global settlement, plus $29.3 million in the
Stand Alone settlements, a total of $193.5 million;381 3) the
attorney fees were 25% of the total amount.

In 1996 a class action suit was filed against 39 oil
companies in federal court on behalf of a putative nationwide
class of royalty and working interest owners alleging that
those companies, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
conspired for over a decade to artificially depress payments
made for oil leases.382

These claims, asserted by the

plaintiffs in the McMahon case, depended on proving that
defendant oil producers and transporters entered a pricefixing conspiracy to depress posted prices, and thereby,
depressed the market price for oil at the lease.
One year later, the lead plaintiffs in the class action
suits presented a settlement agreement with 24 defendants.
Before any ruling on that settlement, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred these suits to the
District Court, S.D. Texas, for coordinated and consolidated
proceedings as In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation.383
381

None of the recovery came from a foreign corporation.

382

McMahon Found. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 98 Fed. Appx. 267
(5th Cir. 2004).
383

186 F.R.D. 403, 408 (S.D Tex. 1999). Prior to the
class action, there was significant litigation and discovery
in several actions consolidated in this case. Mr. Godfrey
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The Court facilitated the division of the parties present
into four groups: Settling Plaintiffs (including Godfrey and
Kipple (the two lead plaintiffs in the class action suits
[above]), and counsel for related settling cases), Settling
Defendants, Non-settling Plaintiffs and Non-settling
Defendants.384

The Settling Defendants and Settling Plaintiffs

presented testimony in support of their respective positions
and in support of the Global Settlement.

In addition to the

Global Settlement, counsel for both the Settling Plaintiffs
and Non-settling Plaintiffs reached seven distinct settlement
agreements with seven remaining Non-settling Defendants, which
make up the Stand Alone Settlements.385

Since these seven

defendants represented all of the remaining significant
defendants in the oil industry, the final approval, given by
the Court, of these Stand Alone Settlements along with the
began investigating this litigation in 1993, and entered
global settlement negotiations when on the brink of beginning
a class certification hearing. Id. Actual notice of the eight
settlements was attempted to all class members who had
received payments from Defendants since 1986. In McMahon, the
plaintiffs were forced to amend their initial complaint, and
subsequently, they successfully defended their amended
complaint from motions to dismiss by various defendants.
McMahon Found., 98 Fed. Appx. at 267-70. There were
approximately five million documents in the MDL-1206 document
depository, and it is estimated that there were several
million more documents which counsel have made available for
review. Id. at 408.
384

Id. at 408.

385

The Stand Alone Settlements adopt the basic structure of
the Global Settlement with limited exceptions, using the same
definitions and releasing the same set of underpayment claims
for the same class of royalty and working interest owners.
The important difference between the Global and Stand Alone
Settlements is the consideration provided and the rate of
recovery to certain class members for their royalty and/or
working interest barrels.
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Global Settlement meant the conclusion of the multidistrict
litigation.
In order to understand the basis of the plaintiff’s
claims for damages, it is necessary to explain some background
information about the oil industry – in particular, about the
movement of crude oil from the well or “lease” to the trading
centers.

There are certain kinds of transactions that take

place at the two transfer points: 1) at the lease, where oil
is transferred from the well into a transportation system of
some type, and 2) at the trading center.

At the trading

centers oil is sold at a price which unquestionably represents
the actual market value of the oil at those trading centers.
The market price at the trading center is certainly a reliable
measure of market value because hundreds of thousands of
barrels are purchased each day at these centers by numerous
refiners which compete for these barrels.

The common factual

issue is that if there was a differential between the market
price at the trading center and the posted price greater than
the value added by its movement to the market center.

The

legal issue is, if this differential was greater than the
value added, who was entitled to the profit?
The plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Leitzinger,
estimated the damages from 1986 to 1998.

Including interest,

the estimate of damages due to alleged underpayments by Global
Defendants amounted to $358.8 million.386

Under the Global

Settlement the first tier royalty owners recovered $116.19
million, 32% of their estimated damages.

The court accepted

these calculated figures because it later stated “compared

386

In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. at 434.
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with other complex commercial class action settlements, a
recovery of over 32% is substantial.”387
Each of the settlements in this case had established a
common fund for the benefit of the nationwide class of royalty
and working interest owners of the crude oil companies and the
funds totaled over $190 million.

Each settlement provided

that attorney’s fees will not exceed 25% of the Settlement
Amount.388

The Court acknowledged that “the plaintiff

attorneys have had to work harder to represent this class due
to its size and diversity; they have not simply benefited from
the fact that, a single tortuous act harmed millions of people
rather than thousands.”389

It stated that the case required

such a large initial investment by the attorneys, and was made
more difficult due to the sheer number and variety of

387

See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D.
297, 325 (N.D. Ga. 1993). The court in that case stated that
applying the range of value of the combined settlement, the
court finds that the settlement in this action amounts to
approximately 12.7-15.3% of the estimated $2 billion minimum
possible untrebled recovery.

388

In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. at 434. The
Fifth Circuit in Johnson recommended 12 factors for the
district courts to use as they reconsidered the award: 1) time
and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; 3) the skill required to perform the legal
service properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee;
6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitation
imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount
involved and results obtained; 9)the experience, reputation
and ability of the attorneys involved; 10)the “undesirability”
of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and 12)awards in similar cases.
See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19
(5th Cir. 1974).
389

In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. at 447.
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members.390

The Court concluded by stating that since the

attorneys had done extraordinary work, had tackled novel
issues, and had gained a relatively high recovery and
substantial benefit for the class, and since the size of the
settlement did not warrant a drastic reduction in the
percentage of the fee in these circumstances, the attorneys’
fee award of 25% was accepted.391
With respect with the Second Tier Claimants, the expert
witness calculated the oil barrels were damaged by 32 cents
per barrel while those barrels were damaged by 49 cents per
barrel.

The Claimants would then receive 3% of their

estimated damages for early barrels and 13% of their estimated
damages for late barrels.

Thus, the Plaintiffs could recover

$48 million for the Claimants under the Global Settlement.
The Court found that the recovery aspects of the Global
Settlement were fair, adequate and reasonable.

390

Id.

391

Id. at 448-49.
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Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Per Local Civil Rule
40.5, Related to Civil Action Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233 (D.D.C.
2002)(a/k/a AOL v. Microsoft).

The Settlement of the lawsuit brought by Netscape
Communications against Microsoft is noteworthy because (1) it
was in large part a follow on private suit to the combined
federal and state government suit against Microsoft392 (2) it
resulted in a cash settlement of $750 million393; (3) the
parties who were once fierce competitors have agreed to become
collaborators of software and distribution of each other’s
products394; and (4) it leaves outstanding the issue of
anticompetitive consequences for consumers of Microsoft’s
continuing domination in the browser and operating system
markets.395
In the mid 1990’s Netscape Navigator, an internet
browser, was dominant with over a 70% share in the browser
392

United States v. Microsoft, Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233 (D.D.C.
1998).

393

David D. Kilpatrick & Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Pay AOL $750
Million; End to 'Long War,' New York Times A6 (May 30, 2003);
David E. Vise, Microsoft, AOL Bridge Digital Divide,
Washington Post E1 (May 30, 2003); Julia Angwin, Robert A.
Guth, and John R. Wilke, Microsoft Settles AOL Browser Suit –
Software Maker to Pay $750 million to Its Rival, Wall Street
Journal A3 (May, 20, 2003).

394

Id.

395

A Big Deal; Microsoft and AOL Time Warner, The Economist,
June 7, 2003 at 67.
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market.396 Netscape was unique as it could be run on different
operating systems as well as it could be used as a platform
itself to write software applications.397 The emergence of this
new browser worried executives at Microsoft.398 Their main fear
was that Netscape would threaten their Windows monopoly in the
operating system market.399
Windows is the dominant operating system as it is used in
more than 90% of the PC’s in this country.400 Its dominance is
mainly attributed to the fact that it can run a large number
of software applications, many of which are written to run
exclusively on Windows.401 Consequently, Microsoft never faced
a threat from a competing operating system.402 However, with
the emergence of Netscape, Microsoft now faced a threat that a
browser that can be run on any operating system could be used

396

Government’s Complaint at 2, United States v. Microsoft
Corp. (D.D.C. 1998)(Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233).

397

Id. at 3.

398

Id.

399

Id.

400

Id. at 1.

401

Id.

402

Id.
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as a rival platform that could run software programs.403
Therefore, the multi-billion dollar Windows monopoly was in
jeopardy.
What ensued was the so-called “browser wars” in which
Microsoft sought to minimize the threat to its Windows
monopoly by increasing its share of the browser market.404
Microsoft’s browser, Internet Explorer, was the alternative to
Netscape and an extensive campaign was launched to market
it.405
This campaign garnered the attention of Department of
Justice, who along with Attorney Generals from 19 different
states filed suit against Microsoft in 1998.406 After more than
a year of proceedings the District Court for the District
Columbia issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law
that Microsoft had engaged in an anticompetitive campaign
against Netscape.407 Following the conclusions found in the
government’s case, American Online (AOL), which had purchased

403

Id. at 2.

404

Id. at 4.

405

Id.

406

Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, Netscape Comm. Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., Per Local Civil Rule 40.5, Related to Civil
Action Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233 (D.D.C. 2002).
407

Id.
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Netscape, privately sued Microsoft.408 AOL’s allegations
substantially mirrored the government’s complaint of
Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct.409
Specifically, they made several allegations. First, they
accused Microsoft of tying Internet Explorer to the Windows
operating system410. Second, they alleged exclusionary
agreements that prevented other companies from selling,
buying, marketing or using Netscape Navigator.411 Lastly, they
alleged that Microsoft monopolized and attempted to monopolize
the PC operating system and browser markets.412
In May 2003, AOL and Microsoft reached a settlement.413
The two companies had agreed to several terms. First,
Microsoft was to pay AOL $750 million.414 Second, AOL will
receive a seven year, royalty free use of Internet Explorer on
its online service as well as long term license to use

408

Id. at 1.

409

Id. at 12-19.; United States v. Microsoft (D.D.C.
1998)(Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233).

410

Id.

411

Id. at 5-6.

412

Id. at 15-16.
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David D. Kilpatrick & Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Pay AOL $750
Million; End to 'Long War,' New York Times A6 (Mar. 30, 2003).

414
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Microsoft’s media software.415 Third, Microsoft agreed to
distribute AOL CD ROM’s to Original Equipment Manufacturers
around the world.416 Lastly, both companies agreed to make each
other’s instant messaging services interoperable with one
another.417
Overall, Microsoft and AOL have entered into a win-win
collaborative effort. Microsoft will be able to further expand
the dissemination and use of its software into even more
markets.418 On the other hand, AOL is able to get a badly
needed infusion of cash as it was $25 billion in debt.419
Moreover, AOL was able to expand the dissemination of its
fledgling internet service as well as expand its appeal with
the royalty free use of Microsoft software.420
While the settlement might be a good deal for both
companies, what about the consumers? Critics have charged that

415

Id.

416

Julia Angwin, Robert A. Guth & John R. Wilke, Microsoft
Settles AOL Browser Suit --- Software Maker to Pay $750
Million to Its Rival; Wide Collaboration Is Set, Wall Street
Journal A3 (Mar. 30, 2003).

417

Id.
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A Big Deal; Microsoft and AOL Time Warner, The Economist,
June 7, 2003 at 67.

419

Id.

420

Id.

153

this settlement is only about the two companies’ future in
digital media and not about past anticompetitive behavior.421
Furthermore, this settlement might be the “final nail in the
Netscape Coffin.”422 This is so because this settlement does
nothing to address Internet Explorer’s continuing domination
in the browser market.423 Therefore, consumers are still left
with little choice in both the browser and operating system
markets.424

421

Id.

422

Id.

423

Id.

424

Id.
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Oncology & Radiation Associates v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co.,
Case No. 1:04CV00248 (D.D.C.) (Taxol).

This case is notable because: 1. The class obtained a
$65,815,000.00 settlement in a Section 2 rule of reason
action; 2. This was a private action which preceded government
actions against the manufacturer.
Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) manufactures a chemotherapy
drug under the brand name, Taxol.425
Taxol is paclitaxel.426

The active ingredient in

BMS developed paclitaxel during a

research venture with the National Cancer Institute.427

The

National Cancer Institute awarded BMS the right to manufacture
paclitaxel exclusively for five years.428
When the exclusivity period ended, generic competitors
attempted to enter the paclitaxel market.429

Generic drugs

have the same therapeutic value and active ingredients as
425

Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v.
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No.
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003)(available at
http://www.completeclaimsolutions.com/taxol/pdf/notice.pdf).
426

Patrick Cafferty, Miller Faucher & Cafferty LLP, Collusion
and Other Anticompetitive Practices: A Survey of Class Action
Lawsuits Against Drug Manufacturers 21, http://www.familiesusa
.org/assets/pdfs/3rd_edition_lawsuit_surveys_pmd30c3.pdf
(January 2004).
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Id.
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their brand name counterparts.

430

However, generic drugs cost

significantly less than their name brand counterparts.431
Direct purchasers of paclitaxel filed suit against BMS in
2001.432

The suit alleged that BMS engaged in anticompetitive

conduct in order to keep generic equivalents of Taxol off the
market from January 1999 to March 2003.433

Specifically,

direct purchasers argued that BMS abused the FDA patent
process by filing frivolous lawsuits against generic drug
manufacturers, and paid off would-be competitors to stay out
of the paclitaxel market.434

Some have estimated during this

period, BMS made $3 million each day on Taxol.435

430

FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug
Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm (March 7,
2003).
431

Id.

432

Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v.
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No.
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003).
(available at http://www.completeclaimsolutions.com/
taxol/pdf/notice.pdf).
433

Id.

434

Id.

435

Common Cause, Prescription For Power: How Brand Name Drug
Companies Prevailed Over Consumers in Washington,
http://www.hatch2006.org/positionpapers/ppPharmaceuticalReport
.html#_4 (June 12, 2001).
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Drug manufacturers have to record patents related to
brand name drugs in the FDA publication referred to as the
“Orange Book”.436

When a generic drug manufacturer seeks FDA

approval, the generic manufacturer must certify to the FDA
that the drug will not infringe upon any patents in the Orange
Book.437

The generic manufacturer must put the brand name

manufacturer on notice of its intentions to introduce a
generic equivalent.438

If, within 45 days, the brand name drug

manufacturer files a patent infringement suit against the
generic drug manufacturer, the FDA automatically delays entry
of the generic drug into the market for thirty months.439

The

purchasers alleged that BMS abused this process, by filing a
series of baseless patent infringement suits in order to delay
generic competitors from entering the market.440
In addition to filing frivolous patent suits in order to
delay the entry of generic paclitaxel, the plaintiffs also
alleged that BMS colluded with American Bioscience Inc.(ABI),

436

FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug
Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm (March 7,
2003).
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Id.

440
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a generic manufacturer, to settle its “sham” patent case.

BMS

settled this case with ABI for over $70 million in exchange
for ABI’s promise that it would refrain from obtaining a
patent for generic paclitaxel.441
The direct purchasers filed suit against BMS and ABI in
November 2001, and the parties settled the suit on August 14,
2003.442

The class of direct purchasers received

$65,815,000.00.443

BMS paid $65 million, and ABI paid

$815,000.00.444
The Court noted that by the time the parties reached a
settlement, private counsel had undertaken an “intensive”
investigation, examined thousands of pages of documents,
retained and consulted with experts; and had “significant”

441

FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug
Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm (March 7,
2003).
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Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Antitrust,
http://www.cmht.com/antitrust.php (accessed June 4, 2006).
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Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v.
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No.
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003)(available at
http://www.completeclaimsolutions.com/taxol/pdf/notice.pdf).
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knowledge of issues such as liability, causation, and
damages.445 The attorneys were awarded 30% in legal fees.446
Following the commencement of this private action in
2001, several government actions were brought against BMS on
behalf of indirect purchasers.447

In 2002, several states and

the District of Columbia filed suits against BMS.448

The

Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against BMS in
2003, alleging the same anticompetitive conduct.449

This case

was resolved when the FTC and BMS entered into a consent order
in which BMS agreed to cease its anticompetitive practices in
order to hamper the entry of generic drugs into the paclitaxel

445

Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v.
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No.
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003)(available at
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Terry Carter, A Deluge of Lawsuits 88 A.B.A.J. 45
(December, 2002).
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FTC, Plaintiff’s Complaint In the Matter of Bristol-Myers
Squibb 26, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf
(April 14, 2003).
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market.450

When generic paclitaxel finally entered the market,

Taxol sales fell by 50%.451

450

Marcus Meier, Overview of FTC Antitrust Actions In Health
Care Services And Products 4, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
0604hcupdate.pdf (April 2006).

451

FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug
Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm (March 7,
2003).
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Stop N Shop Supermarket Company, et. al.v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp. Civil Action No. 03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. 2005), and;
Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 00-CV-6222 (E.D.
Pa.2005) (Paxil)

These cases are notable because: 1:

The Stop N Shop

direct purchaser case resulted in a “megafund” settlement of
$100 million dollars; 2: The Court awarded Plaintiffs’ Counsel
in the Stop N Shop case 20% of the megafund settlement because
of the extraordinary quality of their work; 3: Plaintiffs in
the Nichols case, an indirect purchaser action, received a
settlement of $65 million against Defendant Smithkline Beecham
for the same anticompetitive conduct, and awarded counsel a
30% fee; 4:

The Plaintiffs in both cases coordinated

discovery during the litigation; 5:

These cases were brought

against Smithkline Beecham under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
in the absence of any formal government investigation or
lawsuit.
The plaintiffs in Stop N Shop Supermarket were direct
purchasers of Paxil.

The Plaintiffs in Nichols

were indirect

purchasers of Paxil.

Defendant Smithkline Beecham (“SKB”)

manufactured the antidepressant drug paroxetine hydrochloride
under the brand Paxil.
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The plaintiffs claimed one count of monopolization under
the Section 2 of the Sherman Act.452

Both classes of

plaintiffs alleged that SKB abused the FDA patent approval
process in order to illegally maintain its Paxil monopoly.
Because SKB developed the drug, the company was entitled to a
five-year statutory monopoly under FDA policy.453

After this

exclusivity period ended, SKB filed numerous patent
infringement lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers that
attempted to enter the paclitaxel market.454
The plaintiffs argued that SKB filed these “sham”
lawsuits to illegally maintain their monopoly in the
paroxetine market and fix prices.455

The Stop N Shop direct

purchaser plaintiffs estimated that SKB’s anticompetitive
conduct cost them $880 million in damages.456

The indirect

purchaser plaintiffs in the Nichols case estimated the

452

Id at 8.

453

J. Padova, Memorandum accompanying Order Granting
Attorneys’ Fees, Stop N Shop Supermarket, et. al., p.1.
19, 2005.
454

Id at 2.

455

Id at 2.

456

Id at 21.
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May

overcharge that SKB passed along to consumers to be 35
percent.457
During discovery, SKB was facing two lawsuits alleging
the same anticompetitive conduct, the Stop N Shop case brought
by direct purchasers, and, the Nichols case brought on behalf
of indirect purchasers.458

Plaintiffs’ counsel in both cases

coordinated discovery with each other, leading to a timely
result in Stop N Shop.459

Both of these private cases were

brought against SKB without of any prior government case or
even a formal investigation.460
The Stop N Shop case settled about one year after its
inception.

Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the Motion For Class

Certification and the Motion For Preliminary Approval Of
Settlement with the District Court on the same day.461

The

$100 million settlement represented about 11% of their

457

Smithkline Beecham: News of FTC Probe Triggers Dual Suits
Over Paxil, Class Action Reporter, December 14, 2000 Vol. 2,
No. 142.
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 9.
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J. Padova, Memorandum accompanying Order Granting
Attorneys Fees, Stop N Shop Supermarket v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., p. 13, May 19, 2005.
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estimated damages.462

This was a “megafund” settlement,

meaning that the case resulted in a recovery of $100 million
or more.
Attorneys’ fees are typically awarded on a sliding scale,
with the percentage awarded decreasing as the amount of
recovery increases.463

Plaintiffs’ counsel requested 30% of

the settlement fund,464 and none of the 90 sophisticated
corporations which comprised the direct purchaser class
objected to counsels’ request for 30%.465
Ultimately, however, the Court awarded 20% of the
settlement fund to Plaintiffs’ counsel.466

The Court observed

that “the litigation presented enormously complex legal and
factual issues…moreover, this action was riskier than many
other antitrust actions because there was no prior government
investigation, or prior finding of civil or criminal liability
based on antitrust violations”.467

462

Id. at 21.
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Id. at 22.
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Id. at 24.
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Id. at 35.
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Id. at 44.
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PA Judge Slashes Fees in Paxil Case, Class Action
Reporter, June 1, 2005, Vol 7, No. 107

164

Although the number of hours plaintiffs’ counsel spent on
the case was relatively small, Judge Padova commented, "The
court recognizes that plaintiffs' counsel should not
be penalized for prosecuting this case in an efficient manner,
or for keeping down the number of hours which they were
required to devote to this case by coordinating merits
discovery with plaintiffs' counsel” (in the indirect purchaser
case).468
Judge Padova expressed the idea that although it is
typical for courts to decrease the percentage amount awarded
for attorneys’ fees as the settlement amount increases, there
is no hard and fast rule.

In a case such as this, a 20% award

was justified because class counsel’s work was so “timely and
well done”.469
Judge Padova also granted attorneys fees in the Nichols
case.

From the $65 million settlement, Plaintiffs’ Counsel

received $19.5 million dollars, which is 30%.470

Attorneys in

the Nichols case spent more than 17,000 hours working on the

468

J. Padova, Memorandum accompanying Order Granting
Attorneys Fees, p. 30, Stop N Shop Supermarket v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., May 19, 2005.
469

Id.
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PA Judge Slashes Fees in Paxil Case, Class Action
Reporter, June 1, 2005, Vol 7, No. 107
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case to reach the settlement.471

It is believed that SKB paid

millions more to private plaintiffs that opted out of the
class actions in confidential settlement agreements.472

471

Id.

472

Id.
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In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
The polypropylene litigation is important because 1. it
started with a different private antitrust suit, that led to a
government conviction, that led to this litigation; 2. the
government suit led to a judicial finding of price fixing and
an executive serving prison time; 3) the cases involved a
nationwide class action, 4) the settlements totaled $49.7
million; 4) Legal fees were 33 1/3% plus expenses.

In 1993 Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills, a private carpet and
fibermaker sued Shaw Industries,473 the nation’s largest
publicly traded carpetmaker, for illegal monopolization.474
The suit alleged that Shaw had illegal monopolies in the
manufacture of residential carpet and polypropylene fiber,
that Shaw tried to lure Diamond into a price-fixing scheme,
and that Shaw cajoled Dupont, the maker of the widely popular
treated nylon carpet fiber called Stainmaster, into refusing
to sell the Stainmaster fiber to Diamond.475

473

See Susan Harte, Suit Threatens Fiber of Carpet Industry,
Shaw Accused of Holding Monopolies, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., July 6,
1993, at E1.
474

Id.

475

Id.
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The suit against Shaw attracted the attention of the
Justice Department, and it began investigating several carpet
makers that used Dupont’s Stainmaster nylon carpet fiber,
including Beaulieu of America, Mohawk Industries, and Sunrise
Carpet Industries.476

In late 1994, Diamond and Shaw settled

their suit and had the results sealed.477
On June 7, 1995 the Justice Department brought charges
against Sunrise Carpet Industries and its Chairman, Johnny A.
West.

The charges stated that Sunrise and Mr. West “engaged

in a combination and conspiracy to fix, raise, and maintain
prices of twenty-ounce level-loop polypropylene ("poly")
carpet in the United States” between October 1992 and, at
least, June 1993 which violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.478
Sunrise and Mr. West plead guilty to one count of price
fixing, and a federal judge sentenced Mr. West to a twelve

476

See Susan Harte, Shaw-Diamond Quarrel Possible Trigger,
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., December 14, 1995, at 6F.
477

See Beenea A. Hyatt, Firms Pile on Carpet Lawsuit; Federal
Case To Go To Trial By 1999, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, October 8, 1997,
at B1.
478

Complaint, U.S. v West (N.D. Ga. 1995) (1:95-CR-240).
Sunrise and Mr. West also were accused of agreeing with fellow
carpet makers to charge prices above certain levels on
polypropylene carpet and of communicating with fellow carpet
makers on prices for polypropylene carpets. Id.
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month prison sentence and fined him $150,000; Sunrise was
fined $750,000.479
A civil complaint was then filed by seventeen plaintiffs,
who were direct purchasers, against Sunrise Industries, and in
December 1995 six other carpet makers were added as defendants
to the suit.480

The new defendants included Shaw Industries,

Mohawk Industries, and Beaulieu of America, the three largest
carpet makers in the country.481

In 1997, the U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the
plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class Action,482 and it was
estimated that were potentially 4,000 to 5,000 plaintiffs in
the suit.
After class certification, the litigation proceeded and
the next major development was in 2000 when the court ruled on

479

The sentencing judge stated that “Mr. West provided complete
information about a multi-corporation price-fixing scheme,”
but there were no more indictments brought forth by the
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice closed its
investigation of price fixing in the carpet industry in 1997.
See Susan Harte, Sunrise Carpet Chief Sentenced in Antitrust
Case, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., September 16, 1995, at 3B.
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See Don Plummer, Carpet Pricing Challenged; An Expanded
Lawsuit Now Targets the Industry’s Biggest Manufacturers,
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., December 14, 1995, at 1F.
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In 1995, Shaw Industries had $2.96 billion in annual sales,
Mohawk Industries: $1.64 billion, and Beaulieu of America:
$903 million. Id.
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See In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 996 F.
Supp 18 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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the Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony.483

The

Plaintiffs intended to introduce the testimony of an economist
to “analyze whether the conditions in the polypropylene carpet
market during a particular period were consistent with
competitive or collusive activity;”484 and an econometrician
who had developed a model “to forecast competitive prices
during the time period at issue, and identify any difference
between the actual prices of polypropylene carpet and the
forecasted competitive prices during that period.”485

The

expert estimated that there has been an overcharge of 8.3% by
Defendants which resulted in the Plaintiffs being overcharged
$222,963,542.486

The court concluded that the Plaintiffs’

expert witnesses satisfied the Daubert criteria and denied
Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Testimony.487
Shortly after the court’s decision regarding the expert
witnesses, Shaw Industries and Mohawk Industries announced
they had agreed to settle the lawsuit.

Shaw agreed to pay

$27.5 million and Mohawk agreed to pay $13.5 million.488

483
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See In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
484

Id. at 1351.
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Id.
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Id. at 1360.

487

Id. at 1370, 1352.
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year later, in March 2001, Beaulieu of America also agreed to
settle for $8.7 million.489

The final aggregate settlement

amount was $49.7 million.
After the settlement was reached, Judge Murphy granted
the Plaintiffs motion for attorneys’ fess and reimbursement.
The court awarded the attorneys fees in the amount of 33 1/3%
of the total settlement fund plus accrued interest.

The court

also awarded the attorneys $3,329,622.52 in out-of-pocket
expenses.

.

488

See Patti Bond, Shaw, Mohawk Will Settle in Carpet PriceFixing Suit, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., August 12, 2000, at 3F.

489

See Beaulieu of America Settles Antitrust Class Actions, THE
WEEKLY NEWSPAPER FOR THE HOME FURNISHING NETWORK, March 5, 2001, at 32.
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RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. JFM04-968, MDL Docket No. 1332 (D. Md.) (2005 settlement)
This settlement of the lawsuit brought by RealNetworks,
Inc., (“Real”) against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) is
noteworthy because (1) it was the last of the major competitor
lawsuits pending against Microsoft; (2) the recovery will be
at least $478 million, and possibly as much as $761 million,
depending on how many subscribers Real receives from its
collaborative efforts on MSN; (3) the parties agreed to
cooperate on the creation and distribution of what had
previously been competing products; and (4) it resulted in the
withdrawal of claims against Microsoft before competition
authorities in the European Union (“EU”) and South Korea
(“Korea”) as well as the dismissal of Real’s complaint,
involving Section 1 and 2 claims, in the United States.
This was not a “follow on case” to the Department of
Justice’s (“DoJ”) earlier lawsuit against Microsoft, although
it alleged similar misconduct by Microsoft. The DoJ case
concerned Microsoft’s bundling of its web browser with the
Windows operating system (“Windows”). Real’s lawsuit, on the
other hand, concerned a different product, i.e., Microsoft’s
bundling of the media player with Windows. In this sense,
RealNetwork’s lawsuit could be called a “follow on case” to
the EU’s preliminary decision in August 2003 that Microsoft’s
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bundling violated the EU’s competition law.490 RealNetworks had
participated in the EU proceedings as a witness,491 and in
October 2004 RealNetworks filed a complaint with the Korea
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) regarding Microsoft’s bundling of
the media player.492
Real filed the lawsuit against Microsoft on December 18,
2003.493 Microsoft and Real competed directly against each

490

C|Net, EU Closes in on Microsoft Penalty (Aug. 6, 2003),
available at
http://news.com.com/EU+closes+in+on+Microsoft+penalty/21001016_3-5060463.html. In March 2004, a final decision against
Microsoft was issued. Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.792
(2004) (Microsoft). Indeed, Real CEO Ron Glaser told
shareholders in a cover letter to the 2003 Annual report that
the “recent European Commission ruling against Microsoft
regarding its media player bundling practices reinforces” the
company’s view “that the merits of our case are relatively
strong and that the funds spent pursuing this litigation will
be money well spent.” RealNetworks, Inc., 2003 Annual Report
115 (2004).

491

Seattle Post-Intelligencer, RealNetworks sues Microsoft
(Dec. 19, 2003), avaliable at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/153239_realsuit19.html.
492

InfoWorld, Korea to hear Microsoft Competition case (July
8, 2005) available at
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A
=/article/05/07/08/HNmskorea_1.html. Ultimately, the KFTC
fined Microsoft and ordered the firm to remedy its bundling
practices. InfoWorld, Update: Microsoft fined $32M by South
Korea (Dec. 7, 2005) available at
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A
=/article/05/12/07/HNmicrosoftfined_1.html.

493

RealNetworks, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., Complaint, No. C035717 (JW) (EAI) (N.D. Cal. 2003). The case was subsequently
transferred to Judge Motz of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, who was hearing most of the
173

other, as well as Apple and Macromedia (now a subsidiary of
Adobe), in the media player, server and digital rights
management (“DRM”) markets.494
Although not a true “follow on case” to the DoJ
litigation, Real’s complaint relied heavily on the findings
from the DoJ’s case against Microsoft, and alleged that
Microsoft deliberately pursued the same tactics against Real’s
products, e.g., bundling of competitive products with Windows,
exclusive dealing contracts with PC manufacturers and content
providers for Microsoft products, preventing consumers from
removing Microsoft’s media player, denying Real access to
technical information, etc., that Microsoft successfully used
against Netscape’s web browser. Real alleged that the conduct
enabled Microsoft to maintain its monopoly in PC operating
systems as well as to create a monopoly in various digital
media markets in violation of the Sherman and Cartwright Acts.
More specifically, Real claimed illegal monopoly maintenance
in the operating systems market attempted monopolization of
the digital media markets under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
as well as tying of the media player and the streaming media
follow on cases to the DoJ’s action against Microsoft. See,
RealNetworks, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., No. JFM-04-968, MDL
Docket No. 1332 (D. Md.).
494

Michael J. DeMaria, Screaming Streaming Media, Network
Computing, Feb. 2006, at 47. Interestingly, Real’s complaint
does not list Macromedia as a competitor. Complaint, at 10.
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server to the desktop and server operating systems and
exclusive dealing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.495

Real

sought both damages and injunctive relief.
Real’s Annual Report for 2005 revealed that it had spent
$1.6 million on legal fees for the case 2003, $11 million in
2004, and $55 million in 2005.496 Real received $478 million
from Microsoft in 2005.497 In the “Shareholder Letter”
contained in the 2005 Annual Report, CEO Ron Glaser noted that
the settlement had “substantially enlarged” Real’s profit for
2005. More precisely, the company would not have “returned to
GAAP profitability” without the settlement.498 But for the $478
million from Microsoft, Real would have suffered a $166
million net loss for 2005.499
In addition to the $478 million paid to Real in 2005,
Microsoft agreed to pay Real an additional $283 million over

495

RealNetworks, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., Complaint, No. C035717 (JW) (EAI) 46-55 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
496

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 28 (2006). These
were not immaterial costs for RealNetworks. The legal fees
equaled 1% of Real’s total net revenue for 2003, 4% for 2004,
and 17% of the net revenue for 2005. Id. at 31.
497

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 30 (2006). The
settlement payment exceeded net revenues in 2005 by $153
million. Id. at 28, 30.
498

“Shareholder Letter,“ reprinted in RealNetworks, Inc., 2005
Annual Report (2006).

499

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 28 (2006).
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the next two years.500 Microsoft also agreed to “promote and
integrate” Real’s music and game services with Microsoft’s MSN
network.501 The $283 million may be reduced depending on how
many subscribers Real receives from the collaborative efforts
on MSN.502 Microsoft agreed to provide Real with technical data
and assistance in software development,503 but Microsoft did
not agree to end its bundling practices or to allow users to
remove the media player from Windows.504
Other than returning the company to profitability for the
first time since 1999, it is not clear that the settlement
achieved its objectives. For example, the 2005 Annual Report
states that the company “cannot predict whether consumers will
adopt or maintain our media player products …, especially in
light of the fact that Microsoft bundles its competing Windows
Media Player with its Windows operating system.”505 Similarly,

500

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 30 (2006).

501

“Shareholder Letter,“ reprinted in RealNetworks, Inc., 2005
Annual Report (2006).

502

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 30 (2006).

503

See Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement Between Microsoft
Corporation and RealNetworks, Inc.: Windows Technology
Commitments in RealNetworks Inc., Form 10-K, Exhibit 10.24,
”Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement” (March 16, 2006).
504

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 13 (2006).

505

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 13 (2006).
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the Annual Report noted that notwithstanding the settlement,
“Microsoft will continue to be an aggressive competitor”506 and
Microsoft’s “dominant position” as well as “its aggressive
activities … will likely continue to have … adverse effects on
our business and operating results.”507

506

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 14 (2006).

507

RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 16 (2006).
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Red Eagle Resources, et al. v. Baker Hughes Inc., et al., No.
4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 1991)(In re Drill Bits
Antitrust Litigation)

Summary: These related cases concern an agreement between four
of the major drill bit manufacturers to artificially fix
prices of roller cone drill bits used in drilling oil and gas
wells. They are noteworthy because: 1) the primary source of
the litigation was a private suit. Despite the fact that the
Drill Bits Litigation followed a government investigation, the
government investigation had been prompted by a private suit;
2) Two of the private settlements preceded guilty pleas and
settlements in their criminal counterpart; 3) Counsel achieved
a settlement with Dresser Industries, a drill bit manufacturer
not included in the government suit; 4) The total settlement
was for $53.4 million dollars; and 5) Counsel was awarded a
fee of 30.8%.
This case can be traced back to a private suit between
two drill bit manufacturers, Rockbit International of Fort
Worth and Baker Hughes, one of the defendants in the Drill
Bits Antitrust Litigation.508 Baker Hughes had brought suit
against Rockbit for violating a patent agreement. While
discovery was being conducted, Rockbit came across a memo from
508

David Ivanovich, Drill Bit Makers Face Charges of
Conspiring to Fix Prices, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Oct. 23,
1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 3253623).
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Baker Hughes to a sales manager at Reed Tool Co. in Houston,
which implicated the parties in a price fixing scheme.509
Rockbit then filed suit against Baker Hughes in November
1989 claiming the company violated federal antitrust laws by
fixing prices, tying its products, and forcing Rockbit out of
business in order to protect its price fixing conspiracy.510
Rockbit was not successful in this suit and a motion to
dismiss was granted on June 24, 1991. The court found that
Rockbit, as a manufacturer lacked the proper standing to bring
the suit.511
This litigation prompted a Justice Department
investigation and a private antitrust suit (“Drill Bits”).
The DOJ conducted a investigation into the pricing practices
of three of the major drill bit manufacturers named in the
private action: Baker Hughes, Smith International d/b/a Reed
Tool Company and Camco International.512 The government brought
two different suits, one against Baker Hughes and one against
Smith International and Camco International. Dresser
509

Id.

510

Rockbit Indus. U.S.A., Inc., v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 802
F.Supp. 1544, 1546-47 (S.D.Tex. 1991).

511

Id.

512

L.M. Sixe, Texas Firms Agree to Settle Price-Fixing
Dispute, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Sept. 10, 1993)(Available in 1993
WLNR 3254515).
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Industries, a defendant named in the private Drill Bits suit
was not indicted.
The DOJ charged that between March and November 1989,
Smith and Camco violated the Sherman Act. The two companies
allegedly conspired to fix prices for roller cone drill bits
by reducing discounts and by publishing new price lists. The
government alleged that 500 customers - including independent
drilling contractors, major oil companies and oil and gas
property owners- were victimized by the price fixing.513 These
cases resulted in criminal fines.514
In March 1991, a class action suit was brought on behalf
of plaintiffs representing direct purchasers of roller cone
drill bits. In their complaint plaintiffs allege that four
drill bit manufacturers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.515
Between 1986 and 1992, plaintiffs allege defendants agreed to
513

David Ivanovich, Drill Bit Makers Face Charges of
Conspiring to Fix Prices, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Oct. 23,
1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 3253623).
514

This investigation resulted in Baker Hughes pleading
guilty and paying a one million dollar fine in 1992. In 1993,
Smith International paid a fine of $675,000 and Camco
International settled charges filed against its Reed Division
by promising to pay $575,000.
Ralph Bivins, Houston Drill-Bit Price-Fixing Cases Settled,
HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Nov. 24, 1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR
3254369).
515

Complaint ¶¶ 28-33, Red Eagle Resources, et. al. v. Baker
Hughes Inc., et al., No. 4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11,
1991)(In re Drill Bits Antitrust Litigation).
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fix, stabilize, and/or inflate or raise the prices of drilling
bits in the United States market by refraining from
discounting their list prices and by refraining from competing
among themselves on the basis of price.516 Several similar
cases were consolidated into a class representing
approximately 6,000 purchasers of drill bits.517
All Defendants settled over a three-year period for a
total of $53.4 million dollars.518 An attorney’s fee of 30.8%
or $16,129,271.00 from the settlement funds was awarded to

516

Id. It was reported that defendants controlled
approximately 75 percent of the domestic drill bit roller cone
market at that time; Smith International dominated with a 27
percent share of the market, followed by Baker Hughes with 25
percent, Camco International with 15 percent and Dresser
Industries with 12 percent. Ralph Bivins, Houston Drill-Bit
Price-Fixing Cases Settled, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Nov. 24,
1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 3254369).
517

Ralph Bivins, Houston Drill-Bit Price-Fixing Cases
Settled, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Nov. 24, 1993)(Available in 1993
WLNR 3254369).
518

See Fine, Kaplan & Black’s website, at

http://www.finekaplan.com/CustomPage.shtml#1. Baker Hughes paid $17.8

million in Jan. 1993, Reed Tool Company paid $16.8 million and
Camco paid $10.8 million in September 1993. Dresser Industries
was the last party to settle for $8 million in April of
1994.Order of Approval of Settlement and Final Judgment, Doc.
372 (April 26, 1994), Red Eagle Resources, et. al. v. Baker
Hughes Inc., et al., No. 4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11,
1991)(In re Drill Bits Antitrust Litigation).
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class counsel in addition to reimbursement of expenses in the
amount of $1,079,308.09.519

519

Order of Approval of Attorney’s Fees and Expenses, Doc. 379
(April 26, 1994), Id.
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In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. 01-12239WGY; 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2004); 231 F.R.D. 52 (D.
Mass. 2005).

This case is noteworthy because: 1) Counsel for the
direct purchaser Class secured a cash settlement of $175
million, 69% of their estimated class damages520 2) Counsel for
the indirect purchaser (end payer) class secured a cash
settlement of $75 million, 26% of their estimated damages;521
3) The Defendant, UK-based GlaxoSmithKline Beecham Corporation
(“GSK”) took a $405 million charge in the 4th quarter of 2003
to provide for Relafen litigation,522 these settlements
represent a large portion of that amount, much of which will
be distributed among businesses based in the U.S; 4)
Apparently there was no federal government investigation,
although a State enforcer was permitted to intervene523; 5) The

520

Memorandum in Support of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiff’s
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, Document 290-01,
filed 4/02/2002, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master
File No. 01-12239-WGY at page 13 note 3. (D. Mass. 2004)
521

End Payer Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Final
Approval of Proposed Settlement, Document No. 415, filed
4/25/2005, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master File No.
01-12239-WGY at page 3 (D. Mass. 2005).
522

GSK Settles Lawsuit Over Relafen Patent Tactic, Generic Line Copyright
2004 Washington Business Information, Inc., All Rights Reserved Generic
Line, Vol. 21, No. 11, June 2, 2004.
523

On July 7, 2004, the states of Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Oregon, and Washington filed motions to intervene in
the end payer litigation already pending in the Massachusetts
District Court, however, only Illinois was ultimately
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allegations involved violations under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, and; 6)

Plaintiffs’ success in this litigation will

discourage other brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers from
manipulating the patent process and the Hatch-Waxman Act in a
effort to unlawfully prevent generic competition, and keeping
pharmaceutical drugs competitively priced is especially
important because the cost of prescription drugs contributes
greatly to the rising cost of healthcare.

On November 2, 1982 the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) denied GSK’s sixth application to
patent nabumetone, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug.
The PTO cited a 1973 article that described the method and
synthesis of the drug, thus making any claim to nabumetone
void for anticipation.

On appeal, GSK persuaded the board of

patent appeals that the substance and methods described in the
1973 article were distinguishable from the nabumetone GSK was
trying to patent.

On December 13, 1983 the PTO issued GSK a

patent for nabumetone.

The drug, which GSK marketed under the

brand name Relafen, received FDA approval in February 1992.
In 1997 several generic drug manufacturers submitted
Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) to the FDA seeking
permitted to intervene. In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation,
231 F.R.D. 52, 61 (D. Mass. 2005).
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approval to begin marketing nabumetone.

As part of their

applications, each of the generic manufacturers524 certified
that GSK’s nabumetone patent was, to the best of their
knowledge, invalid or unenforceable and gave GSK notice of
their applications as is required by statute.

GSK filed

patent infringement actions against its would-be generic
competitors, triggering an automatic stay of FDA approval for
30 months or until the patent litigation is resolved, pursuant
to the Hatch-Waxman Act525.

Generic versions of nabumetone

would have otherwise been on the market on September 1, 1998.

524

The generic competitors included: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
(“Teva”) based in Israel, Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., which
was acquired by Teva in 1999; and Eon Labs, Inc., a division
of Sandoz, Inc. (“Eon”) which is headquartered in Princeton,
New Jersey.
525

The complicated provisions of the Hatch-Waxman act provide
the backdrop for this and similar litigation. Under its
provisions, each ANDA must be accompanied by a certification
that the drug for which they seek approval does not infringe
on a legitimate patent right because the patent is either
invalid, expired, or will not be infringed by the marketing of
the generic drug. The patent holder is entitled to notice of
this certification and, can immediately file a patent
infringement suit against the generic competitor. Filing a
patent infringement suit triggers an automatic stay of FDA
approval of the generic manufacturer’s ANDA for 30 months or
until the patent litigation is resolved. 21 U.S.C. 355.
Relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in
2003 See: The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Title XI: Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals, sections a-b, United States Public Laws,
108th Congress –1st Session, 108 P.L. 173 (2006). The
amendments adopt several FTC recommendations, including that
brand-name companies be limited to one 30-month stay of
approval and that a counterclaim for improper Orange Book
185

In August 2001, after a sixteen day bench trial,
District Court Judge Reginald C. Lindsay declared GSK’s
nabumetone patent invalid due to anticipation.526

The Court

also held that the patent was unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct because GSK “engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation
in its dealings with the PTO so pervasive as to negate any
possibility that [its] misrepresentations to the PTO were
inadvertent ….
dissembling….”

Such a pattern bespeaks only deliberate
527

Judge Lindsay’s finding of invalidity was

upheld on appeal, but the Federal Circuit Court did not reach
the issue of unenforceability.528

Within a week of the

District Court’s decision, Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA529

listing be authorized for generic companies faced with patent
infringement suits. Statement of the Honorable Timothy J.
Muris before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Aug. 1, 2003. For
a history of the act and a discussion of the recent amendments
See: Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure and Legacy, 71 Antitrust
L.J. 585 (2003). For a discussion of the 2003 amendments and
the loop holes that still exist see: Brian Porter, Comment:
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s Effort
to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch Waxman Act, 22 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 177 (Fall 2005).
526

In re ‘639 Patent Litigation, 154 F.Supp. 2d 157. (Dist.
Mass. 2001).

527

Id. at 194.

528

GSK Beecham Cop. V. Copley Pharm., 45 Fed. Appx. 915, 917
(Fed. Cir. Aug 15, 2002) (unpublished opinion).

529

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA (“Teva”) is a division of Teva
Pharmaceuticals, which is based in Israel.
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(“Teva”) entered the market with a generic nabumetone priced
at 60% of the Relafen price.530
Direct Purchasers of Relafen filed a consolidated class
action complaint in December 2002531 and the District Court
certified the Direct Purchaser Class on November 10, 2003.532

530

Affidavit of Co-Lead Counsel Bruce E. Gerstein and Linda P.
Nussbaum, Document 295-01, filed 4/02/2002, In re Relafen
Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. 01-122390WGY at page 7
paragraph 14. (D. Mass. 2004).
531

In addition to the Direct Purchaser Class, actions were
filed by GSK’s competitors, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
(“Teva”), and Eon Labs, Inc. (“Eon”) Eon Labs., Inc. v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civ. A. No. 03-10506-WGY, Doc. No.
62; and by drugstore Plaintiffs see note 12, infra. The
website for the National Association of Attorneys General
(www.naap.org) reports that in 2004 West Virginia was the lead
state in litigation initiated in 2004 against GSK with the
help of the U.S. Department of Justice. The litigation was
regarding GSK’s efforts to block generic competition with
Relafen and two other drugs, Paxil and Augmentin. This case
settled for $500,000 dollars plus attorney’s fees. West
Virigina ex rel. McGraw v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC et al. 04-C254M, Circuit Court of Marshall County 2005). (Summary
available at: www.naap.org).
532

In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 337 (D.Mass.
2003). The Direct Purchaser Class included all entities in the
U.S. who purchased Relafen directly from defendants between
September 1, 1998 and December 31, 2002.. Drugstore
Plaintiffs (Albertson’s, Eckerd, Hy-Vee, Kroger, Walgreens,
CVS, Rite Aid, and Safeway opt-ed out of the class and chose
to pursue individual actions) filed complaints against
SmithKline on March 29, 2002 and January 7, 2003 asserting
claims under sections 15 and 26 of the Sherman Act. Walgreen
co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civ. A No. 02-10588-WGY, Doc.
No. 1, CVS Meridian, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civ. A.
No. 03-10040-WGY, Doc. No. 1. These plaintiffs settled with
SmithKline and the action was closed on January 20, 2004,
187

The Plaintiffs alleged that the nabumetone patent was
fraudulently obtained and wrongfully listed in the FDA’s
Orange Book,533 and that the patent infringement suits that GSK
filed against its generic competitors were baseless sham
litigation used to delay competition with Relafen.

Plaintiffs

alleged that this conduct violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act causing class members to pay substantially higher prices
for nabumetone than they would have if generic entry to the
market had not been wrongfully delayed.
Class counsel spent an aggregate of over 33,700 hours
litigating this case over the course of two years, taking more
than 30 depositions and reviewing hundreds of thousands of
internal company documents during the course of discovery.
Counsel succeeded in persuading the court that Defendants
should be collaterally estopped from relitigating key issues
that were decided in the underlying patent litigation and
defeated GSK’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary
judgment.
The Direct Purchaser Class reached a settlement
agreement January 9, 2004, on the eve of trial, for $175
Walgreen, Civ. A. No. 02-10588-WGY, Doc. No.11, CVS Meridian,
Civ. A. No. 03-10040-WGY, Doc. No.11.
533

The “Orange Book: is an official FDA publication formally
know as “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations.”
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million dollars. Not a single member of the class objected to
the terms of the settlement, which is especially significant
in light of the fact that this class consists of large,
sophisticated businesses, many of whom are independently
represented and could be expected to object.534

The court

subsequently approved the settlement and granted Class
Counsel’s request for one-third of the fund in attorney’s fees
plus $1,799,023.24 in expenses, and a $25,000 incentive award
for named plaintiff Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc.

Judge

William G. Young for the District of Massachusetts noted that
the award was “fair in this case”535 given “that Class Counsel
vigorously and effectively pursued the Class members’
claims.”536

The $175 million dollar cash settlement represents

a substantial percentage --approximately 69%-- of plaintiffs’
total damages according to plaintiff’s expert’s estimate that
class-wide damages totaled $252.8 million.
The first indirect purchaser (end payer) action was filed
on January 30, 2002 and the District Court certified a

534

Memorandum in Support of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiff’s
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, Document 290-01,
filed 4/02/2002, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master
File No. 01-122390WGY at page 18. (D. Mass. 2004).
535

T.R.O. Hrg. Transcr. 4:3-4 (April 9, 2004) In re Relafen
Antitrust Litigation, 346 F.Supp. 349.
536

In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28801 at 19 (D. Mass. 2004).
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nationwide class for purposes of settlement on September 28,
2005.537

The class represented actual and potential third

party payers and consumers of both Relafen and its generic
alternatives including individual consumers, health care plans
and insurers.

Plaintiffs asserted claims under federal and

state antitrust laws, state unfair competition and consumer
protection statutes, and the unjust enrichment doctrines of 24
states.538

Similar to the Direct Purchaser Class, the End

Payer’s alleged that GSK made misrepresentations in pursuit of
a patent for nabumetone which ultimately resulted in
substantially higher prices for both Relafen and its generic
alternatives.
Class counsel spent four years and more than 29,000 hours
litigating this case including analyzing more than one million
pages of documents and taking more than 75 depositions during
discovery. Counsel successfully opposed a motion to dismiss
and succeeded in defeating GSK’s motion for summary judgment.
The End Payer Class reached a settlement agreement on
November 18, 2004 for $75 million.

The settlement also

included a Cy Pres award of $500,000 for consumers and third
party payers whose claims were limited for procedural

537
538

In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 231 F.R.D. at 57.
Id. at 60.
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reasons.539

There were no objections to the amount of the

settlement, and in fact the court noted that “[t]he overall
reaction to the settlement has been positive,” which is
significant given the 272,229 class members.540

The court

approved the settlement on September 28, 2005 and granted
counsel’s request for one-third of the fund541 in attorneys’
fees, plus $1,297,301.10 in expenses, and incentive awards.542
In approving the final settlement Judge Young commented on
“the exceptional efforts of class counsel” and had previously
noted that the proposed settlement was “the result of a great
deal of fine lawyering on behalf of the parties. . . .”543
According to the End Payer’s expert the $75 million settlement

539

Id. at 82.

540

Id. at 64, 72. The settlement was divided between
consumers and third-party payers, with one third going to
reimburse consumers and the remainder to third-party payers.
541

Id. at 77 n.18. Because a portion of the $75 million
settlement fund was paid to settling health plans as part of a
separate agreement with GSK, the award of attorney’s fees and
expenses is based on the $67 million of the fund that remains.

542

Incentive awards included “$8,000 for each named consumer
Plaintiff, $9,000 for each named consumer organization, and
$14,000 for each named third party payor.” Id. at 82.
543

Id. at 80.
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represents 26% of the estimated $294 million in class
damages.544
Most significant is the deterrent effect that the large
settlements in these cases will have on other brand name drug
manufacturers seeking to fraudulently obtain or extend patents
in an effort to charge monopoly prices for prescription drugs.

544

End Payor Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Final
Approval of Proposed Settlement, Document No. 415, filed
4/25/2005, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master File No.
01-12239-WGY at page 3 (D. Mass. 2005).
192

In re: Remeron Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis
27013 (D.N.J. 2005).

This case is noteworthy because: 1) It highlights
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act545 being used to forestall
generic competition; 2) Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class
persevered after an early setback and after all other
plaintiff classes settled, and secured a $75 million
settlement which represents 56-69% of Plaintiffs’ estimate of
the overcharges paid as a result of Defendant, Organon
Inc.’s546 (“Organon”) anticompetitive scheme; 3) Private
counsel was first to investigate the conduct at issue, and
obtained most of the relief in this matter because the federal
545

Relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in
2003. See: The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Title XI: Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals, sections a-b, United States Public Laws,
108th Congress –1st Session, 108 P.L. 173 (2006). The
amendments adopt several FTC recommendations, including that
brand-name companies be limited to one 30-month stay of
approval and that a counterclaim for improper Orange Book
listing be authorized for generic companies faced with patent
infringement suits. Statement of the Honorable Timothy j.
Muris before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Aug. 1, 2003. For
a history of the act and a discussion of the recent amendments
See: Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure and Legacy, 71 Antitrust
L.J. 585 (2003). For a discussion of the 2003 amendments and
the loop holes that still exist see: Brian Porter, Comment:
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s Effort
to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch Waxman Act, 22 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 177 (Fall 2005).
546

Organon Inc., now Organon USA, is a division of Dutch
pharmaceutical giant Akzo Nobel, NV.
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government

permanently closed its investigation prior to

securing any relief;547 and 4) Judge Hochberg, who approved the
settlement on November 9, 2005, awarded class counsel their
request of one-third of the recovery in attorneys’ fees and
thanked counsel on behalf of the entire federal judiciary “for
the kind of lawyering we wish everybody would do.”548

547

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced its decision
to close its investigation in a press release on Oct. 20, 2004
noting that “significant evidence indicate[s] that Organon
may have violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act by knowingly making misleading statements to the FDA in
order to delay introduction of generic competition to
Remeron.” Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding
the Decision to Close Its Investigation into the Conduct of
Akzo Nobel, NV and Its Organon Subsidiary (available at
Federal Trade Commission, For the Consumer,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/organon.htm (last updated
October 13, 2006)). Before closing its investigation, however,
the FTC worked with state attorney general to incorporate
injunctive terms into the End-Payer’s proposed settlement. In
Re: Remeron End-Payer Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27011 (D.N.J. 2005).
548

In Re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action no. 022007 (FSH) (D.N.J. 2005) (Transcript of proceedings at 15:16).
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In 2003, direct purchasers549 of Remeron filed class
action complaints against Organon alleging various illegal and
deceptive means to improperly obtain and extend patents for
the drug mirtazapine550 in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.

Remeron received FDA approval in 1996 and

Organon’s right to market exclusivity was set to expire in
June 2001.

In 1999 Organon obtained a patent for a

mirtazapine combination drug which it listed in the FDA’s
Orange Book551 in January 2001.

Because mirtazapine was listed

in the Orange Book, generic drug manufacturers intending to
market mirtazapine were required under the Hatch-Waxman Act to
provide notice to Organon as part of their Abbreviated New
Drug Application (“ANDA”) filed with the FDA.552

After

549
Nine large chain stores opted out of the direct purchaser class and
settled for a total of $59.8 million in 2004. Technology & Health Brief –
Akzo Nobel NV: Remeron Antitrust Suit Settled In the U.S. for $59.8
Million, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 4, 2004. End-payers, including
attorney generals for Texas, Florida and Oregon, filed a Consolidated
Class Action Complaint in September 2002 and settled for $36 million in
2004. In Re: Remeron End-Payer Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27011(D.N.J. 2005). Organon settled with competitor, Mylan laboratories
Inc, for $15 million. Dow Jones Newswires, Business Brief –Mylan
Laboratoires Inc.: Akzo Nobel Pays $15 Million in Depression-Drug
Settlement, The Wall Street Journal, pg B2 Oct. 4, 2004.

550

Organon holds a patent on mirtazapine, an antidepressant
drug, which it manufactures and markets under the brand name
Remeron.
551

The “Orange Book” is an official FDA publication formally
known as “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations.”
552

Each ANDA must be accompanied by a certification that the
drug for which approval is sought does not infringe on a
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receiving notice, Organon filed patent infringement suits553
against the would-be generic competitors triggering a stay of
FDA approval of the generic competitors’ ANDA’s for 30 months
or until a final judgment in the patent infringement suits.
The litigation was complex and hard fought. The district
court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the generic
manufacturers’ antitrust counter-claims alleging sham
litigation, holding that the court could not find that Organon
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for its patent
infringement claims.

554

The court later held that the Direct

Purchaser Class was collaterally estopped from litigating its
similar claims. However, the court upheld the independent
claims arising from Defendants’ late-listing in the Orange
Book of the newly-patented combination drug and the
legitimate patent right because the patent is either invalid,
expired, or will not be infringed by the marketing of the
generic drug. The patent holder is entitled to notice of this
certification and, can immediately file a patent infringement
suit against the generic competitor. Filing a patent
infringement suit triggers an automatic stay of FDA approval
of the generic manufacturer’s ANDA for 30 months or until the
patent litigation is resolved. 21 U.S.C. 355. Relevant
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in 2003. See
supra note1.
553

The Direct Purchaser Class’ complaint came on the heels of
a December 2002 grant of summary judgment in favor of certain
generic competitors with respect to the patent infringement
suits filed by Organon. In Re Remeron End-Payer Antitrust
Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27011 at 4, (D.N.J. 2005).
554

Organon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 293 F.Supp.
2d 453 (D.N.J. 2003).
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Defendant’s alleged overarching scheme to forestall generic
competition.

Although every other plaintiff group involved in

the litigation chose to settle their claims after this early
set back, the Direct Purchaser Class persevered and sought
recovery for the harm wrought by Defendants’ attempts to
prevent and delay generic competition in the mirtazapine
market.
Class Counsel aggressively pursued the surviving claims,
filing motions for summary judgment, partial summary judgment
and issue preclusion.

Class counsel invested an aggregate of

more than 35,000 hours on this complex litigation involving
research and analysis of a variety of issues including
regulatory requirements of the Hatch-Waxman Act and FDA’s
Orange Book listing, the intricacies of the pharmaceutical
industry from scientific and production processes to sales and
marketing, as well as patent law and economic issues. The
contentious discovery process produced more than one million
pages of documents and class counsel conducted more than 45
depositions and spent thousands of hours researching,
analyzing and consulting with experts.

These efforts led to

vital evidence indicating, among other things, that Defendants
knew their listing of the combination drug in the FDA’s Orange
Book was improper and was undertaken with the express intent
of delaying generic competition.
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After more than two years of

negotiation and numerous mediation sessions, the parties
agreed to settle for $75 million to be distributed pro-rata
among the direct purchaser class after the deduction of onethird in attorneys’ fees plus expenses.

The $75 million

settlement represents a significant proportion − 56-69% − of
the class damages as estimated by the Direct Purchasers’
expert.555
At the hearing on the motion for final approval of
settlement, District of New Jersey Judge Faith S. Hochberg
thanked counsel on behalf of the entire federal judiciary “for
the kind of lawyering we wish everybody would do”556 and noted
that “[t]he settlement entered with Defendants is a reflection
of Class Counsel’s skill and experience.”557

Judge Hochberg

approved the settlement and plan of allocation, and granted
Class Counsel’s request for one-third in attorneys’ fees plus
expenses and an incentive award on November 9, 2005.

555

Memorandum of Law in Support of Direct Purchaser Class
Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Award, filed
10/26/2005, In re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, Master Docket
No. 03-CV-0085 (D.N.J. 2005)
556

In Re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action no. 022007 (FSH) (D.N.J. 2005) (Transcript of proceedings at 15:16)

557

In re Remeron, (2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013) [Not for
Publication] (D.N.J. 2005).
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In Re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 350 F.Supp.2d
1366, 2005-1 Trade Cases P 74,804 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. Dec. 21,
2004((No. MDL 1648).

Summary: These related cases concern an agreement between
three of the largest manufacturers of rubber chemicals in the
world to artificially fix prices in the sale of rubber
chemicals and to allocate markets and customers in the United
States. They are noteworthy because: 1) Counsel for the direct
purchaser class secured a settlement of over $268 million
dollars, all of which came from foreign corporations and their
American affiliates; 2) Counsel in the direct purchaser class
was awarded a fee of twenty-five percent (25%); and 3) Counsel
secured an $18 million settlement with a defendant which was
not indicted in the parallel government investigation,
Akzo/Flexsys corporations and their affiliates.
This case initially started on or about September 26,
2002, with a series of government raids on a number of rubber
chemical producers, including Bayer AG and Flexsys NV, in
several European cities. These unannounced inspections were in
connection with an investigation into the alleged cartel
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agreement and related illegal practices concerning the pricefixing of rubber chemicals.558
As a result of this investigation, a number of companies
and their top executives plead guilty, paid criminal fines and
served jail time starting in 2004. Crompton and two of its top
executives plead guilty to price fixing in the international
rubber chemicals market,559

after admitting to “participating

in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate
competition by maintaining and increasing the price of certain
rubber chemicals” sold in the United States from 1995-2001.560
Bayer AG agreed to plead guilty and pay a $66 million fine for
participating in the conspiracy.561 A number of its top

558

Second Amend. Consol. Compl. for Violations of the Fed.
Antitrust Laws ¶ 51 (Mar. 18, 2005).
559

Crompton was sentenced to pay a $50 million criminal fine
and its executives await sentencing. Press release, U.S. Dept.
of Justice (Sept. 14, 2004), First Executive in the
International Rubber Chemicals Cartel Agrees to Plead Guilty,
available at
http://searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search?q=cache:6MwGZC767v0J:www
.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/205419.wpd; See also
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Sept. 21, 2004)
Executive in the International Rubber Chemicals Cartel Agrees
to Plead Guilty. Available at
http://searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search?q=cache:8_VCoA3b1s8J:www
.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/205496.wpd.
560

Id.

561

Press Release, U.S. Depart. Of Justice (July 14, 2004).
Bayer Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $66 Million Fine for
Participating in Rubber Chemicals Cartel. Investigation to
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executives were sentenced to fines and imprisonment.562 Flexsys
NV was not a target of the DOJ investigation.563
On April 8, 2003, the first private complaint in this
multi-district litigation was filed. Several subsequentlyfiled cases were consolidated and a Second Amended
Consolidated Complaint for violations of federal antitrust
laws was filed on March 18, 2005 in the United States District
Court Northern District of California. Direct purchasers of
Rubber chemicals, including the companies and industrial
manufacturers, brought this lawsuit alleging that from at
least as early as May 1, 1995 through December 31, 2001,
Date Yields Over $100 Million in Criminal Fines. Available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_at_480.htm.
562

On November 23, 2004, Martin Petersen, a German national
and Head of Marketing and Sales for Bayer’s Rubber Business
Group agreed to plead guilty. He was sentenced to four months
in jail and a $50,000.00 fine. Available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/215514a.htm#a.
On May 16, 2005, Wolfgang Koch, a German national of Bayer
plead guilty and was sentenced to four months in jail and a
$50,000 fine. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 16,
2005) Former Bayer AG Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty in
International Rubber Chemicals Price-Fixing Conspiracy. Former
Executive Faces Jail Time in U.S. Available at
http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/209038.wpd.
On August 10, 2005 Jurgen Ick and Gunter Monn, top executives
at Bayer, were indicted. Both Ick and Monn are German citizens
and remain international fugitives. Press release, U.S. Dept.
of Justice (Aug. 10, 2005) Former Top Bayer Executives
Indicted in Price-Fixing Conspiracy. Available at
http://searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search?q=cache:Tkx6stpvMn0J:www
.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/210540.wpd.
563

Id.
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Defendants conspired to fix the prices of Rubber Chemicals
sold in the United States and/or to allocate markets and/or
customers in the United States.564
In 2005 Plaintiffs settled with two of the three groups
of defendants for approximately $268 million:565 Bayer, and its
affiliates in Germany, Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey566;
and Akzo/Flexsys and its affiliates in the Netherlands,
Illinois, Belgium and Ohio.567 The case against Crompton
appears to be ongoing.
In the course of this litigation class counsel analyzed
hundreds and thousands of documents produced by Defendants.568
They also conducted an independent investigation of the facts
and analyzed Defendants’ sales and pricing data. Class counsel
was awarded an attorney’s fee equal to 25% of the Flexsys

564

Second Amend. Consol. Compl. for Violations of the Fed.
Antitrust Laws ¶ 2 (Mar. 18, 2005).
565

Flexsys paid $18,500,000. Settlement Agreement of
Defendants Flexsys N.V. and Flexsys America L.P., and Akzo
Nobel Chemicals International B.V. and Akzo Nobel Chemicals,
Inc. (“Flexsys Defendants”), Doc. 12 (Feb. 18, 2005), ¶ 7.
Bayer settled for $250,375,190. Notice of Settle. in Class
Action and Hearing on Settle. Approv., Plan of Allocation and
Request for Atty’s Fees and Costs (June 26, 2006), ¶ 17.
566

Id. ¶¶ 18-21.

567

Id. ¶¶ 13-17.

568

Id. ¶ 13.
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Settlement Fund, or $4,625,000 (and $692,523.57 for costs).569
Counsel was awarded approximately 20% of the Bayer Settlement
Fund, or $47,975.19 and also $400,000 for costs.570

569

Order Granting Interim Atty’s Fees and Reimburse. Offof
Costs to Class Counsel Based on the Settlement with the
Flexsys Defendants, Doc. 150, (June 21, 2005), ¶ 1.
570

Notice of Settle. in Class Action and Hearing on Settle.
Approv., Plan of Allocation and Request for Atty’s Fees and
Costs (June 26, 2006), ¶ 17.
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In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Not
Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2002 WL 31655191 (N.D. Cal.).

This case is noteworthy because: 1. the primary
defendants/manufacturers, who formed a price fixing cartel
between 1979 and 1996, were spread out between three countries
(United States, Germany, and four in Japan) and

defended

their actions globally (United States, Canada, and Europe),
making this litigation a complex and extensive process; 2.
civil actions were brought by both direct purchasers of
sorbates and on behalf of indirect purchasers of many states
within the U.S.; 3. total recovery for direct purchasers in
the U.S. was roughly $96.5 million (at least $36.5 million of
which came from foreign defendants)571; 4. attorneys fees
varied between the direct purchaser and state actions from 2233% of the total recovery.
In 1998 the U.S.D.O.J. began an investigation into the
alleged price fixing of sorbates, a chemical manufactured for
use in the food preservatives industry, by several large
multinational corporations. The Dept. of Justice investigated
Eastman Chemical, Co. (U.S. manufacturer), Hoescht AG,
Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH, CNA
Holdings (German manufacturer), and Daicel Chemicals Industry,
571

In addition, several actions, brought by individual States
on behalf of indirect purchasers, settled for a total of more
than $12 million.
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Ltd., Nippon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co., Ltd., Ueno Fine
Chemicals Industry Ltd., and Chisso Corporation (the four
Japanese manufacturers) to determine whether they had formed a
cartel for the purpose of fixing the prices of sorbates
between 1979 and 1996.572
In response to the DOJ investigation, several of the
industries “[pled] guilty to participating in the antitrust
conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition by fixing
prices and allocating the market shares of sorbates sold in
the United States.”573 Following this, the European Commission
held similar investigations which resulted in additional
criminal fines.

574

The Commission found that by 1995, the

572

Williams Food Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., Not Reported in
P.3d, 2001 WL 1298887 (Kan. Dist. Ct.).

573

Id. Between 1998 and 2001, Diacel, Hoescht, Nippon, Eastman
and Ueno, agreed to pay fines of $53 million, $36 million, $21
million, $11 million, and $11 million, respectively, as a
result of litigation with the Department of Justice. U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Sherman Act
Violations Yielding a Fine of $10 Million or More (January 23,
2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal.htm.
574

These fines totaled EUR $172 million; divided between
Hoescht ($123 million), Diacel ($20.6 million), Ueno ($15.3
million) and Nippon ($13.1 million). Chemicals: Monti’s Cartel
Clampdown: Sorbates Firms Fined EUR 138 M: Hoescht, Chisso,
Daicel Chemical Industries, Nippon Synthetic Chemical Idustry
and Ueno Fine Chemicals, Chemical Business NewsBase - Europe
Environment, October 9, 2003. “The Commission calculated the
fines according to the gravity and duration of the
infringement, but took into account the level of cooperation
from the companies.” Chisso Corp. was granted full immunity
for its role as a whistleblower. Id.
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cartel had control of 85% of the sorbates market in Europe.575
Additionally, Hoescht AG and Eastman Chemicals both pled
guilty to violations of the Competition Act of Canada.576
In addition to the fines, several civil actions were
brought in the U.S. by both direct purchasers represented by
private counsel, and by States on behalf of classes of
indirect purchasers within those States. The direct purchasers
led the way with a consolidated class action in the Northern
District of California; followed by a few separate smaller
classes of direct purchasers in other states. Finally cases
brought by States had varied success in different State courts
throughout the country.
A large group of direct purchasers brought suit in the
Northern District of California, which resulted in final
approval of a settlement for $81,978,000;577 followed shortly

575

Id.

576

They were fined a total of $3.28 (Canadian) in a Canadian
federal court Companies Guilty of Price Fixing, The Toronto
Star October 27, 1999, Wednesday, Edition.
577

In re Sorbates, Master File C 98-4886 Cal (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(combined settlement of Diacel, Nippon, Hoescht and Eastman).
“Japan's Daicel Chemical Industries Ltd. and Nippon Synthetic
Chemical Industry Co. revealed in separate statements that
they would pay $16 million and $7.2 million, respectively to
US food firms.” CHEMICAL COMPANIES: Japanese Firms To Settle
Antitrust Suit For $23.2M, Wednesday, Dec. 12, 2001, Vol. 3,
No. 242, at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/011212.mbx.
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by a second settlement for $14.6 million.578 At least 1/3 of
direct purchaser recovery, which covered the vast majority of
private civil recovery, came from foreign defendants.579
Defendants were required to make yearly contributions into a
net settlement fund, where purchasers could recover damages
measured by a mathematical formula approved by the court.
Successful suits by states on behalf of indirect
purchasers were brought in Wisconsin, California, Kansas, Ohio
and Illinois, totaling over $12 million.580 Notably, the
Wisconsin suit was brought on behalf of purchasers in 12

578

In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Not
Reported in F.Supp.2d, WL 31655191 (N.D. Cal. 2002). With $6.5
million being allocated to Euno. EUNO FINE CHEMICALS: Judge
Approves $6.5M Settlement Deal, Thursday, November 28, 2002,
Vol. 4, No. 235, http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/021128.mbx

579

See supra notes 7 & 8. The remaining 2/3, totaling over $60
million was divided b/w Hoescht (a german corporation),
Eastman (an American corporation) and one other. FOOD FIRMS:
Freeman, Freeman Files Sorbate Price-Fixing Suit, Thursday,
July 27, 2000, Vol. 2, No. 145,
http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/ 000727.MBX.
580

EASTMAN CHEMICAL: Indicates Openness to Settle Remaining
Sorbates Cases, Tuesday, May 15, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 95,
http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010515.mbx; Sorbates Prices
Cases, JCCP NO. 4073 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2003)
http://www.sorbatessettlement.com/not.html; Williams Food v.
Eastman Chemical, Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 1298887
(Kan.Dist.Ct. 2001); State v. Diacel Chemical Ind., No.
02CH19575 (Illinois 2004); Children’s Hunger Alliance
Receives $197,761 from Sorbates Settlement, 2005
http://www.childrenshungeralliance.org/NEWS/0406/0406-ag.html
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states and constituted a large bulk of non-direct purchaser
recovery with a settlement of $7.8 million.581
Attorneys fees and costs awarded have varied between
jurisdictions and plaintiff classes.

The percentages were

between 22% and 33% of total recovery.582

581

Of those state’s that have recovered, there is a general
trend toward cy pres distribution of the funds. For instance,
several states have donated large portions of their
settlements to food banks, boys and girls clubs, and other
charitable local institutions PRESERVATIVE MAKERS: Judge
Approves Settlement of Wisconsin Suit, Monday, April 30, 2001,
Vol. 3, No. 84 http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010430.mbx.
582

See id. (direct purchaser settlement of Euno and Chisso at
25%); Proposed Final Judgment and Order, State v. Daicel Chem.
Ind., et.al. (No. 02CH19575) at
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/sorbates/prop
osed_ final_judgment&order.pdf (Illinois settlement at 22.5%);
Williams Food Inc. v. Eastman, et. al., 2001 WL 1298887 (Kan.
Dist. Ct.)(opt out Kansas direct purchaser litigation at 33
1/3%).
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Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2003).

This case is notable because 1. It involved an
exceptionally large payment for the settlement of an antitrust
claim, $700 million out of a $2 billion overall payment by
Microsoft to Sun; 2. While the action relied in part upon
findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the U.S.
Government’s Microsoft case, its allegations were much broader
then those in the government’s case; 3. Sun provided much of
the evidence that it accumulated for this case to the European
Union, and this evidence apparently helped form much of the
basis for its action against Microsoft involving the server
market; 3. The allegations involved rule of reason violations,
not “hard core” cartel violations; 4. The agreed-upon relief
helped protect Java from pollution by Microsoft, and helped
ensure that only pure, non-Microsoft Java would in the future
be distributed on PCs.

This was a significant victory for the

PC ecosystem and the consumers who benefit from it.

In March 2002 Sun filed an antitrust suit against
Microsoft, charging that Microsoft had engaged in a number of
antitrust violations, some of which mirrored the charges in
the U.S. government’s case against them, and others of which
were broader.

Sun also charged a number of intellectual
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property violations. Among the specific antitrust violations
were the allegations that Microsoft illegally attempted to
monopolize the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market,
the browser market, and the Office suite market.

Sun also

charged Microsoft with attempting to monopolize the workgroup
server market.

In addition, Sun charged Microsoft with

illegally tying Internet Explorer to its PC operating system,
its workgroup server to its PC operating systems, and its
exchange server software to its Office productivity suites.
Sun also charged that Microsoft illegally entered into
exclusive dealing arrangements for its browser, and that it
entered into exclusionary agreements with Apple and Intel not
to develop, distribute or use non- Microsoft compatible
implementations of Sun’s Java platform, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
On January 21, 2003, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland granted Sun’s motion for preliminary
injunction.583

Microsoft was, inter alia, enjoined from

distributing its Windows PC Operating System or Browser unless
they contained unpolluted Java software.
Microsoft appealed this decision, however, and the 4th
Circuit lifted the preliminary injunction. The reasons for
this reversal were that: “(1) future and present harm alleged
583

Sun v. Microsoft, 240 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 2003).
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by competitor were insufficient to support mandatory
preliminary injunction requiring manufacturer to distribute
competitor's middleware software with every copy of
manufacturer's operating system and web browser; [and that
the] (2) mandatory preliminary injunction was not necessary to
prosecute competitor's claim that manufacturer had monopolized
operating system market...” The Court of Appeals remanded the
case for a trial on the merits.
On April 2, 2004, Sun and Microsoft agreed to settle
these antitrust and intellectual property issues, and also
agreed on a variety of patent license and other issues.

Of

the overall $2 billion settlement, a joint Sun-Microsoft Press
Release attributed $700 million to a settlement of Sun’s
antitrust claims against Microsoft.584

584

See April 2, 2004 Press Release, “Microsoft and Sun
Microsystems Enter Broad Cooperation agreement; Settle
Outstanding Litigation” available at
http:www.sun.com/smi/Press/sunflash/2004-04.
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In Re: Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation Case No.
99-MDL-1317-Seitz/Klein, a/k/a Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co.,
Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, et al. S.D. Fla. Case no. 98-3125
and Valley Drug Co. v. Abbot Laboratories, et al. S.D. Fla.
Case No. 99-7143.

Summary: This case is noteworthy because: 1) Although the
government was first to investigate, the litigation was
primarily initiated and led by private counsel;585 2) Private
counsel obtained a substantial monetary recovery, whereas the
federal government secured only injunctive relief;586 3)

585

The first federal government action in this case was the
complaint and consent order proposal issued by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) on March 16, 2000, more than one year
after the first Direct Purchaser complaint was filed in
December 1998. Attorney Generals for Colorado, Kansas and
Florida filed suit alleging antitrust violations based on the
same facts on September 27, 2001 “on the heels of an
investigation started [in 1999] by the Federal Trade
Commission.” Michael Perrault, Suit: Drug Makers Were In
Collusion, Rocky Mountain News, Pg. 4B, September 28, 2001.
In many cases the Attorneys General or the FTC will conduct a
non-public investigation before filing a complaint, making it
difficult to determine whether the government or private
counsel began investigating first, or were conducting
separate, parallel investigations.
586

The FTC finalized a consent order against Abbott and Geneva
on May 22, 2000. In the Matter of Geneva Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., Docket No. C-3946, Decision and Order (available at
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition: Case Filings,
http://ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946.do.htm (last updated December
14, 2001)). The order, which terminates on May 22, 2010,
prohibits both companies from entering into any further
similar agreements and requires that Geneva report to the FTC
annually for five years on the manner and form of its
compliance. Despite the range of remedies available to the
government, “including possibly seeking disgorgement of
illegally obtained profits,” the order was the only relief
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Counsel for the Plaintiffs’ class were successful in
persuading the District Court that the agreement between Abbot
Laboratories587 (“Abbott”) and its generic competitor, Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, now Sandoz, Inc.,588 (“Geneva”) effectively
delayed generic competition with the brand name drug Hytrin589
and was thus anticompetitive and a per se violation of the
Sherman Act; 4) Counsel for the Plaintiff class secured a
total cash settlement of $74.5 million,590 which, according to

obtained directly by the government in this case, although
state attorney general joined in the Direct Purchaser private
action. In the Matter of Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket
Nos. C-3945 and C-3946, Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky
and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony, et. al (available at
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition: Case Filings,
http://ftc.gov/os/2000/05/abbottgenevastatement.htm (last
updated December 14, 2001)).
587

Abbot Laboratories is based north of Chicago in Abbot Park,
Illinois.
588

Sandoz, Inc. is owned by Novartis, which is based in
Switzerland.
589

Hytrin is the brand name for terazosin hydrochloride, a
drug used for the treatment of high blood pressure and
enlargement of the prostate gland.
590

The $74.5 million figure includes the $72.5 million
settlement between Direct Purchaser Class and Abbot and Geneva
as well as a settlement with Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., now known as Ivax pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Zenith”), also
named by Valley Drug it its original complaint alleging
substantially similar Sherman Act violations. Zenith settled
for $2,072,327 plus interest. This settlement was finally
approved by the Court on June 13, 2002.
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plaintiffs’ expert,591 is enough to reimburse a substantial
percentage – 40% to 60% – of overcharges suffered by the class
members while generic competition was delayed; 5) Plaintiffs’
success in this litigation will discourage other brand name
pharmaceutical manufacturers from unlawfully preventing or
delaying generic competition, and keeping pharmaceutical drugs
competitively priced is especially important because the cost
of prescription drugs contributes greatly to the rising cost
of healthcare; and 6) Judge Patricia A. Seitz for the Southern
District of Florida awarded in awarding Counsel for the Direct
Purchaser Class one third of the total recovery plus over
three million dollars in expenses, Judge Patricia A. Seitz for
the Southern District of Florida said that the relationship
that counsel had with the class members combined with the fact
that there were no objections to the settlement was “a
testament to the great clientmanship that [Class Counsel]
provided.”592

591

Sherman Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorneys’
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Incentive Awards for the
Named Plaintiffs and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support Thereof, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, MDL 1317 at page 15, submitted April 6, 2005 (S.D.
Fla. 2005).
592

In re: Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, Case
No. 99-1317 MDL, Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before Hon.
Patricia A . Seitz at pg 15 ln17-18, April 15, 2005.
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The $72.5 million settlement agreement entered into on
February 24, 2005 concluded over five years of litigation
stemming from Abbot Laboratories’ “attempts to protect its
patents’ exclusivity with respect to the brand name drug
Hytrin, and the competing efforts of generic manufacturers to
develop and launch bioequivalent drugs for entry in the
terazosin hydrochloride market.”593 Plaintiffs alleged that
Abbot made multi-million dollar payments to generic
manufacturers of the drug to delay the entry of generic
versions of Hytrin to the market.
On March 30, 1998, Geneva obtained final approval from
the FDA to market and sell its generic, capsule version of the
drug terazosin hydrochloride, brand-name Hytrin.

Two days

later, April 1, 1998, Abbot entered into and agreement with
Geneva. In exchange for $4.5 million a month from Abbot,
Geneva agreed not to put its generic version of Hytrin on the
market, an arrangement that would continue until Abbot’s
patent expired or until a final judgment in the patent
infringement suit that Abbot filed against Geneva regarding
Geneva’s tablet formulation of Hytrin.

Abbot and Geneva

voluntarily terminated the agreement in August 1999 after the

593

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352
F.Supp.2d 1279, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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FTC began an investigation.594 Geneva launched its generic
product on August 13, 1999.

During the last five months of

1999 Geneva’s generic terazosin hydrochloride had sales of
$71.8 million, an 8.8% share of the market.595
Named Plaintiffs of the Direct Purchaser Class,596
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. (“LWD”) and Valley Drug Co.
(“Valley Drug”) filed complaints against Geneva and Abbot in
December 1998 and August 1999. They alleged that the agreement
between Geneva and Abbot was an illegal market allocation
agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.597

594

In the early months of 1999, the FTC launched a “probe of
the drug industry’s alleged efforts to block generic rivals
and thus protect sales of brand-name medications.” Jerry
Guidera and Ralph T. King, Abbott Labs, Novartis Unit Near
Pact With FTC Over Agreement on Hytrin, The Wall Street
Journal, Aug. 21, 1998, Pg B1.
595

Ralph T. King Jr., FTC Panel Backs Suit Against Abbot,
Novartis on Deal for Hypertension Drug, The Wall Street
Journal, pg B20 Feb. 7, 2000.

596

In addition to the Direct Purchaser Class litigation
summarized here, similar claims were pursued by individual
Direct Purchasers such as Walgreens and Shop-Rite and an
Indirect Purchaser classes including seventeen certified state
classes of end payers for Hytrin consisting of Third Party
Payers (e.g., insurance companies) and individual consumers.
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 335 F.Supp. 2d 1336, 1342 fn 5,
(S.D. Fla. 2004).
597

Valley Drug also named Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., now known as Ivax pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Zenith”) in
its complaint alleging substantially similar Sherman Act
violations. That case settled for $2,072,327 plus interest.
This settlement was finally approved by the Court on June 13,
2002.
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Plaintiffs argued that this agreement blocked the introduction
of generic versions of Hytrin, which “resulted in reduced
output, artificially inflated prices, and eliminated
competition in the market for terazosin hydrochloride.”598
Plaintiffs sought damages for the financial loss incurred by
direct purchasers of Hytrin who paid inflated prices while
entry of the generic versions of the drug was delayed by the
agreement between Geneva and Abbot.
On December 13, 2000, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida granted Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment holding that the agreement between
defendants Geneva and Abbot was a per se violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act.

The court concluded that the agreement

essentially allocated the entire United States market for
terazosin drugs to Abbot.599

This ruling was reversed by the

11th circuit as “premature” and remanded to the district court
to consider the exclusionary scope of the patent before making
any determination.600

On January 5, 2005, the district court

598

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352
F.Supp. 2d at 1287.

599

Id. at 1292.

600

Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1304 (11th Cir. 2003). In reversing the District Court’s
Ruling, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d
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ruled on multiple motions for summary judgment filed by
parties on both sides of the litigation.

The district court

again granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this
issue holding that the agreement exceeded the exclusionary
rights Abbot enjoyed as a result of the patent it held on
terazosin hydrochloride not due to expire until 2014 and that
in light of this, the agreement was indeed a per se violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The Direct Purchaser Class

settled with Geneva and Abbot for $72.5 million the following
month.
Class Counsel spent more than 51,000 hours over the
course of six years litigating this case, not including the
pre-complaint investigation. The litigation involved obtaining
admissible testimony from witnesses, working with experts,
conducting market research and analysis, several rounds of
motions for summary judgment and class certification and a

896 (6th Cir. 2003). In Cardizem, the court held that a
similar agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
adding that “[i]t is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly
that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing
altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting
competition by paying the only potential competitor $40
million per year to stay out of the market.") Id. at 908. In
Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit responded that “[w]hen the
exclusionary power of a patent is implicated, however, the
antitrust analysis cannot ignore the scope of the patent
exclusion.” Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311. However, not
withstanding the Valley Drug opinion, on remand the District
Court did find the agreement to be a per se violation. In re
Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F.Supp 2d. 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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complex and protracted discovery process.

Class Counsel’s

significant investment of time and resources resulted in a
substantial settlement – 40% to 60% of the direct purchasers’
total loss601 – on February 24, 2005.

The court granted Class

Counsel their requested fees in the amount of one third of the
settlement proceeds, plus interest and $3,133,070.86 in
expenses.602

The remaining settlement funds will be

distributed pro-rata, reimbursing class members603 for the
difference between the price they actually paid for terazosin

601

Sherman Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorneys’
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Incentive Awards for the
Named Plaintiffs and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support Thereof, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, MDL 1317 at page 15, submitted April 6, 2005
(S.D..Fla. 2005).
602

Including the Zenith settlement, supra n. 5, for $2,072,327
the total recovery in this litigation was $74,572,327. The
proceeds of the Zenith settlement are being applied to the
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses only. Class Counsel
are not seeking attorney’s fees from the Zenith settlement.
The Judge also approved incentive awards for the named
plaintiffs “[i]n light of their six years of service on behalf
of the class.” In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, Case No. 99-1317 MDL, Order and Final Judgment, pg
11, ln 27, Apr. 19, 2005. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc.
was awarded $45,000 and Valley Drug Co. was awarded $30,000.
Id.
603

Ultimately the class was defined as all purchasers of both
brand name and generic drugs who also purchased terazosin
hydrochloride directly from Abbot at any time during the
period commencing March 31, 1998 when Geneva obtained FDA
approval to sell its generic version of terazosin
hydrochloride until the illegal agreements were terminated on
August 13,1999.
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during the period that generic competition was illegally
delayed and the price they would have paid if a generic
version of the drug was available.

District Court Judge

Patricia A. Seitz approved the final settlement on April 15,
2005 noting the quality of the advocacy and that “this is a
case in which I think justice was accomplished by a
settlement”604 and said that the relationship that counsel had
with the class members combined with the fact that there were
no objections to the settlement was “a testament to the great
clientmanship that [Class Counsel] provided.”605
In addition to obtaining a substantial monetary award for
direct purchasers who overpaid for terazosin hydrochloride,
Plaintiffs’ success in this litigation will benefit consumers
in the future.

In particular, the district court’s

determination, on remand, that the agreement between Abbot and
Geneva was a per se violation of the Sherman Act will
discourage other brand name drug manufacturers from using such
agreements to delay or prevent generic competition, helping to
reduce national healthcare costs by keeping prescription drugs
competitively priced.
604

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, Case
No. 99-1317 MDL, Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before Hon.
Patricia A . Seitz at pg 15 ln 6-7, April 15, 2005.

605

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, Case
No. 99-1317 MDL, Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before Hon.
Patricia A . Seitz at pg 15 ln17-18, April 15, 2005.
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Transamerican Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp., et al., No.
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 1988)(Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust Litigation)(1992 settlement)

Summary: This case is noteworthy because: 1) It resulted in a
$50 million settlement in 1992; 2) The Court awarded 30%
attorney’s fees; 3) All of the overcharged victims were
American businesses; and 4) The private action was a follow-up
to a federal enforcement action that involved a large
nationwide class action slightly broader in its scope than the
federal suits that were brought.606

This litigation began as a result of a task force that
the federal government appointed to investigate the sale of
pipe to the Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”) in
Seattle.607

Apparently this investigation was sparked by the

closing of several public power projects. Numerous suits
involving securities fraud and contract matters were filed
606

The private action spanned a time frame of 1966-1985. The
federal cases alleged activity no earlier than 1974 and no
later than 1987, with many cases spanning only a few years
Aff. Of Lynn Lincoln Sarko in Support of Pls’ Mot. For Class
Cert. Re: Summary of Crim. Procs. Ex. 2. Parallel Crim. Procs.
In Re Spec. Steel Antitrust Litig. Pgs. 1-5. Transamerican
Refining Corp., et. al. v. Dravo Corp., et. al., No.
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 1988)(Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust Litigation).
607

Dravo and others Settle Pipe Price-Fixing Suit, 228 ENGR.
NEWS-RECORD 14 (Apr. 6, 1992)(Available in 1992 WLNR 1682774).
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against the WPPSS due to the failure of these nuclear power
projects. There was much public interest in their completion
because it was hoped that they would provide an economical
energy supply to Washington residents.608
As a result, a price-fixing scheme was uncovered by
the WPPSS Task Force of the Justice Department, the
Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.609 From 1986-1988, numerous corporations
and their officers were criminally charged with price fixing
schemes. The alleged mastermind, Gerald Profita, president and
CEO of Shaw Corporation, Inc., plead
guilty and received a jail sentence of eight years plus a
$25,000 fine.610

608

Per telephone conversation with Mark Griffin, Esq, Partner
at Keller Rohrback in Seattle, Washtington. He was a co-lead
in the Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation.
609

Dravo and others Settle Pipe Price-Fixing Suit, 228 ENGR.
NEWS-RECORD 14 (Apr. 6, 1992)(Available in 1992 WLNR 1682774).

610

Aff. Of Lynn Lincoln Sarko in Support of Pls’ Mot. For
Class Cert. Re: Summary of Crim. Procs. Ex. 2. Parallel Crim.
Procs. In Re Spec. Steel Antitrust Litig. Pgs. 1-5.
Transamerican, No. 4:88CV00789 (Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10,
1988)(Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation). The
government’s “star” witness, Shaw Co.’s manager of purchasing
from 1976-1985, W. Robert Short, was found guilty of violating
the Sherman Act and received a jail sentence of three years
plus a fine of $11,000. Id. at Pg 21,22. Two other main
participants included the president and vice president of
Standard Pipe & Supply Company Inc., Daniel Petrone and Allan
Miller. Both plead guilty and received a jail sentence of two
222

This suit, filed on March 10, 1988, arose out of an
alleged conspiracy to illegally fix the price of specialty
steel piping materials sold under cost-plus arrangements
throughout the United States between 1966 and 1985.611 The
class of Plaintiffs, numbering approximately 6,000, consisted
of refineries, and other buyers who purchased the specialty
steel piping material on a cost-plus basis. There were thirty
one defendants representing the sellers of the specialty steel
piping material.612

Plaintiffs’ counsel successfully defeated

several motions to dismiss based on plaintiffs’ failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and lack of
proper pendent jurisdiction.613

years each. Id. Many others received lesser prison sentences
and fines. Id.
611

“The manufacturers or distributors, as suppliers of
specialty steel piping, allegedly made arrangements with
pipe fabricators to quote an inflated price on steel which
was to be resold by the pipe fabricators on a cost-plus
basis. It is alleged that the supplier and fabricator later
divided the price differential through payments or
credits.” Transamerican Refining Corp., et al. v. Dravo Corp.,
et al. Available in 1990 WL 122228, 1990-2 Trade Cases P 69,
127,1 (S.D.Tex. June 22, 1990)(No.CIV. A. H-88-789). “Some
defendants allegedly marked up the cost of
the pipe by about 25% and kicked back a portion to the
fabricators”, said Lynn L. Sarko, an attorney for the
plaintiffs. Dravo and others Settle Pipe Price-Fixing Suit,
228 ENGR. NEWS-RECORD 14 (Apr. 6, 1992)(Available in 1992 WLNR
1682774).
612

Id.

613

Transamerican, Available in 1990 WL 122228, 1990-2 Trade
Cases P 69, 127 (S.D.Tex. June 22, 1990) and Transamerican
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The case settled in 1992 for about $50 million.614
Attorneys fees of 30% were awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel in
addition to reimbursement of costs.615

Refining Corp., et al. v. Dravo Corp., et al. Available in
1991 WL 261765, (S.D.Tex. Oct. 29, 1991)(No.CIV.A.H-88-789).
614

Of the thirty one defendants, Allied Signal, Inc.
paid the largest single settlement of $14,000,000.00Adam
Goodman, LaBarge Settles Antitrust Case, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (SAT. FIVE-STAR ED.) 9C (Aug. 8, 1992)(Available in
1992 WLNR 509337). 614 See attached in its entirety as Exhibit
1 the Notice of Class Notice and Proposed Partial Settles.,
Attachment A. Transamerican, No. 4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex.
Mar.10,1988)(Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation).
Pullman Power Products and Resco Holdings Inc., paid
7,300,000.00. See attached in its entirety as Exhibit 2 the
Notice of Hearing on Proposed Partial Settles. of Class
Actions and Application for Interim Award of Counsel Fees and
Expenses, Attachment A. Transamerican, No.
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar.10,1988)(Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust Litigation) as Exhibit 2. Dravo settled the suit
for $6,000,000.00. Id. Crane Company was one of the last defendants to
settle for $5,300,000.00. See attached in its entirety as Exhibit 3 the
Notice of Hearing on Proposed Partial Settle. of Class Actions;

Application for Award of Counsel Fees and Expenses; Proposed
Plan of Distrib; Verified Proof of Claim Form; and Claim Proc.
at 2.
615

Id. at 3. . Transamerican, No. 4:88CV00789(Docket)
(S.D.Tex. Mar.10,1988)(Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust
Litigation).
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In re: Urethane Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1616, 232 F.R.D.
681 (D. Kan. 2005).
Summary: The urethane litigation is noteworthy because: 1) It
started when the DOJ discovered a conspiracy involving
polyester polyols (Chemical 1), for which defendants paid a
criminal fine; 2) Counsel for the direct purchaser class filed
a follow-on suit, involving a longer conspiracy period, which
secured an $18 million settlement from one defendant, Bayer.
The case against the other defendant is still pending; 3)
While pursuing the case against Chemical 1, plaintiffs’
counsel brought suit alleging another conspiracy involving a
related chemical, polyether polyols (Chemical 2); 4)
Plaintiffs in the Chemical 2 class action, again the direct
purchasers, secured a $55.3 million settlement from one
defendant, Bayer, and the cases against the other defendants
are still pending; and 5) Both settlements received so far,
$73.3 million, were from the wholly owned subsidiary of a
foreign corporation.
Polyurethane (urethane) is an elastic type of rubber
produced by either a polyester polyol (Chemical 1) or a
polyether polyol (Chemical 2).616

616

The Chemical 1 case began

Polyester polyols “are used to manufacture a variety of
foam-based products such as packaging, automobile air filters,
sound-deadening materials, and furniture as well as non-foam
products such as certain coatings and adhesives.” In re
Urethane Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 440, 443 (D. Kan. Aug.
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after a U.S. government investigation revealed an unlawful
price-fixing conspiracy between Bayer Corp., a U.S. subsidiary
of Bayer AG, and Crompton Corp., now known as Chemtura Corp.617
In March 2004, Crompton issued a press release stating that it
was being granted amnesty for participating in the
investigation.618

Nearly a month later, a private follow-on

case ensued, as the first Chemical 1 case was brought by
direct purchasers.619

In August 2004, the U.S. District Court

for the District of Kansas consolidated the Chemical 1 cases
into the In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation.

Plaintiffs

alleged that Bayer and Crompton fixed prices between January
1, 1998 and December 31, 2004.
The Chemical 2 case arose out of an investigation by a
private law firm in Fall 2003, which was actually before any
of the Chemical 1 cases were filed.

Apparently, the private

16, 2006). Polyether polyols are softer and more elastic, and
are usually used to make spandex and soft rubber parts.
617

Bayer Unit to Pay $33 Mln Fine, Plead to Price Fixing; see
<http://www.cbgnetwork.org/296.html (Sept. 30, 2004)>.
618

Crompton Corp., Crompton Announces Agreements in U.S. and
Canadian Rubber Chemicals Investigations, BusinessWire (2004);
see < http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=
68079&p=irol-newsArticle_Print&ID=547653&highlight=>.
619

Per telephone conversation with Christopher J. Cormier,
Esq., of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. in
Washington, D.C (Jan. 12, 2007). This law firm is co-lead
counsel in the Chemical 2 cases.
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plaintiffs wanted to see if either the investigation or
lawsuit involving Chemical 1 would include Chemical 2.

When

they saw that it did not, then they chose to pursue the
Chemical 2 case.620

The named defendants in this suit are

Bayer, BASF, The Dow Chemical Company, Lyondell Chemical
Company, and Huntsman International LLC.

These defendants

control 75% of the Chemical 2 market and 100% of two other
markets closely related to Chemical 2.621
The suit alleges that these defendants consistently
announced and implemented price increases at the same or
similar times between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2004,
and the complaint offered four specific periods describing in
detail each defendant’s involvement.622

Plaintiffs allege that

these price increases cannot be explained by changes in the
price of raw materials or by changes in demand, and that the
defendants participated in secret meetings and conversations
during which they agreed to fix prices and allocate

620

Pl. Coordination Req. at 4-5, In re Urethane Antitrust
Litig., 237 F.R.D. 440 (D. Kan. August 22, 2005).

621

These markets are the methylene dyphenyldiisocyanate (MDI)
and toluene diisocyanate (TDI) markets.
622

In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1280
(D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2006).
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customers.623

In June 2005, these cases were coordinated with

the Chemical 1 cases.624
On September 30, 2004, Bayer agreed to plead guilty to
charges of participating in a criminal conspiracy to fix
Chemical 1 prices between 1998 and 2002, and to pay a criminal
fine of $33 million.

Note that the private suit alleged

overcharges between 1998 and 2004, which encompassed two years
more than the government suit.625
The government began an investigation on Chemical 2
price-fixing in February 2006.

Defendants of the private suit

were issued subpoenas from the DOJ seeking information
relating to the manufacture and sale of Chemical 2, MDI and
TDI.

Because of the timing of the investigation, we believe

that it stemmed from the private suit.
In August and October 2006, the court approved
settlements with Bayer releasing the company from liability in
the two private suits.

623

Bayer agreed to pay $55.3 million to

Id. at 1279.

624

Because of the arguably differing nature between the
Chemical 1 and Chemical 2, the court elected not to
consolidate the two groups of cases, but rather consolidate
each individually, and the two sets of cases would proceed on
separate tracks for scheduling purposes.
625

Notice of Class Action Settle. with Bayer and Fairness Hrg.
at 1, In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 440 (D. Kan.
June 13, 2006).
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Chemical 2 plaintiffs, and $18 million to Chemical 1
plaintiffs.

These have been the only settlements thus far,

and the cases against the other defendants are still
ongoing.626
In granting preliminary approval of the Bayer settlement
for Chemical 2, the Honorable John W. Lungstrom praised the
private plaintiffs’ attorneys, stating that “these law firms
have performed extensive work identifying and investigating
the potential claims in this action, have ample experience
handling cases similar to this one, have demonstrated adequate
knowledge of the applicable law, will devote adequate
resources to representing the class, and have done a
commendable job thus far prosecuting the polyether polyol
plaintiffs’ claims.”627

Attorneys’ fees have not been awarded

yet for either case.628

626

The Chemical 1 cases have finished class discovery and are
currently in merits discovery. The Chemical 2 cases are still
in class discovery. Per e-mail conversation with Christopher
J. Cormier, Esq., of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll,
P.L.L.C. in Washington, D.C (Dec. 28, 2006).
627

T.R.O. Hrg. Transcr. at 18, In re Urethane Antitrust
Litigation, 237 F.R.D. 440 (D. Kan. March 27, 2006).

628

Per e-mail conversation with Christopher J. Cormier, Esq.,
of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. in Washington,
D.C (Dec. 28, 2006).
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In Re: Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, a/k/a WalMart Stores, Inc. et. al v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. and MasterCard
International Inc., 396 F. 3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).

Summary: This case is unusually noteworthy because: 1. It
resulted in payments to victims that had a present value of
$3.383 billion in cash, the largest settlement in antitrust
history (in fact, it was “the largest settlement ever approved
by a federal court”629.); 2. It also resulted in significant
injunctive relief that the court valued at “$25 to $87 billion
or more”630; 3. It did not involve a classic “hard core”
conspiracy, but rather involved a number of complex Section 1
and Section 2 allegations; and 4. The awarded attorneys fees
were only 6.5% of the monetary recovery, and were far less
than 1% of the total value that the Court ascribed to the
combination of the monetary recovery and injunctive relief.631

On October 25, 1996, a class of approximately 5 million
merchants, including Wal-Mart, Sears, and Safeway, sued Visa
and MasterCard for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. “First, plaintiffs claimed that the
629

See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297
F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
630

Id.

631

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al., v Visa USA & MasterCard
International, 396 F. 3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).
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defendants’ ‘Honor All Cards’ policy, which forced merchants
who accepted Visa and MasterCard credit cards to accept Visa
and MasterCard debit cards, was an illegal ‘tying arrangement’
that violated Section One of the Sherman Act.

Second,

plaintiffs alleged that defendants used their Honor All Cards
policy in conjunction with other anti-competitive conduct to
monopolize the debit card market, in violation of Section Two
of the Sherman Act.

As a consequence, plaintiffs claimed that

they incurred supra-competitive ‘interchange fees’ ... during
every debit and credit transaction made between October 1992
and June 2003.”632
Although the DOJ began its preliminary investigation into
antitrust violations by Visa and MasterCard in December of
1993,633 that investigation focused primarily on alleged
duality and exclusionary conduct, resulting in the U.S. v.
Visa litigation.

That case established the relevant market,

but as the district court noted, the Plaintiffs here “did not
benefit from any previous or simultaneous government
litigation....”634

632

Instead, “the Government piggybacked off of

Id. at 100.

633

U.S. v. Visa, Civil Action No. 98-7076 (BSJ) (S.D.N.Y.), Declaration of Mary Jean
Moltenbrey, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2100/2188.pdf.

634

In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297 F.Supp.2d at 523.
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plaintiffs’ counsel’s work,”635 filing a motion to participate
in the distribution of the private settlement.

Moreover,

class counsel petitioned the FTC, numerous state Attorneys
General, and the DOJ to enjoin the conduct alleged in
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which “contributed to the filing of the
[DOJ’s] suit against Visa and MasterCard roughly two years
after In re Visa Check was initiated.”636
The litigation was complex and lasted for years.

During

proceedings spanning almost a decade, more than 400 lawyers
and paralegals, led by Constantine, Cannon, P.C., litigated on
behalf of plaintiffs, obtaining class certification, winning a
motion for summary judgment and defeating defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.

The parties settled on the eve of

trial. “Counsel for the class took and defended approximately
400 depositions, including 21 expert depositions, and reviewed
more than 5 million pages of documents....”637 The quantity and
quality of this effort, the difficulty of the legal issues
involved, and the spectacular results obtained, underlay the

635

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al., v Visa USA & MasterCard
International, 396 F.3d at 122.

636

Id., Brief of Appellees/Class Representatives in Response to Brief of Appellant Nucity
Publications, Inc. at 11.
637

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al., v Visa USA & MasterCard
International, 396 F.3d at 111.
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Court’s decision to award $220 million in legal fees (the
above-mentioned 6.5% of the monetary recovery alone).638
The case was settled in April 2003 for “$3.383,400,000 in
compensatory relief, plus additional injunctive relief valued
at $25 to $87 billion or more."639

Under the terms of the

settlement, Visa will pay slightly more than $2 billion to the
merchants and MasterCard will pay slightly more than $1
billion. Both firms also agreed to implement a wide variety of
injunctive relief.

For example, they agreed to significantly

lower their charges for debit transactions on August 1, 2003.
This saved merchants more than $1 billion from August 2003 to
April 2004 alone. On January 1, 2004, merchants in the United
States gained the freedom to choose to accept Visa and
MasterCard debit products based upon their quality, speed,
safety and price. They are no longer forced by the
associations' rules to accept debit cards if they take credit
cards. Not surprisingly, the District Court judge in the case
characterized the injunctive relief as of “substantial”
value.640

638

Id. at 114.

639

Id. at 111.

640

See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297
F. Supp. 2d 503, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Judge John Gleeson granted final approval of the
settlements and the plan of allocation on December 19, 2003.
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed this decision on
January 4, 2005. Distributions to class member merchants from
the settlement fund will be made soon.

In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation (many related cases)

This series of more than 100 related cases is historic
because: 1. Settlements in total resulted in approximately
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$4.2 to $5.6 billion being returned to overcharged U.S.
purchasers of vitamins and related products641, the largest
total for any related series of antitrust cases in history; 2.
Of this, between $3.7 billion and $5.1 billion was returned to
direct purchasers; 3. Of this total, an additional $500
million was returned to indirect purchasers; 4. Almost all of
the private vitamins cases settled.

A jury in the only

vitamins case that went to verdict, a separate conspiracy
involving choline chloride, decided that the cartel had
overcharged purchasers by approximately $49.5 million, e.g. a
61% price rise; 5. It has been estimated that on average
prices increased by approximately 15% to 80% for the 16
different vitamins that were cartelized, with an average
overcharge of 43.7%. 6. Of the amounts paid to U.S.
purchasers, more than 99%, or $4.2 to $5.6 billion, was paid
by foreign cartel members; 7. Although the precise sequence of
events is not without controversy, it appears that much and
perhaps all of the crucial original discovery of the illegal
behavior was made by private counsel; 8. These cases also
resulted in criminal fines of approximately $915 million by
the U.S. enforcers and approximately $946 million by the

641

Unless noted, all of the empirical estimates in this
Section are from John M. Connor, “The Great Global Vitamins
Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence,” Draft of 2/14/06,
available at www.antitrustinstitute.org
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European Union and other foreign enforcers; 9. A number of
defendants went to jail; 10. Because of the huge number of
separate vitamins cases, we are not able to estimate precisely
the average percentage of the refunds that went to class
counsel in the form of legal fees.

However, one source

estimates that on average the legal fees were no more than 10%
of the settlements, while another source lists the percentage
for the indirect purchaser cases at 14%.
It is difficult to determine the exact origin of these
cases: who first discovered the first evidence of, or enough
hard evidence to prove the existence of, the vitamins
cartels642.

Cause-and effect is especially difficult to

determine because the “vitamins cartels” actually consisted of
16 different cartels with partially overlapping memberships
that, generally speaking, fell into two major groups.

Some of

the earliest indications that one or more vitamins markets
might have been cartelized, moreover, did not seem fruitful
and were not pursued vigorously by the government enforcers,
but were later re-opened and pursued and led to strong
evidence of collusion.

642

We attempted to find an public
the vitamins cases that written by
Antitrust Division but could not.
version contained in this document
its accuracy or completeness.
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account of the origin of
the Department of Justice
When we sent them the
they would not comment on

David Boies relates that one of his partners uncovered
evidence that Roche was discussing prices with its
competitors.643

Boies and his colleagues investigated, and by

May 1997 had found evidence consistent with collusion.

They

then found more evidence, and by December 1997 decided they
had enough to file suit.

But first they gave their

information to the Antitrust Division.

Boies says that his

firm uncovered and ultimately proved the collusion "without
the benefit of government involvement."644

Professor John

Connor presents a more complicated analysis of the events, but
ultimately also gives these private counsel credit for
uncovering the first solid evidence of collusion.645

As will

643

David Boies, Courting Justice (2004) at 226-30. Another
source said this evidence was uncovered while he was in the
course of preparing a patent-infringement suit. John M Connor,
“The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and
Deterrence,” Draft of 2/14/06, at 26, available at
www.antitrustinstitute.org
644

David Boies, Courting Justice (2004) at 230.

645

"U.S. investigators first got wind of the vitamins cartel
and Roche's role in it in late 1996 from sources at ADM
cooperating with the DOJ in its investigation of the citric
acid cartel ..." As a result the FBI interviewed Dr. Kumo
Sommer, the head of Roche's Vitamins division, in March 1997.
"Sommer denied the existence of any vitamins cartel and the
DOJ apparently decided to wind down its investigation for the
meanwhile...[However, in] "late 1997 a partner of the law firm
of Boies & Schiller...." presented the DOJ with evidence that
a conspiracy was occurring. John M Connor, “The Great Global
Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence,” Draft of
2/14/06, at 25-26, available at www.antitrustinstitute.org
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be seen infra, this perspective is confirmed by the defendants
themselves. However, many of the details of the Department of
Justice investigation are non-public, and it is clear that
both private counsel and the U.S. Department of Justice were
on parallel tracks and discovered much of the critical
evidence at around the same time, and that the investigation
of each helped that of the other.
Class counsel filed the first Vitamins Complaint in March
1998, on behalf of a class of direct purchasers.

They alleged

that as early as 1990 and continuing into 1998, Defendants646
conspired to fix prices, allocate markets, and engage in other
collusive conduct with respect to certain vitamins, vitamin
premixes and other bulk vitamin products.647
Following this complaint, the full dimensions of the
Defendants’ conspiratorial conduct began to become known.

In

March 1999, the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice announced that Defendant Lonza AG had
pleaded guilty to violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act for

646

The defendants were F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., Rhone-Poulenc S.A., Rhodia, Inc., BASF AG, and
BASF Corporation.
647

Class Counsel uncovered Defendants’ illegal
conspiratorial conduct before any grand jury investigation
became public, before guilty pleas began to be entered in
1999, before federal cooperation agreements became public, and
before any Defendant confessed to any wrongdoing.
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fixing the price of vitamin B3 (niacin), and that Defendant
Chinook Group Ltd., certain of its executives and certain
executives of non-settling Defendant DuCoa, LP, had pleaded
guilty to violating Section 1 for fixing the price of vitamin
B4 (choline chloride).648
It is clear that Class Counsel significantly contributed
to the discovery of this illegal activity. At the May 21, 1999
press conference in Basel, Switzerland announcing the Roche
guilty pleas, Hoffman-La Roche’s CEO, Franz Humer, explained
how it was the early 1998 class action lawsuit (and not a
government investigation) that prompted a new internal
investigation that caused Roche to terminate its
conspiratorial conduct and begin to cooperate with the
government:
In 1997, responding to the settlement in the
citric acid case and to the news of an
investigation of the bulk vitamins industry,
Roche initiated an internal inquiry of its own,
which at the time did not turn any evidence of
wrongdoing. A second internal inquiry prompted
by class action lawsuits filed against Roche
and other companies in early 1998 for alleged
price-fixing
in
the
bulk
vitamins
market
revealed that further action was needed.
The
inquiry was carried out in collaboration with
US experts. Internal measures were implemented
without delay to ensure an immediate halt to
any antitrust violations.
The findings from
648

Two months later, Defendant F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.
pled guilty and BASF AG agreed to plead guilty to fixing the
prices of various vitamins products.
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this second inquiry formed the basis for
Roche’s decision to offer, on 1 March this
year, its full cooperation in the US Justice
Department investigation.649
As part of the cooperation prompted by lawsuits filed by
Class Counsel, Roche employees interviewed by the U.D.
Department of Justice implicated other conspiracy participants
– including several of the Settling Vitamin Products
Defendants – and provided substantial information about the
duration and scope of the price-fixing conspiracy.

The facts

detailed in these interviews regarding conspiratorial conduct
in the vitamins industry were subsequently relied on by Roche
in preparing its written Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 30(b)(6)
statement, which described Roche’s view of the scope of the
conspiracy.650

Roche’s Rule 30(b)(6) statement, which

implicated other conspirators, placed substantial settlement
pressure on the Settling Vitamin Products Defendants.

649

See Exh. 9 to Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Niacin and Biotin
Defendants, at 3.
650

As described by the Special Master, the Roche Rule
30(b)(6) statement “at 101 pages, the longest of the
statements, contains charts listing the date and location of
events or meetings for particular vitamins, participants and
the companies they represented, the vitamins products
discussed, and additional details about the meetings.”
Special Master’s Report & Recommendation, dated August 8,
2002, at 11. [Verilaw No. 11362.)
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During this period, as a result of additional
investigation and discovery, Class Counsel added several
Defendants to the all-vitamins Complaint,651 and also filed a
separate Complaint that alleged a conspiracy relating only to
choline chloride.652

These and subsequent complaints have

resulted in a large number of settlements.653 Plaintiffs also
pursued their investigation of price-fixing654 in the choline

651

These defendants included Hoechst Marion Roussel; Takeda
Industries, Ltd., Takeda Vitamin & Food USA, Inc., and Takeda
U.S.A., Inc.; Eisai Co., Ltd., Eisai U.S.A., Inc., and Eisai
Inc.; Daiichi Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd., Daiichi Fine
Chemicals, Inc., and Daiichi Pharmaceuticals Corporation;
Merck KGaA and EM Industries, Inc.; Sumitomo Chemical Co.,
Ltd. and Sumitomo Chemical America, Inc.; Tanabe Seiyaku Co.,
Ltd. and Tanabe USA, Inc. (Sumitomo and Tanabe are referred to
collectively as the “Biotin Defendants”); Reilly Industries,
Inc. and Reilly Chemicals, S.A.; Lonza Group Ltd., Lonza Inc.
and Lonza AG; Degussa AG and Degussa Corp.; and Nepera, Inc.
(Lonza, Degussa, Nepera and Reilly are referred to
collectively as the “Niacin Defendants”).
652

They named as Defendants Akzo; UCB Chemicals; Chinook
Group, Ltd., Chinook Group, Inc., and Cope Investments, Ltd.;
Bioproducts, Inc. (United States company), Mitsui & Co.
U.S.A., Inc., and Mitsui & Co. Ltd.; and various individual
Defendants.
653

For example, on November 3, 1999, Class Plaintiffs reached
a settlement with the Hoffman-La Roche, BASF, Rhone-Poulenc,
Hoechst, Takeda, Eisai and Daiichi Defendants regarding those
Defendants’ sales of bulk vitamin products, and with the BASF
Defendants regarding their sales of Choline Chloride (the
“Initial Settlement”). See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
Misc. No. 99-197, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8931 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
2000), at *16
654

These settlements and agreements followed and preceded
several guilty pleas with government authorities. For
example, on March 1, 1999, DuCoa/DCV employees Lindell
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chloride industry, settled with some defendants, and reached
cooperation agreements with most individual Defendants. Two
defendant groups did not settle, however, and this case went
to verdict. The jury found that the Mitsui Defendants and the
DuCoa/DCV Defendants conspired to fix the price of choline
chloride (vitamin B4).

The jury also found that Class

Plaintiffs had been damaged in the amount of $49,539,234
(before trebling).655 After the trial, Class Plaintifs settled

Hilling, John “Pete” Fischer, and Antonio Felix, and Chinook
employees John Kennedy (formerly of Bioproducts) and Robert
Samuelson pled guilty to price fixing and market allocation of
choline chloride. On May 20, 1999, BASF AG pled guilty in the
United States to price fixing and market allocation of certain
vitamins, and on September 17, 1999, BASF AG pled guilty in
Canada to price fixing and market allocation of choline
chloride.
655

On the first day of the choline chloride trial (In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation -- Animal Science Products,
Inc., et al. v. Chinook Group, Ltd., et al.) between Class
Plaintiffs and the Mitsui and DuCoa/DCV Defendants, Chief
Judge Thomas Hogan stated in his opening remarks to the jury
pool that:
”[T]his is a very challenging and interesting case involving
what we call antitrust issues between the parties. That's
anticompetitive-type business issues involving, I think, some
of the finest business litigating lawyers or litigation-type
lawyers in the country that are before you that you will have
the privilege to listen to.” May 28, 2003 Trial Tr. at 25:16.
After the jury returned a verdict of $49.5 million in damages
for the Class Plaintiffs, Chief Judge Hogan thanked the jurors
for their service and stated:
”[T]his is a serious case, and you had the pleasure of having
very excellent lawyers on both sides appear before you.” June
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with the Mitsui Defendants for an amount greater than the
verdict and presently are engaged in post-judgment discovery
with the DuCoa and DCV Defendants.
Professor Connor estimates that on average the attorneys
received no more than 10% of the settlements in the form of
attorneys fees.656 A survey of 24 indirect purchaser class
action cases found that in all 24 cases the attorneys were
awarded a 14% fee, in addition to the total of $267 million
that was returned to overcharged purchasers.657 We have heard
anecdotes of fees in particular vitamins cases as high as 33%,
however, but are aware of no other average figures.

13, 2003 Trial Tr. at 1520:8-10.
656

John M. Connor, “The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy:
Sanctions and Deterrence,” Draft of 2/14/06, available at
www.antitrustinstitute.org
657

See Settlements of Indirect Purchaser Class Actions Under
State Law - September 30, 2005, submitted by Patrick E.
Cafferty to the Antitrust Modernization Commission.
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